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Education and the Constitution of the Subject: A History of the Present.

by
Peter William Harrison

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree:

Doctor of Education

University of Sheffield
School of Education
2013



**The
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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to examine the way the education system operates to constitute the subject. The thesis forges an understanding of this mechanism by utilising Foucauldian theoretical tools to facilitate an examination of how in different historical periods the subject has been constituted in different ways for different ends. This thesis is then a history of the relationship between governmental ontology and education. It is not a philosophy of education which seeks to create abstract aims; nor is it a history of education detached from the subject. Rather the thesis seeks to develop a historicised account of how the subject has been, and still is being, constituted by and through education.

Set within a genealogical methodological framework and utilising Foucauldian concepts such as *relations*, *division* and *technologies of power*, the thesis analyses the relationship between education and the constitution of the subject in a number of historical periods. This historical analysis forms the basis for 'a history of the present': a history which reveals the historical origins of some of the unquestioned assumptions on which our own modern understanding of education has been erected and, by so doing, destabilises them, makes them more transparent and open to critical questioning.

To this end, the thesis takes as its point of departure the end of the sixth century AD, when the constitution of the Christian subject dominated the shape of early English education. Persisting through until the Enlightenment, an understanding is developed of the way in which the arrival of modernity destabilised this position by challenging established knowledge and traditional forms of authority, giving rise to disagreement, argument and contestation about what, in a modern and 'enlightened' society, the aims of education should be.

The thesis explores how the Enlightenment promoted the expansion of the idea of education as a primary means for emancipating the subject from the past. But what it also reveals is how, whilst enlightenment ideals flourished, it was only the Church which had the infrastructure to develop mass schooling, something it used to reinforce the dogma of the past. The thesis then describes how, when state education eventually emerged during the nineteenth century it was both as a reaction to the threat of revolution, and a project to release the educational subject from the Church. To achieve this, state education cast the subject in new forms: the orderly and responsible citizen. The thesis then explores how the contemporary rhetoric of aspiration in education seeks to produce the responsible citizen by now obliging subjects to "produce the ends of government by fulfilling themselves rather than being merely obedient" (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 89).

The thesis draws on Foucauldian scepticism of progress throughout, arguing that not only is the modern concept of 'progress' inherently suspect, but also that fundamental changes to the constitution of the subject produced and enacted through education have more often been the result of political decay than the product of planned and progressive 'reforms'. In its final conclusion the thesis argues for greater recognition of the role education plays in constituting the subject, advocating further work to moderate, overthrow and transcend its effects.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction



Figure 1.1 | Goodall, John Strickland, (20th Century) *The History Lesson*, Private Collection, Watercolour on paper, Bridgeman Art Library (Image number: STC413077)

1.

1.1 WHAT IS EDUCATION?

Is education, not should it be, but is it, in its actuality, about trying to find the 'truth' about the human subject and the world he (sic) lives in – about allowing him to find himself, to discover or to interpret his own self? Or, is education about the formal construction of the individual, about making him into a certain kind of subject, about constituting him in a certain kind of way?

Are the children in this photograph on the way to being emancipated, on their way to having their minds awakened, becoming rational, autonomous beings; or are they on their way to being constructed into very certain kinds of subjects?



Figure P1: Harrison, P. (1987), *Schoolchildren on their way to St Thomas First School, Sydney Road, Exeter.*

My thesis seeks to explore these questions, to understand the extent to which the stated aims of education are played out in everyday practices. The thesis therefore seeks to recognise and contrast the promoted aims of education with its unacknowledged objectives and undisclosed effects.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO 'THE PROBLEM'.

The 1834 *Report from the Select Committee on the State of Education* came just one year after the first government expenditure on education was made. As part of the report's evidence, the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Brougham and Vaux, when asked if he had any further objections to a national system of education, said this:

There is one which would make me pause before I consented to it; suppose the funds were easily to be had, and no diminution to be apprehended from the interference of the Government, I not well perceive how such a system can be established without placing in the hands of the Government, that is of the Ministers of the day, the means of dictating opinions and principles to the people ...
(Brougham and Vaux, 1834 [1836])

Brougham, in other words, was asking the question, what right does the government have to determine what should be taught, and at the same time he was indirectly raising the questions of who should be taught, by whom and to what ends. Brougham was therefore asking, what right the government had to form opinions and influence the behaviours that are shaped by those opinions. He was therefore posing the question: what right does the government have to constitute the subject? The question that Brougham raises at the very start of government involvement in education is one which 180 years later is rarely heard. Today it is accepted that the government of the day determines the curriculum, and the means and the ends of mass schooling and education: interested parties lobby government in an attempt to shape the agenda but ultimately it is accepted that decision making rests with ministers.

1.3 WHY THIS IS A PROBLEM?

For me this is a problem. In the 180 years since Brougham's statement we have become conditioned to our conditions and we have lost sight of obvious observations: that schooling is compulsory; that through control of the curriculum the state controls what is taught; that long before the neoliberal agenda of the present, through compulsion, we have been made to be consumers of education and that consumption makes us into certain kinds of subjects.

Having lost sight of our current condition we are unable to see that present arrangements are a state controlled construction, such that these arrangements take on an *a priori* quality so deeply embedded that it becomes as if it is natural, an essential part of society and of the human condition. We then become unable to answer the Kantian/Foucauldian questions: What are we today? What are we in our actuality?, because we have lost sight of what we are, unable to see our own actuality. As Heidegger would suggest, we have now become so close to the practice of education, that what we are actually doing is often inaccessible to us (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 39).

Our inability to readily recognise that our present condition is constructed limits our ability to modify that condition, such that our efforts to improve education take place at a technical

level: we work at the level that seeks to get more learners to learn more things without proper challenge to what is taught, why we want it to be taught, and the extent to which formal schooling is required for it to be learnt.

Youdell (2011) identifies a number of different ways of viewing this challenge which are evident in both research and practice, and are useful here in helping to further articulate what this thesis is, and is not, about.

The thesis is not aimed at supporting policy reform in the general sense, in that it is not research which aims to support “organised lobbying or co-ordinated resistance over particularly policy initiatives” (Ibid, p.7). Neither is it research which is more specifically aimed at forms of recognition and rights for groups who are understood through various categorisations (social class, ethnicity, gender, race, disability, sexuality and so on), to be underrepresented, misrepresented or in some way treated unfairly by the education system. Examples of research of this genre, ‘identity politics’, argues for and against policies, but it does so from a position within the system. That is to say that such research challenges how the state categorises, constitutes and ‘treats’ the learner. In so doing there is a danger that it can reaffirm these categorisations and the state’s role in the process of categorising and constituting the learner. Whilst queer theory seeks to denaturalise categorisations and identify their existence only in discourse, the limited understanding of this theory outside of those who practice it can lead it to have the opposite effect. Examples of work in this genre, which typically draws on Foucault, include Toynton (2006) and O’Connell (2004).

At the same time the thesis is sympathetic, if not directly aligned towards radical politics which might be characterised as a form of political resistance that aims to overthrow the existing political order and replace it with another (for example attempts to replace capitalism with communism or neo-liberalism with Marxism). However my thesis resists adopting such a position in that it does not seek to argue in favour of one ideology over another, but rather it aims to support the elucidation of ideologies which exist and have existed in to support their further deconstruction in the future. In this way it shares some sympathy with work such as Althusser’s *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (1971 [2006]) without subscribing to the author’s communist ideals.

Instead the thesis aligns with a post-structural political perspective which “asks how power operates across [b]orders and spaces; how knowledge and power are joined together; how the self, or subject, is made or constrained in these conditions ... and how the assemblages of power, discourse, practice, representation and affect come together “ (Youdell, 2011, p. 24). In so doing it is sympathetic with post structural identity politics which problematises and challenges the ways in which subjects are constituted by the categories themselves (Youdell 2011, p22, Cornell 2010, Butler 1990, 1991). However my thesis does not attempt to foreground specific identifies or to theorize at this level of division, but rather seeks to develop an historicised account of how individuals are made subjects in general terms. In this sense it shares some of the objectives of Besley and Peters’ *Subjectivity and Truth: Foucault, Education,*

and the Culture of the Self (2007). However rather than focussing on theoretical concepts my thesis places a greater emphasis on the production of the subject in history, and rather than focussing on present conditions, my thesis aims to develop a history of the present through an examination of the past.

Through this history the thesis also shares some common aims with works such as, Andy Green's *Education and state formation : the rise of education systems in England, France, and the USA* (1954 [1990]), Wilfred Carr's, *Education and the Struggle for Democracy* (1996) and Boli, Ramirez and Meyer's *Explaining the Origins and Expansion of Mass Education* (1985). However, throughout my thesis remains clearly focussed on understanding the creation and expansion of education systems only in so far as they relate directly to a history of the present constitution of the subject.

Moreover my thesis takes on an anti-identity political frame of reference whereby it aims at understanding the relationship between education and the constitution of the subject at a level which sees the process as the site for resistance, rather than the places and spaces in which subjectivation occurs. It is therefore not aimed at identity recognition or direct policy reform, but it is instead aimed at supporting further understanding and theorizing about the relationship between education and the constitution of the subject.

1.4 THE AIM OF THESIS.

The aim of the thesis is then to explore this issue: to explore and elucidate the relationship between education and the constitution of the subject to facilitate further work which might provide new sources of critical challenge to the current education paradigm and its processes of constituting the subject. Agreeing with Fiske (1992) I therefore wish to assert that:

The individual is produced by nature, the subject by culture. Theories of the individual concentrate on differences between people and explain these differences as natural. Theories of the subject, on the other hand, concentrate on people's common experiences in a society as being the most productive way of explaining who (we think) we are ... we are each of us constituted as a subject in, and subject to ideology. The subject therefore is a social construction, not a natural one. (Fiske, 1992, pp. 216-217)

I therefore wish to consider that if the present condition is a construction, if it is neither neutral, natural or essential, then there must in the past be a time anterior to this construction, a time when there was a different set of arrangements. Equally, if the present condition is a construction then in the future we should expect there to be, at some point, a change, and a new set of conditions coming into play.

I wish to argue that if the different ways in which the state has constituted the subject in the past can be extracted and elucidated then it will render the present condition more visible. Moreover, if the transitions between one set of circumstances and another can be

understood, then it offers the potential for understanding how change might occur in the future. It might offer the potential to destabilise the present circumstances to offer the opportunity for change. When we arrive at this point and can envisage the potential for change it might then provide us the opportunity to consider in what ways we might wish to change – how we might wish to constitute ourselves – or, more fundamentally, to think about how we might go about the task of considering how we might want to constitute ourselves.

Breaking these aims down, a number of research questions begin to emerge:

1. In what way is the subject constituted?
In answering this question I am interested in analysing to what ends the subject constituted? I wish to identify the multiple intentions and aims of various sources of power such as the Church, sovereign, the state and subjects themselves, and alongside this to recognise how the subject is constituted in actuality. I want to identify if the subject is constituted for specific ends or if education supports him (sic) to interpret his own self.
2. How is the subject constituted?
In answering this question I want to analyse the mode of operation by which the subject comes to be constituted. How does the constitution of the subject become effected and what is the role of education in this.
3. What is the relationship between education and the constitution of the subject?
Answering this question through thesis, I aim to understand the extent to which it is the constitution of the subject that affects education, and/or the extent to which education affects the constitution of the subject. Through this I hope to recognise the extent to which education can be considered the site for its own transcendence. If the constitution of the subject is ultimately responsible for the aims of education in actuality, then seeking to change education will require us to challenge the constitution of the subject, rather than develop abstract aims of education through the philosophy of education.
4. How do fundamental changes to education and the constitution of the subject occur?
Through this question I want to examine the extent to which changes to the constitution of the subject and the development of the education system have been the result of progressive policy development or the result of contingent turns in history and the process of political decay.

1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK - FOUCAULT AND THE THESIS.

When in 1784 Kant asked, Was heisst Aufklärung?, he meant, What's going on just now? What's happening to us? What is this world, this period, this precise moment in which we are living?

Or in other words: What are we? as Aufklärer, as part of the Enlightenment? Compare this with the Cartesian question: Who am I? I, as a unique but universal and unhistorical subject? I, for Descartes is every-one, anywhere at any moment? But Kant asks something else: What are we? in a very precise moment of history. Kant's question appears as an analysis of both us and our present. (Foucault M. , 1982, p. 785)

Foucault identifies this moment, the Enlightenment, as the moment when we can ask ourselves "What are we today?". "What are we in our actuality" (Foucault M. , 1988, p. 145). It is this moment that sets up and facilitates his work throughout his career. It is this moment which enables him to take on the historical analyses which characterize his work and through this approach to examine how the subject is constituted. It is therefore this moment which causes me to situate Foucault firmly and squarely at the centre of my thesis' methodology.

Foucault describes the importance of this moment to his work:

I would like to say, first of all what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty years. It has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects ... subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.

(Foucault M. , 1982) (Foucault M. , 1988, p. 145)

Prior to this moment, with Descartes, Foucault's analysis of the subject would have been ahistorical and would have led to a structural theorisation of the subject. However through Kant, Foucault is now able to take on a project which aims to show the differences in the ways in which human beings are made subject, and to demonstrate the contingent nature of the changes that occur.

Foucault's project, is then, dependent on the ushering in of modernism that came with the Enlightenment. According to Foucault, knowledge prior to this was based upon similitudes and resemblance. He identifies *Don Quixote* by Cervantes (1605) as marking the beginning of the end of this period by showing countless times the falsehood of similitudes and resemblances as a basis for knowledge. In its place measurement and order were marshalled by thinkers

such as Bacon. In Foucauldian terms, at this point a new *episteme*¹ arrives, with the task of representing things as accurately as possible.

In this the Classical age, nature/God is the maker. The world is made by nature/God and the role of man is to provide description to that which nature/God has made. According to Foucault man does this through observation achieved through sight. Man could not trust his other senses and even colour was too uncertain to count as knowledge. And so a black and white account, observed through sight, is described in language. But it was not man who filled the language with meaning. The meaning was already there, given by God. Man's role in constructing meaning could not be described because he played no part in it. As a consequence, in the Classical age the primary question is "how adequately a sign-system represents the nature of the world in terms of accurate depiction and universal veracity" (McNay, 1996, p. 57).

But when, with the Enlightenment, modernity is heralded in, meaning is no longer God given. It was now for man to provide meaning. Man becomes a subject in the sense of being an observer capable of constructing meaning. The radical break in the *episteme* which came at this time is characterised and made possible by Kant's 'Copernican' revolution. Kant sees that representation is a valid way of knowing but that not all thought and knowledge is representational. As Foucault notes: "the Kantian critique...marks the threshold of our modernity; it questions representation ... on the basis of its rightful limits." (Foucault M. , [1966] 2005, p. 263). Man's knowledge is no longer simply exterior to him. As the observer, knowledge is the product of man. This shift opened up new territories of knowledge which man sought to discover and make known. Whereas in the Classical age only observable objects could be known, now concepts and thoughts are being used as the basis for new domains of understanding.

It is at this point in history that:

Man, who was once himself a being among others, now is subject among objects. But Man is not only a subject among objects, he soon realizes that what he is seeking to understand is not only the objects of the world but himself. Man becomes the subject and the object of his own understanding. (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 28)

This shift, to man becoming both the subject and object of his own understanding, is what characterises Foucault's project. This is a project which seeks to identify how individuals are made subjects by forms of knowledge that are constructed, controlled and contested by man. This construction of knowledge about man gives rise to arbitrary sources of power whose aim

¹ Episteme is a term Foucault ([1966] 2005) used to describe the 'apparatus' which make it possible to say within a "field of scientificity" (1980) what is legitimate or illegitimate knowledge. In this instance measurement and order are the apparatus by which valid knowledge comes to be accepted.

is the control over the constitution of the subject, seeking to shape opinions, behaviours and conduct. As Gordon puts it:

...what Foucault finds most fascinating and disturbing in the history of Western governmental practice and its rationalities is the idea of a kind of power which takes freedom itself and the 'soul of the citizen' the life and life-conduct of the ethically free subject, as in some sense the correlative object of its own suasive capacity. (Gordon, 1991, p. 5)

And so in following Foucault, my thesis seeks to understand the role of education in constituting the subject. To understand in what ways the education system produces the constituted subject. To ask: what is the relationship between the constitution of the subject and education, how does one effect/affect the other and in what ways has this relationship changed? Through this I wish to better understand the present, to illuminate our current reality, to examine how pupils and students, that is to say all young people, are made subjects today.

1.6 MIS-RECOGNITION OF THE SUBJECT.

Writing a history of education and the constitution of the subject inevitably requires reference to the subject. In the English language such reference is gendered – his/her, she/he. The subject is however neither singularly male nor female, but universal or neutral. However, to refer to both the male and female with each reference to the subject makes for incongruous writing and reading, and so for the most part I shall therefore refer only to one gender.

Western, historical writing has been dominated by reference to the male subject, reflecting a position of women in society as subservient to men. The dominant constitution of the subject as male is a mis-recognition of the subject. To recognise, literally to re-know, requires first the construction of knowledge, and knowing the subject as male is a reflection of knowledge created in Christianity (Irigaray , 2005).

As Irigaray states:

A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of sexual difference is to take place. We need to reinterpret everything concerning the relations between the subject and discourse, the subject and the world ... Everything beginning with the way in which the subject has always been written in masculine form, as *man*, even when it claimed to be universal or neutral. (Irigaray , 2005, p. 8)

In my thesis I adopt this misrecognition up until the female subject begins to be recognised once more. Without wishing to make claim as to a definitive historical moment at which this occurs, in my thesis I mark this point with the publishing of Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792). From this point forward, when not referring to earlier historical conditions, I refer to the subject as female to counter the earlier historical position.




Figure 1.2 | Artist Unknown, (1964), *School Teacher*, from *Teddy Bear* (1964), Private Collection, Gouache on paper.
Bridgeman Art Library (Image number: LAL301946)

CHAPTER 2

Methodological Approach




Figure 2.1 | Kendall, Dinah Roe, (1994), *One of three samples for Sheffield University; Michel Foucault (1926-84), French philosopher*, Private Collection, Pencil on paper.

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2.

2.1 INTRODUCTION.

The aim of this chapter is to set out the broad ‘methodological approach’ I use in my thesis and to outline the ‘methods’ and tools I employ to conduct my analysis. The chapter situates the thesis in relation to Foucault’s work, outlines my interpretation of it, and sets out how I use it to conduct the research.

The chapter starts by recognising the thesis as part of a broad set of governmentality studies and how Foucault’s historical perspectives (*archaeology* and *genealogy*) serve as the overarching methodological approach to the thesis. The chapter then continues by looking more specifically at tools Foucault developed and used in his analyses. At the end of the chapter I bring this together to form a grid for undertaking the analysis.

2.2 ON GOVERNMENTALITY.

Brougham’s statement, that he could not ‘well perceive’ how an education system could be established “without placing in the hands of the Government and its Ministers, the means of dictating opinions and principles to the people” (1834 [1836]), came as the concept of population as we understand it today began to appear. With it, a new reason of state emerged, and a new mode of government began to develop, one which undertook “to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to them” (Foucault M. , 1977-1978 [2009], p. 68). Foucault sought to identify this mode of governing: its logic of practices, its systems, its mode of operation, and the forms of its institutions. As he did so Foucault made clear that government is not synonymous with the state. In Foucault’s terms government is the governing of conduct which may be undertaken by a number of different authorities: the sovereign, the church, the state, oneself (Foucault, 1980, p. 87), but which he argues, has, over the past two centuries, increasingly come to be dominated by the state. In this period government has become the:

... ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population ... resulting on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and on the

other, in the development of a whole complex of *savoirs*.” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 102-103)

It is through this ‘ensemble’, and by these ‘savoirs’, that the subject comes to be constituted. In the study of the different forms of government that has followed this mode of analysis, the term ‘governmentality’ has come to denote the different ways in which the population is regulated, ordered, managed and administered by the state. Governmentality then is “understood in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour. Government of children, government of souls and consciences, government of a household, of a state, or of oneself” (Foucault, 1979-80 [1997], p. 82). Governmentality studies explore how the “regularities of everyday existence that structure the ‘conduct of conduct’¹ [ultimately give] expression to distinct historical epochs characterised by particular arts of government or governmentalities” (Nadesan, 2008). Governmentality is therefore an approach that entails looking at how, in different periods of history, different arts of governing have used different technologies of power to address different problems, and in so doing have sought to constitute the subject in different ways for different ends. This thesis is firmly located in this approach.

Such a mode of analysis reveals that governmentalities have a characteristically normative, ethical, and moral form, embodying in the constitution of the subject what is considered by those in power to be right and wrong, good and evil, desired and undesired. As such, behind each governmentality lie considerations as to the “the ideals or principles to which government should be directed – freedom, justice, equality, mutual responsibility, citizenship, common sense, economic efficiency, prosperity, growth, fairness, rationality and the like” and through this “they embody ... [an] account of the persons over whom government is ... exercised” (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 277). As an analytical approach governmentality therefore relies on the ability to identify differences in practices, determine how they came into existence, and recognise their familial relations to other practices and governmentalities. Rose, O’Malley and Valverde suggest that:

From such a perspective, it becomes apparent that each formulation of an art of governing embodies, explicitly or implicitly, an answer to the following questions: Who or what is to be governed? Why should they be governed? How should they be governed? To what ends should they be governed? (2006, pp. 84-85)

In this way governmentality is an approach that is well suited to supporting me in answering my thesis questions: What is the relationship between education and the way in which governmentalities constitute the subject? How do changes to governmentalities and the constitution of the subject occur? and ultimately, through this type of questioning and analysis, how is the subject constituted?

¹ ‘conduct of conduct’ is the standard translation of ‘conduire des conduits’ which appears in Foucault, M. (1994), *Dits et écrits*.

2.3 SITUATING FOUCAULT.

Foucault has been described as a sociologist, historian, philosopher, critic and theorist, structuralist and post structuralist, activist and anti-humanist (Allen, 2012). Such is the contradiction in the labels placed upon him, that it is easy to see why many argue that he defies categorisation. Foucault himself actively sought to distance himself from being labelled famously saying “Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order” (Foucault M. , 1970-1971). Nevertheless, with necessary caution, it may be helpful to think of him as philosopher who undertook work which analysed social practices using historical approaches and to think of my thesis as developing in broadly the same way.

In a series on lectures in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Foucault M. , 1993), Foucault claimed that after the Second World War, the philosophy of the subject came to dominate philosophical inquiry in continental Europe. This inquiry, he suggested, developed along two lines: one which sought to develop a theory of objective knowledge – logical positivism, and the other “that of a certain school of linguistics, psychoanalysis, and anthropology, all generally grouped under the rubric of structuralism”. Neither of these, Foucault announces candidly, are “the directions I took. Let me announce once and for all that I am not a structuralist, and I confess with the appropriate chagrin that I am not an analytic philosopher” (Foucault M. , 1980). Rather, Foucault’s project, attempted to develop a new line of inquiry of the philosophy of the subject, “by studying the constitution of the subject across history” (Foucault M. , 1993, p. 202).

Foucault’s history of the genealogy of the subject sought to understand how through time forms and norms have created certain types of knowledge about the subject which have then defined and transformed him in particular ways. Foucault attempts to identify how he is then required to recognise himself in relation to these norms: “to know oneself, to tell the truth about oneself, and to constitute oneself as an object of knowledge both for other people and for oneself” (Foucault M. , 1993). Foucault’s project therefore stands in contrast to logical positivism and in opposition to structuralism (Ibid) , in that it sees both frameworks of knowledge and knowledge itself as historically contingent rather than atemporally structured, rational, or objective. In this way Foucault saw his philosophy as a philosophy of possibilities. In his words, he saw it as:

... an analysis that relates to what we are willing to accept in our world, to accept, to refuse, and to change, both in ourselves and in our circumstances. In sum, it is a question of searching for another kind of critical philosophy. Not a critical philosophy that seeks to determine the conditions and the limits of our possible knowledge of the object, but a critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves (Foucault M. , 1980)

Foucault's project was then a critical-historical ontology of ourselves (Foucault M. , 1984) : a critical-historical study of the nature of being through which he sought to:

... answer an open series of questions; it has to make an indefinite number of inquiries which may be multiplied and specified as much as we like, but which will all address the questions systematized as follows: How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions? (Ibid)

Foucault's project was not one which sought to identify objective laws, or permanent structures, but rather one which sought to create agency by opening up new possibilities for the way in which we understand ourselves. In this way he saw his work as a history of the present, an approach which aims at an historical analysis of the constitution of the subject, but which does so in order to better understand the conditions of the present, so as to open up new possibilities for transcending them. In his words:

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (Foucault M. , 1984)

2.4 ARCHAEOLOGY AND GENEALOGY.

Foucault's body of work spans 30 years, beginning in the 1950s, and ending with his death in 1984. During this time Foucault's methodological approach evolved, developed and changed. His first principal methodology, *archaeology*, which he had used implicitly in *The History of Madness*, *The Birth of the Clinic*, and *The Order of Things*, was made explicit in his 1969 methodological treatise *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Archaeology was an approach which Foucault used to identify different discursive practices in different periods of time and to make visible the distinctions and similarities between them. These discursive fields were used by Foucault to demonstrate how forms, norms and obligations were constructed to create truths which led to the subject being constituted in different ways. Foucault's archaeological analyses revealed discontinuities and breaks in discursive practices resulting in shifts in the way in which the subject was understood. At this time, Foucault's analysis was focussed on text and discursive practices and the method he employed was "to begin like a pure empiricist, simply selecting as his raw data an ensemble of what were taken to be serious speech acts during a given period" and having done this, the "obvious way to catalogue discursive formations would be to group together those serious speech acts which refer to a common object": (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, pp. 59-61). In doing this Foucault revealed that rather than discursive formations describing objective differentiations, it was the discursive formations themselves

that produced the object about which they spoke. (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 61). Thus for example, in his book *The History of Madness* (1961), Foucault showed that discursive formations didn't simply describe the mad and sane, but rather it was the discursive formations themselves which created the norms, forms, and categorisations, which 'produced' the mad and the sane.

Therefore in researching the constitution of the educational subject, the aim is not to identify discursive formations which refer to an independent, objective reality, but rather to look for the way in which discursive formations actively constitute the subject. As Foucault puts it, it is "a task that consists of not – no longer – treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault M. , 1969 [2002], p. 54).

However critics had "noted that these [archaeological] analyses seemed essentially incomplete since they delineated structures on either side of such breaks but gave no account at all of how the move from one structure to another was accomplished" (Gutting, 1990, p. 333). This led to Foucault being 'accused' of being a structuralist. Recognising the deficiency in *archaeology*, Foucault developed a new methodology, *genealogy*, which would enable him to explain the transitions between different practices. Whereas *archaeology* sought to excavate discursive practices from a moment of time, *genealogy* also sought to identify the familial relations and transitions between those practices. As a consequence it might be seen that *archaeology* applies atemporally whereas *genealogy* applies diachronically, that is, across time. But Foucault's perspective on history is spatial, not temporal. Whilst temporality implies continuity and linear development, Foucault's project was about identifying the differences and distinctions which created domains of understanding. Thus the *History of Madness* (1961 [2009]) is not so much a temporal, chronological understanding of how madness has been understood across time, but rather it is a spatial history which recognises how the conception of madness came to be formed. By virtue of this Foucault seeks to avoid finalism, that is he seeks to avoid proposing any laws of historical development which have a built in purpose, or suggesting that successive developments necessarily imply progress. Foucault does not deny the possibility of progress but wishes to challenge the view that progress is linear, sequential and inevitable. He says:

I don't say that humanity doesn't progress. I say that that it is a bad method to pose the problem as: 'How is it that we have progressed?' The problem is: how do things happen? And what happens now is not necessarily better or more advanced, or better understood than what happened in the past (Foucault, 1980, p. 50).

At the same time Foucault was careful not to develop a method which could be accused of presentism - he did not attempt to take present day concepts and seek to find parallel meanings in the past. Instead genealogy is designed for "isolating the central components of political technology today and tracing them back in time" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 119). Foucault recognised that the importance of the topics that he researched in the present was

by no means guaranteed in the past. But that only suited his method, because as he said, his interest was “not in writing the history of the past in present terms”, but in writing the “history of the present”. (Foucault M. , 1977, p. 31) . In this way Foucault is arguing that the past exists in the present: that what exists in the present is not simply in the present but that it is built up by layer upon layer of the past. It is an accumulated present. It is a historical present.

As a consequence of the interwoven nature of the present, Foucault points out that the cause and effect of any discourse is often unpredictable, noting that “We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power...” (Foucault M. , 1976 [1998]). For Foucault the implication is that no discourse comes into effect without first being affected (and effected) by other discourse and discursive practices. In other words, following Nietzsche he saw that no discourse arises from the slough of nothingness, *causa sui* (Foucault M. , 1977). So whilst Foucault identifies discursive practices as originating unpredictably, by chance, and through contingent turns in history, this is not intended to mean that they arise in a completely random fashion. It is important then to look at the constitution of the subject, not as being identifiable in a singular set of discursive practices, but instead as being genealogically linked to previous discursive practices. Genealogy is in this way, a means for exploring the process of generation, rather than an exploration what is taken to exist in some distant past. It therefore complements, rather than replaces archaeology.

To further complement archaeology and genealogy Foucault developed a wider set of methods for conducting his analyses. Using the term *dispositif* (usually translated as apparatus) he sought to encompass both discursive and non-discursive practices. *Dispositif*, can, according to Foucault, relate to “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions...” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194)

Agamben describes *dispositif* in more detail suggesting that it is:

... anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, judicial measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and--why not--language itself... (Agamben, 2009, p. 14)

The genealogical method is therefore one which goes beyond speech acts as a source of data for interpretation, aiming to look ‘practices’, that is to look at what happened rather than stated intentions - to look how policies were actually implemented, what actually occurred, rather than focussing exclusively on intent.

In my thesis I therefore wish to draw on a Foucauldian archaeological perspective which clearly identifies different practices taking place over different periods of time and at the same time I wish to apply a genealogical perspective which identifies the generative transitions between different conditions. The method I employ will be one which is open to both discursive and non-discursive data.

2.5 METHODS.

Foucault was sceptical of theory (Foucault, 1980, p. 199). He saw in theory a static, structuralist conception of the world. Instead Foucault preferred to think of his work as providing a grid of analysis: tools for thinking, exploring and analysing. I have already located my thesis in the field of governmentality, and identified archaeology and genealogy as providing my broad methodological framework. I now seek to further explore Foucault's work to identify and develop a set of tools for analysing the constitution of the educational subject.

Through a detailed review of Foucault's work I have identified four interrelated ways of looking at the topic which form the tools I will use in this thesis. These are; *Relations*; *Technologies of Power*; *Power Relations* and *Division*.

1. *Relations* looks at how the constitution of the self is founded on "Our relations to truth, our relations to obligations, our relations to ourselves and to the others." (Foucault M. , 1983)
2. *Technologies of Power* looks at the specific actions which create power relations, enforce division and implement specific forms of governance.
3. *Power Relations* looks at the way in which power is effected to construct these relations to truth, obligations, the self and the others.
4. *Division* allows for the recognition that "for a man or woman to be constituted as a subject, he or she must first be divided from the totality of the world, or the totality of the social body" (Gutman, 1988, p. 107).

To this I then add:

5. Samuel P Huntington's concept of *Political Decay* to understand the nature of change: how, in line with Foucault's thinking, it is often neither planned nor progressive.

Finally, throughout the thesis, I draw on Foucault's interest in practices.

6. *Practices* help to ground my work in the day-to-day actions of people, which I hope will both provide a source of evidence for my arguments, but also help to lift and illuminate the thesis, making my arguments real and relevant in lives of everyday people.

Whilst each element is listed here independently and whilst in the next section I describe each tool in turn, it should be noted that in reality the effects work in tandem with each other to create complex outcomes.

2.5A RELATIONS

Whilst governmentality provides a broad concept for understanding how the subject is framed in certain ways by government, and genealogy helps to frame the thesis in historical terms, on their own they lack analytical power. More precise tools are required to really understand how and in what ways the subject is constituted. As a tool *relations* helps to develop this precision.

In the year before his death Michel Foucault delivered a series of lectures at the University of California, Berkeley, in which he describes the aims of his work throughout his career and where he clearly identifies the importance of relations:

What are we now? ... What is our actuality? What are we as part of this actuality? What is the target of our activity of philosophising in so far as we are part of our actuality? Those questions deal with what I should call the historical ontology of ourselves, or the critical history of thought.

It is in the framework of this ... type of questions that I have undertaken several historical enquiries about madness or medicine, crime and punishment, or about sexuality.

Of course there have been several ways, and there are still several ways for elaborating those questions about our historical ontology. But I think, that any ontological history of ourselves have (sic) to analyse three set (sic) of relations. Our relations to truth, our relations to obligations, our relations to ourselves and to the others.

Or, to turn it with other words, in order to answer the question, 'what are we now?', we have to consider that we are thinking beings, since it is through thought that we are beings who look for truth, who accept or refuse obligations, laws, coercions, and who are related to ourselves or to the others. My aim is not to answer the general question 'what is a thinking being?' My aim is to answer the question, 'how did the history of our thought, **I mean of our relation to truth, to obligations, to ourselves and to the others, make us what we are**'? (Foucault M. , 1983) emphasis added.

By analysing relations Foucault asks, how has the truth been produced? What truths have been constructed? How do these truths frame the subject in certain ways: constitute him in certain ways? How have constructed truths created certain obligations to which the subject is bound and compelled, religiously, legally and morally? How do truths and obligations create certain relations to ourselves and others: create ways of seeing ourselves, ways of seeing others and ways of seeing ourselves in relation to others. When Brougham questioned the

government's involvement in the development of the education system he did so because he saw it as providing "the means of dictating opinions and principles to the people", which is to say he did so because he saw it creating certain relations 'to truth, to obligations, to ourselves, and to the others'.

As a tool, relations therefore helps to develop an understanding of how particular governmentalities create relations through the production of truths and the forming of obligations, promoting particular thoughts, and causing people to act upon themselves in certain ways. In short relations alter thoughts and thoughts affect behaviour. Relations is then a tool for helping to "analyse the formation of ourselves through the history of our thought" (Foucault M. , 1983). It helps us to understand what people think, what they do, and "what they think when they do what they are doing" Ibid.

Manifest and latent functions.

The distinction Foucault makes between what people think and what people do is an important one and recognises the difference between aims and actuality. Understanding political intent is one thing, recognising what occurs in reality in quite another.

To help me to make this distinction I draw on Robert K Merton's (1957) work which developed and clarified concepts to support this type of analysis within the social sciences. Adopting and adapting Merton's work throughout the thesis I aim to make the distinction between:

- *Functional* aims/policies which produce an effect in actuality;
- *A-functional* aims/policy which have limited or no effect in actuality.

At the same time I wish to recognise:

- *Manifest* aims and effects: recognised, conscious, deliberate and intended aims and effects;
- *Unacknowledged* aims and effects: Unacknowledged and unconscious aims, and;
- *Latent* aims and effects: unintended or accidental aims and effects.

Within the thesis I seek to identify and make distinctions between manifest, unacknowledged and latent education aims and policy, and to identify the extent to which aims and policy have an effect in actuality. In this way I hope to distinguish between what government (state and church) say they want to happen, what they don't acknowledge they want to happen, and what really happens in actuality.

2.5B TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER

Over time, as different bodies became more or less responsible for governing (the sovereign, church, state) and as their objectives evolved and changed, so different forms of power were developed and employed to ensure relations were developed in such a way so as to fulfil their aims. Foucault calls these different forms of power, technologies of power. In this section I seek to outline the principal technologies of power. I do so by exploring each technology of power in turn. However it should be noted that multiple technologies of power can often be seen to operate together, rendering it difficult to isolate a single form of power at any one time. In practice, because of this overlap, it can sometimes become difficult to distinguish between one form of power and another since it is the combination of technologies of power which help form each particular governmentality, and therefore the particular way in which the subject is constituted.

Pastoral Power

Pastoral power is a form of power that is closely linked with a particular governmentality – one whose aims are tied with religion, and in England it is therefore inexorably linked with Christianity. Developed in Britain since the end of the sixth century it is a form of power which has a very particular aim: to “assure individual salvation in the next world” (Foucault M. , 1982, p. 783). This form of power manifests itself through a powerful set of relations: relations to truth, which are clearly laid down in the Bible; relations to obligations set out in formal and informal codes of conduct established by the Church; and relations to the self and to others as either a sinner or a good Christian. Pastoral power incorporates the power of acting on oneself. It is a reflective power requiring the individual to self-assess themselves, to produce a truth about themselves and to modify their behaviour to bring it into accordance with the ‘truth’. It causes the individual to reveal themselves at confession and to always be observed by God.

Sovereign Power

Under sovereign power, the ruler has ultimate authority. Historically the objective of the sovereign state was to secure its own strength and amplify its wealth. It sought to achieve these aims through a centralised conception of power. Rules and laws demarcated what was right and wrong and any breach of these laws could lead to violent punishment, torture or execution. Punishment was conducted publicly to create fear and reinforce the law. In this sense:

The right to punish ... is an aspect of the sovereign's right to make war on his enemies: to punish belongs to that absolute power of life and death...a right by virtue of which the prince sees that his law is respected by ordering the punishment of crime. (Foucault, 1977, p. 48)

Whilst violence and torture enacted by the state diminished from the eighteenth century onwards, the use of the law, the military and the police to enforce behaviour continues to this

day. In this way the law produces relations between subjects and the state. The law creates relations about what is right and wrong and through this establishes obligations as to what must be done, what cannot be done, and what is permitted to be done.

Disciplinary Power

The general effect of disciplinary power arises from the need for the state to move away from the barbaric rituals of sovereign power to a mode of operation which was less oppressive. At the end of the eighteenth century, revolutions in France and America demonstrated that force was no longer a tenable mode of government. At the same time with the advent of statistics the reason of state began to shift from one concerned with the strength of the sovereign to one which was aimed at the development of the population. The first census of 1801 is symptomatic of the desire to identify the needs of the population through numbers. Statistical societies flourished and reports were produced on all imaginable subjects: the health of the military, education, orphanages, prisons, poorhouses... (Porter, 1986, p. 28) all of which were focussed on this new reason of state – the population.

This significant shift in the reason of state was made possible by the development of disciplinary power, which:

... 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. It is not a triumphant power, which because of its own excess can pride itself on its omnipotence; it is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, but permanent economy. These are humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty... (Foucault, 1977, p. 170)

Key to the success of disciplinary power are three principal instruments: "... hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination" (Foucault, 1977, p. 170).

Hierarchical Observation

Every statistic was in a very general sense a hierarchical observation which set out conditions upon which the population would be examined, norms set and defects to be corrected. But it was, and is, in practical applications such as managerial administration and architecture, rather than in abstract statistics that disciplinary power really impacts on individuals.

At the turn of the eighteenth century, state architecture, once designed to simply be a symbol of power and authority, instead began to become functional (Foucault, 1977, pp. 171-174). The architecture of these new places of gathering supported the pyramidal structure of roles assigned to ensure that at every level and in every way the comportment of the individual was being observed. In factories, military camps, hospitals and monitorial schools, supervisory roles

were created in great numbers all aimed at monitoring, surveillance and hierarchical observation.

Normalising Judgement

Disciplinary power focuses on “that which does not measure up to the rule, that which departs from it” (Foucault, 1977, p. 178) with the explicit aim of reducing the gaps between the normal and the abnormal. To achieve this, it first must create the norm, define the standard against which judgement can be made. Foucault’s body of work demonstrates that the way in which these standards are constructed is often spurious, leading to norms which are at best arbitrary. Once norms are established they are then often implemented through sophisticated systems of punishment and reward: punishment for non-observance of the norm, reward for conforming to the standard that has been set.

Examination

The third instrument is the examination. In Foucault’s words:

The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement. It is a normalising gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them. That is why, in all the mechanisms of discipline, the examination is highly ritualized. In it are combined the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth. At the heart of the procedures, it manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected. (Foucault, 1977, pp. 184-185)

Once the tripartite arrangement of *hierarchical observation*, *normalising judgement* and the *examination* become entrenched, they become invisible, operating as a totalising paradigm, appearing on the surface and in every-day life as an *a priori* way of doing things, as something which is entirely natural, and through this naturalness, just. The arrangement uses *division* extensively, to constitute the subject, individualising and totalising at the same time. It operates to divide one person from another, one group from another, one population from another. It operates on everybody. It creates norms, examines and judges. It divides the literate from the illiterate, those with a degree from those without, those with 5 GCSEs from those without, those who are in education from those who are not. Through these divisions, norms, examinations and judgements the subject is constituted. It names him, creates his place in society. He becomes ‘intelligent’ ‘feckless’ ‘ambitious’ part of the ‘underclass’, or part of the ‘aspiration nation’.

Technology of the self

Towards the end of his career Foucault became increasingly interested in how a “human turns him or herself into a subject” (Foucault M. , 1988, p. 3), recognising that alongside those techniques of power which seek to dominate the subject, there is another, more subtle means of control. In the Howison Lectures of 1980, Foucault explains:

... since my project was concerned with the knowledge of the subject, I thought that the techniques of domination were the most important, without any exclusion of the rest. But, analyzing the experience of sexuality, I became more and more aware that there is in all societies, I think, in all societies whatever they are, another type of techniques: techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on. Let's call this kind of techniques a techniques or technology of the self. (Foucault M. , 1980)

The technology of the self employs the same instruments of control as disciplinary power – observation, normalising judgement, and examination, but on oneself. Hence I observe myself, examine myself, against a norm which I believe to be my own, but which has, in actuality, been set by society, by the sovereign, the church, the state. I act on myself against these standards. Thus, subjects “produce the ends of government by fulfilling themselves rather than being merely obedient” (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 89), and are “obliged to be free in specific ways” (Rose, 1989). Thus, the ultimate aim of this modality of power is to get the subject to constitute himself, but in a way which has been designed by those in power. The subject becomes an agent of the state. In Foucault's terms:

This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches to him his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him. It is a form of power which make individuals subjects...subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a self-conscience or self knowledge. (Foucault M. , The Subject and Power, 1982, p. 781)

2.5C POWER RELATIONS

In both the Howison lectures and the Dartmouth lectures that same year (1980), Foucault reflected on his body of work, concluding that he had for the most part focussed too much on techniques of domination. In his words:

I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western civilization, he has to take into account not only techniques of domination but also techniques of the self. Let's say: he has to take into account the interaction between those two types of techniques - techniques of domination and techniques

of the self. He has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion or domination. The contact point, where the individuals are driven and known by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, and know themselves is what we can call, I think government. Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word, as they spoke of it in the sixteenth century, of governing children, or governing family, or governing souls, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself.

When I was studying asylums, prisons, and so on, I insisted, I think, too much on the techniques of domination. What we can call discipline is something really important in these kinds of institutions, but it is only at one aspect of the art of governing people in our society. We must not understand the exercise of power as pure violence or strict coercion. Power consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational techniques, and the efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion-technologies and self-technologies. (Foucault M. , 1993)

It is this relationship that Foucault suggests is key to understanding ‘how’ power comes into being (Foucault, 1982, p. 788). Thus for later Foucault, power is not domination, but instead exists in a complex relationship between two entities: the state and the population, the doctor and the patient, the school and its pupils. This relationship combines technologies of domination and coercion with technologies of the self. A relationship of power, in contrast to a relationship of pure violence or domination, calls for a “mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future.” (Foucault, 1982, p. 789). Power then is “the structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions... in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions.” (Ibid). In such a relationship success for the ‘governor’, for those ‘in power’, those ‘with authority’, is where the subject has freedom to make choices but acts in the way the governor wants.

2.5D DIVISION

Irrespective of the technology of power being used, in order for someone to be constituted as a subject, “he or she must first be divided from the totality of the world, or the totality of the social body” (Gutman, 1988). For a subject to be rendered visible, a distinction must be made between subjects: *subject a* must be made distinct from *subject b*. The boundaries of the

subject are those lines that divide the subject from the not subject. The “essential move in the constitution of the subject is division” (Ibid).²

The education system is about division. It is about dividing present-day subjects from their future: it marks them and demarcates them in the present, before undertaking a process of reframing, we call education. As education divides one subject from another, it names those subjects : ‘intelligent’ or ‘underclass’, ‘ambitious’ or ‘feckless’, a good citizen of the state or a problem for the state. It is through naming, that Foucault, Austin (1962), Butler (1993), and others argue that the process has a performative function, appearing “to produce that which it names, to enact its own referent, to name and to do, to name and to make. ... produc[ing] that which it declares” (Butler, 1993) (Youdell, 2006). As it names the ‘intelligent’ the ‘underclass’, ‘ambitious’ and ‘feckless’, so it produces the intelligent’, the ‘underclass’, the ‘ambitious’ and the ‘feckless’.

2.5E POLITICAL DECAY

Samuel P Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968 [2006]), describes a theory which suggests that rather than the state being the author of society’s progressive development, it is more often responsible for implementing forced changes which are the product of its own decay. Huntington’s theory is simple: as change takes place, the state and its institutions no longer reflect the needs of society and its people. At this point political decay starts to occur. In response the state may make small changes and accommodations, but its institutions will oppose fundamental change. If the differences between state and society are significant and sustained there will be a disconnect. At this point political decay can threaten the government since “... it is the perceived legitimacy of the government that binds populations together and makes them willing to accept its authority” (Fukuyama , 2011). At points of delegitimation significant change must occur or the government will be overthrown.

Huntington’s theory suggests that either through small changes and accommodations or through more significant change at points of delegitimation, governments are reactive and seek to change to maintain their authority and preserve as far as possible the status quo. Such a theory argues against the progressive development of society by the state. In line with Foucauldian thinking, the theory questions the notion of progress. To repeat Foucault:

... I don’t say that humanity doesn’t progress. I say that that it is a bad method to pose the problem as: ‘How is it that we have progressed?’ The problem is: how do things happen? And what happens now is not necessarily better or more advanced, or better understood than what happened in the past” (Foucault, 1980, p. 50).

² I have both quoted and paraphrased Gutman. Where he referred to the constitution of the self, I have referred to the constitution of the subject. Processes of division apply to both.


When the legitimacy of the state is being eroded it enacts change through the instruments and institutions of state and the way in which they operate. In Foucauldian terms, changes will be made to relations through adjustments to the aims and objectives of the state, the systems of differentiations, the forms of institutions, the means for bringing power into play (rules, laws, observations, examinations) or the way in which power is implemented in actuality. When these changes are significant a shift in the constitution of the subject occurs.

I will use the notion of political decay to examine the extent to which the development of the education system is the result of progressive development, or whether in line with Huntington, it is in fact the product of political decay. Has the education system been positively developed, or has it been developed through a series of accommodations which have, as far as possible, sought to maintain the status quo? Has the government been the instigator of educational change, or is it the subjects who, demanding change, have caused the government to eventually, reluctantly, in some way submit to their power.

2.6 GRID OF ANALYSIS

What arises through this chapter is a Foucauldian methodological framework and a set of Foucauldian tools for undertaking the analysis, tools for identifying practices in any one given period (archaeological) and at the same time tools which support the interpretation of change (genealogical).

The chapter has located the thesis in the Foucauldian domain of governmentality studies and has identified the historical approach that will be undertaken. It has then constructed a grid of analysis to include relations, power relations, technologies of power, including sovereign power, pastoral power and disciplinary power [normalisation, hierarchical observation, and the examination], division and political decay. This grid of analysis is set out in summary form on the following page.



³ I have both quoted and paraphrased Gutman. Where he referred to the constitution of the self, I have referred to the constitution of the subject. Processes of division apply to both.

CHAPTER 3



Constituting the Christian Subject



Figure 3.1 | Artist Unknown, (1469), *Ms 493 fol.56r Teaching from 'Les Georgics' by Virgil with commentary by Servius*, Bibliotheque Municipale, Dijon, France, Vellum, Bridgeman Art Library (Image number: XIR181264)

3.

3.1 INTRODUCTION: HISTORY OF THE PRESENT

Where to begin?

In attempting to write a history of the present about education and the constitution of the subject it is necessary to find a starting point, but where should that starting point be? And in which direction should the analysis travel? Starting somewhere in history and searching backwards to locate the point of origin somewhere in the distant past would enable the analysis to uncover the essential truth about man's being. This would be a truth which stands outside of history, one where humankind has yet to constitute itself. The task then would be to simply work forward, unveiling how and in what ways we have changed this essential self into historical constitutions of subjects. But Foucault argues that this is a pointless exercise. He argues that there is always something before, anterior, prior. There is no origin. As Dreyfus and Rabinow put it:

Foucault analyzes this search for a fundamental experience outside of history which founds history as one of the essential forms of modern thought. With the early works of Heidegger clearly in mind, he shows that this philosophic move is characteristic of the most developed forms of modern thought and yet is bound to fail. Indeed, Foucault himself now seeks other ways than the recourse to an ontological boundary which defines us but is necessarily inaccessible to us, to formulate the problem of the limits of man's knowledge of his own being and hence the limits and functions of the human sciences. (1982)

As a consequence I am not seeking to reach backwards to reveal some essential truth located in a distant past which is never accessible to me. Rather I will take a point of departure and work forward to see how successive societies have manipulated the constitution of the self, building up layers and casting off others to show how we constitute subjects today.

Different periods of history will reveal different ways of constituting the subject, and through this I aim to support a better understanding of our present by placing the present in relation to the past. I develop the thesis on the basis that any historical constitution of the subject has limited meaning by itself, but that far greater insight can be gained by placing it in relation, comparison and contrast to the way in which the subject has been constituted in other periods. The aim however is not a chronological account. Although there is a chronology to the thesis, the aim is to write a spatial history; to show how the subject has been constituted in the space of the educational system.

3.2 BRITAIN 597-1300

The Romans arrived in Britain circa AD43 and left circa AD410. Within this period they established the first known schools in Britain. When the Empire collapsed and the Romans left, the schools they'd established all but disappeared. Consequently, for a period of about two hundred years, from the beginning of the fifth century to the end of the sixth, no notable evidence of schooling in Britain exists. This was a period when Britain was in flux. Romano-Christian Britain had been in decline with Saxons, Picts, and Irish forces all fighting for land, towns and villages, fighting for wealth and resources, fighting for power and control. It was a fight to establish the right to rule over the population. These were early struggles to constitute the subject, not through education but through force. These were struggles for the right to hold absolute sovereign power.

Superseding the Romans, the Anglo-Saxons were, throughout the fifth century, quickly establishing a pagan culture in Britain. Romano-Christian Britain was quickly being replaced by Anglo-Saxon-Pagan Britain, and this was especially the case in the south and east. However, whilst both the Romans and the Anglo-Saxons sought to rule by sovereign power, by the end of the sixth century a new mode of governance was seeking to establish itself.

3.2A AUGUSTINE

To the Christians, pagans were indulgent, barbaric, and unsophisticated. They were polytheistic (worshipping many Gods), with beliefs based on sensation and feeling. In 597 Pope Gregory the Great, sent the monk, Augustine from Rome to convert Britain back to Christianity and in so doing change the underlying *episteme* from one which privileged knowledge through the senses to one which worshipped knowledge of a singular God. This mission therefore aimed at changing the relationship between subjects and accepted truth: that is to say it aimed to change both the knowledge that counted as accepted truth and the way in which subjects related to it. In this way the *unacknowledged* aim of the mission was to change the constitution of the subject – to build a people subject to Christianity. Had England been a properly formed country at this time, this would have been a mission to build a Christian nation.

Writing to the Patriarch of Alexandria (the Archbishop of Alexandria and Cairo) in 598, Pope Gregory describes the challenge:

... the English race, who live in a corner of the world, have until now remained, unbelieving, worshipping stick and stones, but aided by your prayers and prompted by God, I decided that I ought to send a monk of my monastery to preach to them.
(Pope Gregory the Great, 598 [2012])

Augustine landed in Kent and began his work in earnest in Canterbury, establishing a church and a school to support his mission. The school he established is the earliest school in Britain

for which meaningful records remain. The school wasn't created to promote the cause of learning nor was it for the advancement of knowledge. The *manifest* aim of the school was clear: to help establish Christianity in Britain. Designed to support this objective, two types of schooling were defined: the first was to train priests in Latin, the writing of the Bible and the teachings of the Christian fathers so as to enable them to conduct church services; the second was to train choirboys to sing in the choir. Establishing this school structure was a predetermined objective of the mission with Pope Gregory giving "... detailed instructions ... to his missionary about the process of acculturating pagans to a Christian way of life" (Logan, 2012, p. 54). As such, the curriculum was focussed on the transmission of Christianity and the moral code that it sought to represent. Schools were not designed for the development of knowledge but instead were heavily focussed on the development of the tools and techniques of transmission, of literacy and "... grammar to make possible the study of the 'sacred page'" (Lawson & Silver, 1973, p. 11).

Thus from the very outset, Augustine's *manifest* aim was to establish the school with a curriculum which divided the population into those who would become clergy, those who would be choirboys and those who would remain unschooled. The population was then further divided into those who had been converted to Christianity and those who remained pagan. This division established relations: relations to oneself – to know oneself as Christian or pagan; relation to others – to know others as Christian or pagan; relations to the established truth – the Bible; and relations to obligations set out in the everyday rituals of the church. In sum, Augustine's *unacknowledged* aim was to constitute the subject to Christian ends and the school was a principal tool for doing so.

Augustine recorded notable early successes. By 601 King Æthelbert was baptised and many of the surrounding tribal aristocracy soon converted to Christianity.



Figure 3.2 | Artist Unknown, *Augustine baptising King Æthelbert*, (1997), British Postal Stamp commemorating 1400 years since the arrival of St Augustine in Canterbury, Kent. Issued 3rd November 1997.

Insisting that baptism was essential for salvation, Augustine used it to create significant pastoral power. By the eighth century baptism was enshrined in law in the Kingdom of Wessex where “A child shall be baptized within 30 days. If this is not done, [the guardian] shall pay 30 shillings compensation” (Attenborough, [1922] 2006, p. 37). Through pastoral power (salvation) and sovereign power (law) baptism became widespread, tying parents and their children to the church.

3.2B WIDER EDUCATIONAL AIMS

The narrow aims of the school remained until Archbishop Theodore arrived in Britain in 669. Accompanied by a north African abbot, Hadrian, and Benedict Biscop from Northumbria, together they began to create a centre of learning with a much wider curriculum. Bede wrote of their efforts:

They were both extremely learned in both secular and sacred literature and thus attracted a crowd of students into whose minds they daily poured the streams of wholesome learning. They gave their hearers instruction not only in the books of Holy Scripture but also in the art of metre, astronomy and ecclesiastical computation (Bede, 731 [1999], p. 172).

However, whilst the scope of the school now spread beyond literacy, grammar and interpretation of the scriptures, extending the scope of authorised Christian knowledge this new curriculum remained focussed on the objectives of Church. As Williams (1961) explains:

Scripture was the central subject, and rhetoric teaching was mainly a study of verbal forms in the Bible. Grammar was the teaching of Latin, and versification was in the same context, though at times it extended to relate to poetry in the vernacular. Mathematics, including astronomy, was centred on the intricacies of the Church calendar, simple general exercises being an introduction to the all important 'computus' centred on the controversy about the date of Easter. Music and law were vocational studies for the services and administration of the Church, and the natural history, by contrast with the Aristotelians, was literary and anecdotal (p. 129).

As the prevalence of the Church grew and its schooling system expanded, this, combined with it being inextricably linked to authorised accounts of knowledge and accepted truth, gave it increasingly greater power. This power established strong relations between itself and the population, and by virtue of these relations subjects came to be constituted in Christian terms.

By the latter half of the 1st millennium the model used to spread Christianity had been strongly established. Comprising schools to train the clergy, churches to preach the gospel and baptism to ritualise the connection between the subject and God, the combined effect was the instituting of significant pastoral power. However whilst the model was firmly established the speed of change remained slow, and the effect of the Church and its schools in constituting the subject was by no means conclusive.

3.2C FROM AUGUSTINE TO NORMAN THE CONQUEROR

The period between Augustine's arrival in England in 597 and the Norman Conquest of 1066 was turbulent with power fluctuating between numerous kingdoms. Invasions, most notably from Scandinavia, further destabilised any sense of structure and order, and continued to hamper the efforts of the Church to consolidate its position in society. As a consequence, whilst by 1060 Christianity was widely recognised there were by this time only an estimated 1,000 practising monks. As Lawson and Silver note:

... in a sparse poverty stricken population totalling about 1.5 million their [the monks] combined educational influence can only have been slight and local. Society as a whole must have been oral, customary, illiterate, semi-barbarous ... whole communities of people unable to read, knowing only what they had personally experienced or been told ... who had never seen a map (because none existed) or travelled more than a few miles from the village where they were born. (Lawson & Silver, 1973, p. 16)

Nonetheless, in this period there is a gradual shift in *episteme* caused by the development of power through the Church and its schools. The technology of power used by the Church at this time is pastoral. Subjects become divided and constituted along Christian lines: as Christians or pagans, as believers or non-believers, as sinners or redeemed. At the same time education is privileged to those directly delivering the Christian message and is not generally available to the population. Those who are educated therefore become constituted as being of higher moral worth than those who aren't. Those who are educated are seen as being closer to God, and in this way education attracts symbolic and social capital.

The shift in *episteme* taking place during at this time occurred during a period of instability brought about by warring kingdoms and invasions which was only replaced by a period of relative calm following the Norman Conquest of 1066. This enabled the spread and development of knowledge from Spain and Italy together with an appreciation of new translations of classical Greek (Thomas, 2008, p. 97) (Daniell, 2003, p. 21). In this period standardised versions of Latin were developed and Norman-French became a primary language of the upper classes. Pivotal to the development and spread of this knowledge were the cathedrals and churches which were now established through the land. Whilst the Church therefore had a central role in the spread of knowledge, this was also a period when schools were beginning to emerge autonomously of the Church. Education began to take place in less formal settings and through private schoolmasters, and as a consequence the educated were no longer confined to roles within the Church. Other professions started to become educated as the ability to write and count emerged as professional skills essential for the effective administration of the state. The Domesday Book (1086) is perhaps the most famous non-religious account of the time, though there are numerous examples of the use of literacy spreading from beyond the Church and into the everyday administration of life. In Sheffield for example 'Robert the Cutler' was recorded in a tax return, which would have required both literacy and numeracy skills independent of any Christian-led curriculum. Whilst control of

knowledge remained unequivocally with the Church, this was the beginning of secular knowledge and secular schooling. This was the earliest sign that in the future the domination of the Church over the control and dissemination of knowledge would be weakened.

3.2D UNIVERSITIES

It is also in this period that the university as we know it today came into being. In around 1200 the cluster of educational activities at Oxford became sufficiently consolidated to see it emerge as a centre for higher learning. Disturbances between Oxford students and the local population led to the establishment of boarding houses which would become the Colleges of Merton and Balliol, whilst students from Oxford broke away to form Cambridge University. Less than a hundred years later, from origins of an unruly and ill-coordinated group of scholars, emerged one of the pre-eminent seats of learning in Europe. In these universities, although remaining within a Christian framework, a broader curriculum was now emerging which included grammar, logic, rhetoric, (the trivium) and arithmetic, astronomy, geometry and music (the quadrivium) (Williams, 1961, p. 130).

By 1300 Oxford had around 1500 scholars, Cambridge somewhat less, but both were steadily growing (Vauchez, Dobson, & Lapidge, 2000). For the population at the time this represented a large body of students. All were fee paying. Whilst grammar schools existed throughout the country, Oxford and Cambridge had a near monopoly on higher education and it was their educated elite which provided the intellect for the burgeoning secular and ecclesiastical administrations.

3.2E 3% LITERATE BY 1300

Piece by piece, education in terms we are familiar with today began to stumble into existence. Nevertheless despite the developments from 597 through to 1300, Silver and Lawson (1973) estimate that by this time only 3% of the population was literate. With concentrations in churches, and in Oxford, Cambridge and London, that left vast swathes of the country with hardly anyone capable of reading or writing. The extent to which education acted to constitute the Christian subject during this period must therefore be questioned. Whilst it is possible to say that the purpose of education was primarily to support the development and promotion of Christian knowledge, it remains the case that the practice of schooling was not widespread. Where it had been established it served the development of the clergy or an elite administrative class. As a consequence the direct impact that education had on the everyday subject was minimal.




Figure 3.3 | Loggan, David (1675), New College, Oxford, from 'Oxonia Illustrata', Courtesy of the Warden and Scholars of New College, Oxford, hand coloured engraving, Bridgeman Image Library (image number NCO183651)

EARLY EDUCATIONAL ARCHITECTURE

The design of the early educational establishments such as the universities of Oxford and Cambridge followed ecclesiastic architectural principles. Whilst they were undoubtedly capable of serving their purpose, the focus was not utilitarian, but was instead aimed at mirroring the symbolic power evident in Christian architecture. In a largely rural landscape buildings such as these were formidable symbols of power which helped reinforce belief in established authority and orthodox sources knowledge.

3.3 PENITENCE AND CONFESSION

3.3A PENITENTIAL

The education system developed to serve the growth and expansion of the Church, and alongside this, secular education began to emerge to support the administrative functions of both the Church and state. Access to education was limited to the clergy and administrative classes and the everyday subject was therefore not being directly constituted by education because at this time he had no access to it. Nonetheless he was increasingly becoming tied to religion. I have already noted the development of baptism in this process, but there were two further techniques that were implemented between the time of Augustine and the Middle Ages which ensured that this tie became cemented in the everyday lives of subjects: firstly penitentials, and then secondly, confession.

From the seventh century, penitentials began to emerge which set out in written form sins and their corresponding punishments. Although eventually banned by the Council of Paris in 829, their use continued to remain widespread throughout the middle ages. Meen describes the penitentials as a handbook for confessors suggesting that they are “an important source of our knowledge of early medieval attitudes ... These texts, basically lists of sins with prescription of an appropriate penance for each iniquity, can be said to reflect widespread practices and ideas” (1994, p. 53). The penitentials laid down ideals and norms that would be enforced through regulation and punishment. The penitentials created relations to truth and relations to obligations:

Penance had a sacramental as well as a disciplinary aspect. It was thought of not merely as a discipline for the restoration of sinner to the privileges of membership in the Church, but as a supernatural grace annulling the consequences of sin and recovering the favour of God. (McNeil & Gamer, 1938 [1990], p. 15)

When all similarities between the penitentials and earlier writings on penance have been recognized, it is still evident that the emergence of the series marks a new departure. Not only do the penitentials indicate a new method of penitential discipline; they also constitute a means hitherto unemployed of guiding confessors in their task. (Ibid, p.23)

To guide subjects, the penitentials listed sins and their corresponding punishment- from a few days fasting to years in exile. Whilst they contained inconsistencies with authorised teachings and the origin of many was arbitrary they were nonetheless widely used to instil discipline and order. They acted to create a relationship between the subject and a recognised Christian truth, establishing obligations to conduct oneself in certain ways. This extended to all layers of society – for example, Henry II, on seeking to assert sovereign rule over the Church was forced to do penance by the Pope after the murder of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas a Beckett.

THE PENITENTIALS

Book of penance set out the remedies (punishments) for a multitude of sins. The *Penitential of Theodore of Canterbury* (c668-690) has a large volume of penitentials under a wide range of headings. To the contemporary reader many of the penitentials appear obscure, but they had a significant impact at the time and many continue to influence our laws to this day (Berkeley, 2012). The penitentials helped govern knowledge of the truth, and the relations to obligations they created significantly modified behaviours. Examples of the penitentials include:

Excess and Drunkenness

5. Whoever is drunk against the Lords command, if he has taken a vow of sanctity, shall do penance for seven days on bread and water, or twenty days without fat; laymen, without beer.

Fornication

10. He who desires to commit fornication, but is not able, shall do penance for forty days.

Thieving Avarice

Money stolen or robbed from churches is to be restored fourfold; from secular person, twofold

Manslaughter

1. If one slays a man in revenge for a relative, he shall do penance as a murderer for ten years.
6. One who slays a man by command of his lord shall keep away from the church for forty days.


Three Principal Orders of the Church

5. A bishop or abbot may keep a criminal as a slave if he [the criminal] has not the means of redeeming himself

Baptism and Confirmation

1. In baptism sins are remitted

Translation by (McNeil & Gamer, 1938 [1990])



King Henry II of England (1133-89), being flogged by the monks of Canterbury Cathedral as penance for the murder of Thomas Becket (c.1117-80)

Figure 3.4 | Artist Unknown, Penance of Henry II, after an engraving in Carter's 'Specimens of Ancient Sculpture and Painting' published in 1780, Private Collection, engraving, Bridgeman Education (Image number: XJF32899)

3.3B CONFESSION

When the Church no longer authorised the use of penitentials this form of redemption gradually came to be replaced by confession. Confession, in contrast to penitence, was expiatory, placing emphasis on the purifying significance of priestly absolution (Smith & Kurian, 2010, p. 130) to assure “individual salvation in the next world” (Foucault, 1982, p. 783).

Confession requires the individual to construct and produce an account of themselves and to modify their behaviour as a consequence. It causes the individual to reveal themselves at confession and to always be observed by God. This requirement of Christians to confess was set out by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 which commanded that every Christian confess his sins at least once a year. In practice, this simply reinforced a practice that was likely to have already existed in medieval society. Nonetheless confession was now confirmed as an established and institutionalised form of self-assessment. Referred to as *the forum internum*, the 'internal court', its significance increased from 1215, becoming widespread and consistently adhered to throughout the Europe (Murray, 1993, p. 53).

The confession acted as a form of power which caused the subject to act on himself: it required the individual to self-assess themselves, to produce a truth about themselves and to modify their behaviour to bring it into accordance with the 'truth'. Towards the end of his career Foucault became increasingly interested with these confessional technologies of power and in *Technologies of the Self* (1988), he outlined the proximity and overlap between pastoral power and technologies of the self:


Christianity is not only a salvation religion, it is a confessional religion. It imposes very strict obligations of truth, dogma, and canon, more so than do the pagan religions. Truth obligations to believe this or that were and are still very numerous. The duty to accept a set of obligations, to hold certain books as permanent truth, to accept authoritarian decisions in matters of truth, not only to believe certain things but to show that one believes, and to accept institutional authority are all characteristic of Christianity.

In this way Foucault saw Christianity and the confession as playing a significant role in establishing relations to truth, relations to obligations and relations to oneself:

Christianity requires another form of truth obligation different from faith. Each person has the duty to know who he is, that is, to try to know what is happening inside him, to acknowledge faults, to recognize temptations, to locate desires, and everyone is obliged to disclose these things to either God or to others in the community and hence to bear public or private witness against oneself. The truth obligations of faith and the self are linked together. This link permits a purification of the soul impossible without self-knowledge. (Foucault, 1988)

This obligation, which Foucault argues stems from the Delphic principle, *gnothi sauton* ('Know yourself'), causes the subject to act upon himself in relation to Christian truths. It causes the


application of the technology of power Foucault calls, technology of the self. The Church used this type of power through confession to cause the subject to renounce himself in the name of God. In so doing it caused the subject to become constituted along Christian lines.



RENOUNCING THE SELF

Within the Bible it is easy to find evidence which backs up Foucault's claim that the aim of the confession was the renouncing of the self in the name of God. Matthew 16:24 states:

Let him deny himself: let him deny sinful self, ungodliness, and worldly lusts; and part with them, and his former sinful companions, which were as a part of himself: let him deny righteous self, and renounce all his own works of righteousness, in the business of justification and salvation; let him deny himself the pleasures and profits of this world, when in competition with Christ; let him drop and banish all his notions and expectations of an earthly kingdom, and worldly grandeur, and think of nothing but reproach, persecution, and death, for the sake of his Lord and Master: and take up his cross; cheerfully receive, and patiently bear, every affliction and evil, however shameful and painful it may be, which is appointed for him, and he is called unto; which is his peculiar cross, as every Christian has his own; to which he should quietly submit, and carry, with an entire resignation to the will of God, in imitation of his Lord



In 2012, the Minister of the day, Michael Gove marked the 400th anniversary of Kings' Bible by sending a leather-bound copy, to all primary and secondary schools in England and Wales, the spine of each copy being embossed with the words "PRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EDUCATION"

Left. Figure 3.6 | Photograph of part of the spine of the Kings' Bible distributed by the Secretary of State of Education to all primary and secondary schools in England, 2012

3.4 BLACK DEATH

In contrast to the instability at the end of first millennium, the beginning of the second millennium was a period in which England and Europe in general was able to flourish. International trade prospered on the back of growth in populations and technologies ranging from food production to transportation. Alongside these advances, a stable and thriving society produced the conditions for education to expand. Secular schools sprang up in cities to serve the mercantile and administrative classes whilst new translations of ancient Greek and Arabic texts along with new scientific and mathematical texts provided fuel for the continued development of the university (Logan, 2012, p. 132).

A stable society had been steadily emerging, but this period of economic and cultural development was brought to an abrupt and violent halt. Between the 1340s and the end of the fourteenth century the Black Death swept through Europe. Wiping out up to half of the population, it caused pain, misery and death in biblical proportions.

3.4A MORTALITY IN THE CHURCH

Society struggled to function. The economy buckled, food production broke down and Church administration was brought to the brink of collapse. The clergy suffered disproportionately during this time: exposed through issuing the last rites to those who were suffering, significant numbers either contracted the disease and died, or had fled in order to escape their inevitable fate. The effect of this was significant, as Harper-Bill explains:

With such high clerical mortality, so many churches left vacant and so few surviving unbeneficed chaplains who might fill them, there was obviously an urgent need to replenish the ranks of ordained ministers, especially priests, at a time when the pool of potential recruits was itself greatly diminished. The drastic fall in population did not mean that there were any fewer parishes to be served ... Moreover, demand for priests to celebrate for the souls of the dead had increased greatly. (1996, p. 87)

Society was in crisis: the Black Death resulted in a prolonged and profound economic depression and added to this there was the failure of crusades, The Hundred Years War with France and conflicts and war with Scotland, Ireland and Wales. The combined effect of these crises challenged the orthodox belief that the world conformed to God. Whilst at the time the Black Death was attributed to disease, foreigners, the poor, and Jews (DeWitte, 2006, p. 9) the question remained as to how God could allow this and the other disasters to happen. The Church sought to shore up its position with philosophers and theologians such as William of Ockham arguing that the people shouldn't seek to rationalise God. They could never fully understand God, he suggested, and instead they should therefore retain faith in all he does.

Whilst the Church was brought to brink of collapse, it weathered the storm. In the end rather than create a crisis of faith, the Black Death merely hardened the view that worship and

compliance with religious law was imperative for personal salvation. So although the structures of the Church were in disarray, the strength of Christianity was stronger than ever. The increase in demand for church services which resulted coupled with the shortfall in manpower capable of delivering them led to a number of educational developments. Chief among these was a significant growth in provision for secular priests with seventy colleges created for that purpose between 1350 and 1530. At the same time there was recognition of the need to use other techniques to develop clerical knowledge. An example of this was the publication of the *Lay folks Catechism* (1373) by John Thoresby, Archbishop of York, which provided those training for priesthood with a core text to help them guide the conduct of the Christian subject (Harper-Bill, 1996, p. 109).

3.4B PURGATORY

Whilst Purgatory hadn't originated with the Black Death, it did increase the consciousness of the living, on their plight after death. "The stench of death and the sight of the reaper's scythe cutting down millions indiscriminately focused attention, as nothing else could, on the afterlife" (Logan, 2012, p. 268). The Black Death served to increase consciousness and contemplation, and reinforced myths and superstitions to a point whereby the "psychological consequence of greatly increased and sudden mortality was an almost desperate fear of oblivion after death" (Harper-Bill, 1996, p. 110).

That the concept of purgatory was so indelibly inscribed onto the psyche of medieval Europe reveals that so too were the teachings of the Church, its orthodox truth, its concept of morality, its perspective of right and wrong, good and evil, sin and sinner. This stands in sharp contrast to the polytheistic pagan society, which worshipped 'sticks and stones' when Augustine arrived in Britain in 597. Thus, during this period there had been a significant shift in the prevailing *episteme* of the time. Accepted truth had been radically changed and along with it obligations to oneself and to others had been fundamentally reframed. The effect was the profound recasting of the constitution of the subject. But this effect begs the question, exactly how did it happen: exactly how did a society transform itself from one that worshipped sticks and stones to one which feared God?

3.5 PREACHING AS TEACHING

Silver and Lawson (1973) claim that only 3% of the population were educated at this time, but this assertion depends on how education is defined. Until now my focus has followed the traditional outline of education found in most historical accounts for the period - one which takes the modern conception of schooling and traces it back, looking for evidence in the past of something which resembles the present. Such as account follows the development of schools and universities, their location, their origination and so on. This traditional perspective of medieval education is one that can be found in benchmark texts such as *Schools of Medieval*

England by A.F Leach (1915) its more contemporary counterpart *Medieval Schools: From Roman Britain to Renaissance England*, by Nicholas Orme (2006), as well as more general histories of education by Lawson and Silver, Brian Simon and others. Such a method is one which Foucault employed in his earliest works, beginning like “a pure empiricist, simply selecting as his raw data an ensemble of what were taken to be serious speech acts during a given period..., [and then] group[ing] together those serious speech acts which refer to a common object” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 59/61).

However to understand education by simply looking at the discourse that refers to schools or to education would be to omit recognition of educational *practices* which may be independent of this discourse. It is therefore important and necessary to extend the analysis beyond the discourse of education to examine *practices of education*- to extend the analysis beyond the discourse of the school, in order to identify in our history, those practices which educated society in the truth of the Christian Church. And when this is done, a whole new vista opens up, beyond that of the traditional historical account of education, one which occurred not in the school, but in the church itself. This analysis is pivotal to understanding how the Church was able to constitute the Christian subject at a time when only 3% of the population were literate.

By the thirteenth century, churches were to be found in almost every parish and village in the land, and attendance on a Sunday was the norm. It is during these services that the majority of the population was taught. Not a broad curriculum and certainly not a critical nor a liberal curriculum, but nonetheless, taught they were. Analysing the routines of these churches, and in particular the procedure of preaching within them reveals that across England there existed a system with practices very similar to those we today call education.

Firstly, the Church had what might otherwise be called a highly structured, centralised national curriculum. Helen Leith Spencer’s (1993) authoritative account of preaching in the Middle Ages demonstrates that the content of sermons was highly controlled by a central Church authority. Since printing didn’t arrive in Britain until 1476, the production and distribution of texts at this time was a highly specialised task, something which supported the Church in regulating the content of church services. The Church produced sermons which followed a regularised structure that took in the Christian calendar and reflected upon the most important parts of the Bible. These texts were then published and circulated by the Church to priests. In the form of model sermons these were influential narratives constructed for use by other preachers. As Spencer explains:

Model sermon collections were a sensible solution to limited access to books and restricted educational facilities...[D]rawn from the common stock of religious writing, [they] assist[ed] a preacher not only by giving him something to say, but also by showing him how to present it. That is, they influence both the content and organisation of individual sermons and collections. Furthermore, the long tradition of producing model collections ensured that the user would already understand

how such books were customarily arranged and what to expect from a new compilation. Models influence models. (Spencer, 1993, pp. 46-47)

There is evidence that they were locally interpreted, but these model sermons formed the backbone of what was delivered each Sunday. In this sense they represented a structured, centralised curriculum, albeit one which had a very narrow scope. In this way not only did model sermons reflect something analogous to a national curriculum, they also influenced the future structure and development of new sermons. Thus whilst individual preachers undoubtedly tailored their services to their own style and local influences, it is clear that a highly centralised set of knowledge was widely preached.

Secondly, the content and organisation of model sermons followed the *sermons de temporale* and *sermons de sanctis*. These were the two principal influences on structure and related to the major Christian festivals and holy days. The preaching calendar therefore included major festivals such as Easter, Christmas and Whit (Pentecost), just as the modern-day structure of the school year is based around these festivals. A complete collection of *de tempore* and *de sanctis* provided more sermons than were needed at certain times of year, and when the catechetical syllabus was interwoven, this often resulted in a crowded 'curriculum'.

Thirdly, the sermon used familiar pedagogical approaches. Preachers would summarise key points at the end of a sermon, recapping the principal lessons from the previous week, and issuing notes on the sermon to those gathered. (Spencer, 1993, pp. 42-43). This was part of the process of embedding the message in minds of the congregation, but it also aimed at enabling the dissemination of key information to those not present (Spencer, 1993, p. 74).

Fourth, the right to preach was restricted by license, with preacher training and the distribution of sermons and other texts controlled (Spencer, 1993, pp. 5-6). Debate about who was qualified to preach – bishops, secular priests, lay priests, (Spencer, 1993, pp. 50-55), and what training was required to preach could be highly contested. Alongside the right to preach, there is some evidence of the control and assessment of standards of preaching and of provision of further training for those found wanting (Spencer, 1993, p. 63).

Fifth, alongside the sermon wider guidance was issued around the pastoral care of souls. "In the years that followed [the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215], a distinctive type of didactic literature emerged to educate pastors and to prepare them to teach their people...Not just bishops and learned monks, but every priest charged with the care of souls was expected to learn the techniques of pastoral care" (Anthony, Mantello, & Rigg, 1996), which were set out in the texts composed between 1200 and the end of the Middle Ages. And thus whilst the sermons were set texts to be delivered from the pulpit, there was alongside the necessity for a curriculum for the preachers which included the pre-requisites for hearing and responding to confessions (Peter Quinel, Bishop of Exeter 1287).

TEACHING V. PREACHING



Figure 3.7 | Artist Unknown, (c.1460) *Ms 1044 fol.73v A philosophy lesson*, from *Ovide Moralise* written by Chretien Legouis, Bibliotheque Municipale, Rouen, France, vellum, Bridgeman Education (Image Number: XIR240934)



Figure 3.9 | Artist Unknown, (c.1460), *Ms 1044 fol.67 The Sermon*, from *Ovide Moralise* written by Chretien Legouis, Bibliotheque Municipale, Rouen, France, vellum, Bridgeman Education (Image Number XIR200033)




Figure 3.8 | Artist Unknown, (c. 15th century) *Interior of a School*, reproduced from an illustration in 'Science and Literature in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance', written and engraved by Paul Lacroix, 1878, Private Collection, engraving, Bridgeman Education (Image Number: XJF173290)



Figure 3.10 | Artist Unknown, (c. 14th Century) *Ms.230 fol.57 Monk Preaching on Imitation*, from 'Sermons sur la Passion et Traites Divers' by Jean Gerson, Bibliotheque Municipale, Valenciennes, Bridgeman (Image Number: XIR171017)

ST GEORGE'S CHURCH LECTURE THEATRE



Figure 3.9 | Harrison, P. (2013), St George's Church Lecture Theatre




Figure 3.8 | Velazquez, J.A, Lecture at St George's Church Lecture Theatre

In contemporary times the University of Sheffield acquired St. George's Church, converting it into a lecture theatre: lecture as sermon, lecturer as preacher.

3.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have shown how the transformation that occurred between the sixth century and the later Middle Ages, from a pagan society to a Christian one, was achieved by educating the population not through the school, but through the church itself. The purpose of this Christian education was clear from the beginning when Pope Gregory sent Augustine on his mission, a purpose which was continually reinforced, first through the education of the clergy in church run schools, and then by the clergy through the delivery of sermons at weekly church services. From the very beginning Pope Gregory and Augustine set out to construct a Christian society which would later become a Christian nation.

Achieving this aim, sermons, based on the bible, were carefully controlled by the Church to provide an authorised account of knowledge which was transmitted to the population as a whole. Alongside the sermon, the development of the penitentials and then confession served to provide the Church with a unique form of power. This pastoral power acted to inveigle the population into behaving and acting in certain ways through the threat of eternal damnation and the promise of salvation. Not only did this act upon individual behaviours of the population, fundamentally it acted to reinforce the need to attend church and the need to confess one's sins. This served to constitute the subject in certain ways. It constructed relations between the subject and the truth set out by the Church, which would be continually examined through the confession. It made a set of obligations for the individual to himself - to be the good Christian in order to be redeemed. And it constructed a set of relations to others – to be part of a Christian community or not, and for the parent to support their child to be a good Christian or allow him to go to hell.


Thus the subject came to be constituted along Christian lines through the creation of a centralised, official truth (the Bible), to which the subject was obligated through pastoral and sovereign power – law, baptism, penitence and confession. These twin forces – an established truth and the obligation to accept it, ensured the indoctrination of the subject to the ideology of the Church.

This period of time reminds us that in the present we should be wary of centralised and rigid conceptions of truth and wary too of the power to obligate the acceptance of such truths. In tandem, centralised knowledge (such as an uncritical national curriculum) and the enforcement of its acceptance (compulsory education) might act to indoctrinate rather than educate.

Today the influence of this early Church led education continues. The Church of England remains the largest provider of schools in England with “nearly 4,500 Church of England primary and middle schools and more than 190 secondary schools. Nearly one in five primary school children are educated in Church of England primary schools by 19% of all primary

teachers" (Church of England, 2013). At the same time the law states that all pupils in primary and secondary schools must participate in a daily act of worship that is "wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian character" (Shepherd, 2010), whilst in May 2012, the 'Minister of the day', the Secretary of State for Education issued leather-bound copies of the King James Bible to all secondary schools in England in Wales.

CHAPTER 4



Transcending the Christian Constitution of the Subject




Figure 4.1 | Blake, William, (1795), *Newton*, Copper engraving with pen and ink and watercolour, Tate Britain

4.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

As the last chapter made clear, the Church held a dominant position over the constitution of the subject for over a thousand years. From Augustine's arrival in England in 597 until late into the second millennium, Christianity dominated control of accepted truth. The subject related to a Christian truth, was obligated to Christian truths, and understood himself in Christian terms and in Christian ways. The constitution of the Christian subject was achieved through the persistent and relentless education (indoctrination) of the population, realised not in the school, but in the church itself: preacher as teacher, church as lecture hall, congregation as class, sermons as curriculum, service as lesson, good student redeemed, the uneducated a sinner.

In this chapter I aim to set out how this stranglehold was weakened so that later in the thesis a full understanding of how the Christian constitution of the subject was transcended can be established.

First I will look at the way in which the dominant Christian understanding of the world which had prevailed for over a millennium came to be challenged by the development of science. Second, I examine how, when science had succeeded in dealing Christian knowledge a significant blow, philosophy came to question and doubt the validity of all knowledge. Thirdly, from this position of doubt I set out how philosophy then sought to resolve this negative epistemology through the development of the conflicting approaches of rationalism and empiricism. Finally I set out how it was empiricism that rose to prominence as the dominant force in the way in which knowledge comes to be accepted. Throughout the chapter I argue that the changing epistemological framework caused changes to accepted truth and relations to it. The overall purpose of this chapter is therefore to set up an understanding of the way in which the underlying *episteme* was radically changed during this period allowing for new constitutions of the subject to emerge.

4.2 CHALLENGING THE CHURCH AS THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY.

Accepted truth in Augustinian Christian Britain took as its anchor point a belief held since at least the 2nd century AD when a consensus in astronomy emerged which followed the thinking of the Greco-Roman, Ptolemy. Asserting that the earth was at the centre of the universe, this geocentric position was adopted and promoted in Christianity and remained as the almost universally held view until the sixteenth century. For 1400 years the accepted understanding of the Christian world was therefore both geo-centric and homo-centric. In other words, accepted truth stated that the earth was the centre of a God made universe and man was the focus of His attention. This understanding formed the bedrock of Christian thought, establishing God as all powerful, and casting man in His image. It established the subservient relationship between man and God, enabled the concepts of heaven and hell to be explained in astronomical terms, and through this established the fundamental position of pastoral power – sinners will be punished in hell, good Christians will gain eternal life in heaven.

The challenge to this orthodoxy started in earnest with Copernicus and the publication of *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* (*On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres*, 1543). In this work Copernicus set out the revolutionary claim that that it was the sun, rather than the earth, that was at the centre of the universe. The Church quickly recognised that through such a theory “the whole established order was placed under threat” (Magee, 1998b, p. 65). They realised that if the earth was no longer understood to be at the centre of the universe, then neither was man, and in this way the whole relationship of man to God would be thrown into doubt. The Church, Lutherans, Protestants and Catholics alike, all acted quickly to condemn Copernicus in an attempt to quash his findings.

Despite the condemnation, scientists continued to build on this new perspective. Kepler and Galileo took Copernicus’s work forward creating a line of succession that culminated in the publication of Newton’s *Principia* in 1687. In this major work, Newton provided an accurate and comprehensive description of the planetary system, describing the earth as a minor star of a minor planet in an ever unfolding universe. Between Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton there was now such a weight of theory behind a post-Ptolemaic astronomy that the orthodox Christian belief that the earth was the centre of a God made universe, was severely challenged. This challenge to some of the fundamental beliefs about God and man, led to scrutiny of the Bible. Questions were asked – Was Adam really the first man? Did Christ really rise from the dead? Was Christ really born to a virgin mother? In short, were the miracles

true? Doubt had been created and in the analysis that followed the validity of large parts of the Bible was thrown into question. And if the Bible was to be doubted, then so too was the Church - if the Bible was no longer seen as true, then it followed that the Church could not be seen as representing the truth, and consequently what authority did the Church have?

For a thousand years Britain had been shrouded in the mist of Christianity, but with the science of Kepler, Galileo, Copernicus and Newton the fog began to lift. The effect of this was not only the destabilisation of orthodox religion, but since much of the established authority revolved around the Church and religion, it also dealt a blow to the idea of authority itself. Science had demonstrated that what those in authority had been saying was questionable, and so their power now came into question too. In this way the whole basis for society suddenly became fragile.

Philosophers began to exploit the findings of science. Thinkers such as Voltaire, d'Holbach, Spinoza and Diderot were all characteristic of the scepticism of the time, posing and prompting questions such as: If the Bible wasn't true, what was? If what the Church said wasn't true, then what was? And who would decide? Who has the authority over knowledge and to what ends is it directed?

Following the science of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton, philosophers were destabilising the existing order, upsetting the entrenched, totalising, epistemological and ontological assumptions that had stood for centuries. Nonetheless it would be wrong to suggest that the philosophers were against religion *per se*. Many Enlightenment thinkers were deeply religious, but what the majority of them shared was contempt for the Western monotheist mysticism of religions such as Christianity. For many Enlightenment thinkers the Bible was a myth but this didn't stop them believing in a transcendental superior. It was just on a different level. The religion of many Enlightenment thinkers was deist¹ – a belief in a supreme creator, but one who was removed from humans. The planets and stars had to come from somewhere, but for the deists the supreme being who had created them wasn't linked to mankind, didn't have man at the centre of the universe. So for many enlightenment thinkers religion was important, but biblical Christianity and all that it entailed, manifest through the Church, in fear and religious ritual, was wrong. Deism could be rationalised. Monotheism (Christianity) could not. Religion then was not the enemy, but for the most part the Christian Church was, for through the way it controlled knowledge, society, education, publishing and the law, it was seen as holding progress back. Thus what started with Copernicus in astronomy

¹ Certainly not all philosophers of the time were deists and indeed it would also be wrong to think that their views remained constant. Hume for example became a deist but eventually was to turn his back on it. The picture is a complex one, but in general terms what is in evidence is a general shift away from monotheism towards deism.

and science, soon developed to present a radical challenge to the status quo that would lead to fundamental changes to the constitution of the subject.

4.3 SCIENCE SEEKS TO REPLACE RELIGION

Since Augustine, subjects had come to recognise themselves in relation to accepted Christian truth. The effect was for subjects to be constituted by the Church, born into a God given position in society which was to be dutifully accepted. Subjects knew themselves through the scriptures and their relationship to the Bible's truth; created a relationship to themselves through the confession; knew themselves as good or bad, sinners or redeemed; and understood their place in the world as subservient to God, renouncing themselves and giving themselves up for Him. But now Science was battling with religion for the claim to truth, destabilising the entire order of society.

In monotheist religion, man thought the world was made for him - religion was for man, belief was for man. But what was science to be for? Newton characterises the early move by considering nature "as an orderly domain governed by strict mathematical-dynamical laws and the conception of *ourselves* as capable of knowing those laws" (Bristow, 2010). Newton here lays the foundation of the Enlightenment by placing the universe in a natural and rationally understandable domain. If through Christianity man had placed himself at the centre of monotheist world, now he was beginning to place himself placed at the centre of a scientific one. If with religion man had been constituted by the Church, now through science he would seek to constitute himself, not in an arbitrary, mystical way, but through the objective laws of nature.

Nonetheless, this was a battle for the claim to truth and the idea of science wholeheartedly replacing religion as the means by which we constitute ourselves, was not one which was universally supported. William Blake was critical of the absence of spirituality in science, whilst Alexander Pope's, *An Essay on Man* (1734 [1870]), is indicative of a struggle for man to constitute himself through science and at the same time retain faith in God. He argues that the objective should be to "vindicate the ways of God to Man" by explaining that how the universe functions according to rational, natural laws which have been created by God. Whilst Pope was promoting the virtue of science, he did so by warning man not to think that science was his creation. Instead he was arguing that science was simply a way of explaining a small part of God's creation. Man, he said should remove his pride, show modesty, stop being a fool and recognise that for all his science he will never fully explain his own beginning or his reason for being.

Despite the concerns of Blake, Pope and others, the period is characterised by a shift in epistemology from one which privileged God, to one which privileged science. Even for the deist thinkers the central foundational principles of knowledge were being swept away creating the space for new ways of knowing the world, ways that would need to be created through science and philosophy. It is here, at this time, that great philosophical debates occurred. How should man now see himself if not through the eyes of Church? What should his purpose be if not to serve God? How should he be ruled over if not by the rule of God?




Figure 4.2 | Dahl, Michael, (1727), *Alexander Pope*, National Portrait Gallery, London

ALEXANDER POPE'S 'AN ESSAY ON MAN'

Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;

The proper study of Mankind is Man.

Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise, and rudely great:
With too much knowledge for the Sceptic side,
With too much weakness for the Stoic's pride,
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest,
In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast;
In doubt his Mind or Body to prefer,
Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err;
Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
Whether he thinks too little, or too much:
Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confus'd;
Still by himself abus'd, or disabus'd;

Go, wond'rous creature! mount where Science guides

Go, measure earth, weigh air, and state the tides;

Instruct the planets in what orbs to run,

Correct old Time, and regulate the Sun;

Go, soar with Plato to th'empyreal sphere,
To the first good, first perfect, and first fair;
Or tread the mazy round his follow'rs trod,
And quitting sense call imitating God;
As Eastern priests in giddy circles run,
And turn their heads to imitate the Sun.
Go, teach Eternal Wisdom how to rule -
Then drop into thyself, and be a fool!

Superior being, when of late they saw

A mortal man unfold all Nature's law,

Admir'd such wisdom in an earthly shape,

And shew'd a NEWTON as we shew an Ape.

Could he, whose rules the rapid Comet bind,
Describe or fix one movement of his Mind?

Who saw its fires here rise, and there descend,

Explain his own beginning, or his end?

Alas what wonder! Man's superior part

Trace Science then, with Modesty thy guide;

First strip off all her equipage of Pride,

Deduct what is but Vanity, or Dress,

Or Learning's Luxury, or Idleness;

Or tricks to shew the stretch of human brain,

Mere curious pleasure, ingenious pain:

Expunge the whole, or lop th' excrescent parts

Of all, our Vices have created Arts:

Then see how little the remaining sum,

Which serv'd the past, and must the times to come!

Pope, A, (1734), Second Epistle of *An Essay on Man*, as reproduced in *Poetical Works*, ed. H. F. Cary (London: Routledge, 1870), 225-226. Emphasis added



Figure 4.1 | Blake, William, (1795), *Newton*, Copper engraving with pen and ink and watercolour, Tate Britain

NEWTON - PERSONIFICATION OF MAN LIMITED BY REASON

'Newton had successfully explained the workings of the physical universe. To Blake, however, this was not enough: Newton had omitted God, as well as all those significant emotional and spiritual elements which cannot be quantified, from his theories. Blake boasted that he had 'fourfold vision' while Newton with his 'single vision' was as good as asleep. To Blake, Newton, Bacon and Locke with their emphasis on reason were nothing more than 'the three great teachers of atheism, or Satan's Doctrine'.

In this print from 1795 Newton is portrayed drawing with a pair of compasses. Compasses were a traditional symbol of God, 'architect of the universe', but ... the picture progresses from exuberance and colour on the left, to sterility and blackness on the right. In Blake's view Newton brings not light, but night.'

(Tate, 2013)

4.4 RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM

Attempting to unpick these questions philosophy flourished across two broad planes of thought: rationalism and empiricism. On the one hand “rationalism takes the position that self-evident propositions deduced by reason are the sole basis of all knowledge ... [whereas empiricism] argues that all knowledge must ultimately be derived from the senses” (Magee, 1998). These two different accounts of knowledge led to different views on what counted as knowledge. This in turn would lead to different conceptions of the relationship to these different truths and therefore different ways of conceiving the constitution of the subject.

Descartes, the first modern rationalist, believed that knowledge was too readily accepted and had often been unchallenged. On this basis he argued that knowledge should be doubted in its entirety. From a starting point which threw everything into doubt (Cottingham, 2007, p. 22), Descartes concluded that certain types of knowledge were doubtful, and only those derived entirely from reason and from logic, could be true. He argued that it was reasonable to conclude:

... that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other sciences dealing with things that have complex structures are doubtful; while arithmetic, geometry and other studies of the simplest and most general things – whether they really exist in nature or not – contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two plus three makes five, and a square has only four sides. It seems impossible to suspect that such obvious truths might be false. (Descartes, 1641 [2008])

Having cast doubt over knowledge Descartes then used his rational argumentation to affirm the existence of God. He wrote in the *Fifth Meditation*:

But, if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something that entails everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature. (Descartes, 1641 [2008])

Descartes’ belief in God was notable in that the concept of God he is trying to support is “based on the monotheist Christian notion of a supremely perfect being” (Viens, 2001). In the preface of *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641), Descartes writes “Granted, it is altogether true that we must believe in God’s existence because it is taught in the Holy Scriptures, and, conversely, that we must believe the Holy Scriptures because they have come from God...”. Thus Descartes was rationalising not only God, but the Bible, the Church and the way in which

Christianity was manifest in society. Descartes was propounding the authority of the Bible. The new epistemological thinking developed during the Enlightenment was being used by Descartes to justify God, not through mysticism and superstition, but via rationalism and logic.

In contrast to this position developed by Descartes, Spinoza used the sense of doubt to “examine the scriptures as historical documents that were of problematic authorship ... embod[ying] the intellectual limitations of their time” (Magee, 1998b, p. 90). Spinoza saw the creation of state religion with “no rational foundation, and a mere ‘respect for ecclesiastics’ that involve[d] adulation and mysteries but no true worship of God’ (Nadler, 2008, p. 239). He challenged specific accounts in the Bible, arguing from a rational perspective that it should be possible to identify the natural cause of every event. Nothing, he said “happens in nature that does not follow from her laws” (Spinoza, 1677 [1991]). Thus for Spinoza, the ascension of Christ, the parting of the sea for Moses, and the virgin birth, all had to be doubted.

Spinoza was challenging religion, the Church, superstition and mysticism. He was challenging the way in which the Church constructed knowledge and used it to control people in certain ways. However he was not challenging God. On the contrary he concluded that since God has no limits, God is everything: to think otherwise would be to place limits on God. On the one hand he therefore sought to undermine the scriptures and structures of religion, but on the other hand he sort to develop an image of God that was panentheistic².

Furthermore Spinoza sought to make the distinction between morality and ethics: morality, through religion, which declares a truth and arbitrarily proclaims that actions are good or evil, is distinguished from ethics, not a proclaimed truth, but a consequential truth that reveals actions to be good or bad. Spinoza was in favour of ethics, and against morality. Morality seeks obedience, ethics seeks to educate (Garver, 2006) (Deleuze, 1988, p. Chap.2). In ethics Spinoza saw rationality and in both ethics and rationality he saw the need for education. In *Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order* (1677) he said:

Nothing can agree more with the nature of anything than other individuals of the same species. And so nothing is more useful to man in preserving his being and enjoying a rational life than a man who is guided by reason. Again, because, among singular things, we know nothing more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, we can show best how much our skill and understanding are worth by educating men so that at last they live according to the command of their reason (Spinoza B. , 1677, p. IV IX).

² Spinoza's view of God is sometimes described as panentheist as distinct from pantheist. Panentheism differs in that God is seen as being nature, the world, the universe, whereas pantheism sees God as being the animating force of nature, the world, the universe.

Whilst sharing a broad theoretical perspective, in Descartes and Spinoza, perhaps the most celebrated rationalist thinkers, there are then two radically different and conflicting accounts of God, religion and truth. Both used rationalism: Descartes in an attempt to underpin monotheist religion with logic, and Spinoza to identify a panentheistic God to challenge the authority and morality of monotheist religious accounts and practices.

4.5 EMPIRICISM

Whilst Descartes and Spinoza sought to develop a rational understanding of the world, others, were at the same time, seeking to develop knowledge not rationally, but empirically. Whilst in medieval times there was a belief that we would simply continue to discover new knowledge until there was nothing left to know, empiricists such as Locke rejected that it was possible to ever know everything, asserting that there are limits to what can be known. Locke argued that if we can ascertain what our faculties are capable of /not capable of, then we will recognise the limits of our knowledge. He argued that these limits would be derived by the limits of our senses, irrespective of what might exist externally to us. Placing the limits of our knowledge on the limits of our faculties caused Locke to examine sense experience, emphasizing that it is only through the senses that we can recognise anything external to us. He suggested that whilst the mind can then manipulate those sensory inputs, if it constructs knowledge which is not based on input data, then it has no correlation to the external reality of the world. Because our senses are for the most part the same, he wanted to assert that by virtue of this we are born a '*tabula rasa*', that no one is superior to anyone else, and that there is no pre-ordained structure or order to society. Consequently he saw education as being fundamental to human development.

Another empiricist of the time, Hume, believed that we could never really attain certainty and that instead we should seek to arrive at a position of probability. He argued that we could never be certain of the link between a cause and an effect. That *a* follows *b* is not to say *a* is caused by *b*. In other words he believed that we can think we know, but can never be certain of it. He thus rejected the principle of induction as a basis for secure knowledge. (Russell, 1945 [2012], pp. 604-612). Hume believed, we should "hold our opinions and expectations diffidently, knowing them to be fallible, and should respect those of others. The whole temper of his philosophy is in this way modest, moderate and tolerant..." (Magee, 1998, p. 116). Combined with his sceptical view of certainty, Hume questioned authority, suggesting that the views of any authority had no greater grounds than the views of anyone else.


4.6 KANT – JOINING EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM

Kant developed the work of Hume, questioning rationalist metaphysics and suggesting that:

It [reason/rationalist metaphysics] begins from principles whose use is unavoidable in the course of experience and at the same time sufficiently warranted by it. With these principles it rises (as its nature also requires) ever higher, to more remote conditions. But since it becomes aware in this way that its business must always remain incomplete because the questions never cease, reason sees itself necessitated to take refuge in principles that overstep all possible use in experience But it thereby falls into obscurity and contradictions (Kant, 1781 [1999], p. 99)

Like Hume, Kant suggested that the limits of our knowledge are dictated by the limits of our senses and faculties. He argued that the sum total of what our senses can experience is the sum total of what we can know. If our senses can't experience it, we can't know it. He showed that what our senses experience is through us – through our eyes, our ears and so on and that these channels of experience have limitations – what we hear is limited to the capacity of our ears. Sounds of certain frequencies exist, but our ears have no way of experiencing them. He concluded that we can therefore only experience the representation of something through our senses – the way a sound represents itself to us and not how the noise actually sounds. He called this knowledge phenomenal knowledge. The representations are subject dependent – they depend on the subject who is experiencing them. Everything, he suggested, therefore exists to us in space and time.

But he also concluded that alongside the subjective knowledge that we experience, another set of knowledge must exist that we cannot experience. A set of knowledge to which we have no means of access. He called this noumenal knowledge. Kant argued that phenomenal knowledge is likely to be very much smaller than noumenal



Kant's argument ruled out *knowledge* of God, but it did not rule God out. God could still exist but, according to Kant, we have no access to knowledge of Him. Such a view undermined the

authority of the Church. Whilst Kant suggested that existence of God could not be proved or disproved, since there was no way of saying for certain, he showed that all knowledge of God was mythical.

4.7 THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

There were then, two broadly different philosophical views of the time seeking to emerge from the mysticism of the Medieval Age. On the one hand there was empiricism which sought to construct knowledge through sense experience, and on the other there was rationalism, attempting to build knowledge from logical and foundational truths. What both strains of philosophy shared was doubt: the need to question knowledge, to challenge the accepted beliefs of the past.

As both philosophies developed it was empiricism that rose to prominence as the basis for the scientific method, becoming a dominant force in the way in which we have come to accept knowledge through until this day. As a method, its process is one which typically seeks to collect data, organise this data so as to identify patterns within it, through which a hypothesis can be developed which can then be tested and evaluated, before conclusions can be reached. This approach to knowledge creation seeks objectivity. It is a method which runs counter to mysticism.

There was a sense that through such methods we would be able to ascertain knowledge in such a way that it would reveal scientifically and objectively who we are. A sense that the constitution of who we are would somehow become independent of us, whereas previously it was dependent on religion and the Church. In other words a sense that previously it was constructed by mankind through religious myth, and now an independent reality would be objectively known through science. But even at the time, Kant and others raised the subjectivity involved in knowledge – our inability to divorce ourselves from anything that we can claim to know. With the shift in epistemology, they argued that man not only becomes “the subject and the object of his own understanding...but even more paradoxically ... [the] organiser of the spectacle in which he appears” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, pp. 28-29). And so whilst there were attempts at constructing newly independent knowledge, in reality Christian mysticism gradually came to be replaced by empirical subjectivism. One set of constructed arguments began to be replaced by another. One set of arguments were being advanced in the place of another. One way of the subject coming to be constituted being replaced by another.

4.8 CONCLUSION

Under the Christian *episteme* the truth was set out in the Bible and delivered in the church. Subjects learned who they were through this process – they learned accepted truths, how they related to these truths, how they were obligated to/by them, and the way in which all this caused them to relate to themselves and others. The Church acted to constitute the subject as Christian according to accepted Christian truths. This became cemented in society via church services delivered in a manner with many parallels to what we today call education. The break with this position came when the accepted truth was destabilised, first through the science of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton which challenged the belief that the earth was at the centre of a God made universe and then by the Enlightenment philosophy of the likes of Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Hume and Kant which questioned the fundamental basis of knowledge casting further doubt on monotheist Christian beliefs.

Through enlightenment thought, the scientific approach emerged, striving to attain objective truth through empirical evidence which aimed to create reasoned autonomy, freedom, liberty, and progress, bringing us ‘into the light’, supporting equality, empowering education, and creating the basis for a fair and just society. Central to this aim was the desire to remove power based on tradition, superstition and myth, to destabilise the notion that man is born into a God given positions. Through science and art, music and philosophy as the Enlightenment project developed it created new sources of knowledge which weakened the authority of the Church.

It is in this period that the Kantian question “What are we today?” appears as a recognition that the understanding of what humans are changes at this precise moment. The understanding of man based on his relationship to a Christian God was crumbling, but science and philosophy had yet to deliver an accepted truth to take its place. “What are we today?” appears at this moment as *the* question of time.

It is at this moment that:

Man, who was once himself a being among others, now is subject among objects. But Man is not only a subject among objects, he soon realizes that what he is seeking to understand is not


only the objects of the world but himself. Man becomes the subject and the object of his own understanding. (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 28)

“What are we today?” was recognition of this. The sudden rupture and refusal of Christian truth left many unanswered questions. What was man for, if not to serve God? What is his purpose? How should he be in the world? How should he see himself? What should count as truth and what is man’s relationship to it? These were the questions philosophers wrestled with as modernity rushed forth.

When Foucault says: My aim is to answer the question, ‘how did the history of our thought, I mean of our relation to truth, to obligations, to ourselves and to the others, make us what we are?’ (Foucault M. , 1983); he does so in the recognition that it is at this moment that the history of our thought, the relation to truth, obligations, to ourselves and to the others becomes radically disrupted.

In the next chapter I set out ways in which man sought to reconstruct these relations and how far from emancipating the subject, modernity simply changes the basis on which these relations are forged, binding subjects to knowledge based on science and reason, instead of moral codes derived from religion and myth.

CHAPTER 5



Contesting Educational Aims for an Enlightened Subject



Figure 5.1 | Engraving after Opie, John (1797), *Mary Wollstonecraft*, frontispiece of the book William Godwin, *His Friends and Contemporaries, With Portraits And Illustrations. Vol. II.* Kegan Paul.

5.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The categorical reference points of God and the Bible which stood as the essential foundation of knowledge for a thousand years had been thrown into doubt by science, allowing for philosophy to seek to construct anew man's place in the world. Thus the Enlightenment caused and produced a great flux in thought which might be characterised as an attempt to answer the Kantian question 'What are we today?'. The philosophical examinations and deliberations which resulted sought to construct arguments for how man should be in the world, if not, if no longer, as a subject of God.

By examining the different ways in which philosophy sought to construct new knowledge about man, this chapter aims to illuminate the contested nature of the constitution of the subject, and illustrate how different perspectives sought to influence education in different ways.

The chapter explores the philosophy of education during this period by contrasting a number of positions which continue to have influence to this day. The chapter begins by first exploring the idea of natural development, an educational aim developed by Jean- Jacques Rousseau, before examining the utilitarian perspectives of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham and then the radical philosophy of education as espoused by Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin.

Each of the perspectives considered were developed in response to specific concerns of the time. As Hegel suggested philosophy is "...its own time apprehended in thought..." (1821) . "As such the insight that the form that philosophy takes in any given age is always influenced by, and intimately related to, the presuppositions embedded in the culture of that age" (Carr, 2005, p. 37). At the same time whilst "philosophy is always a creature of its past", it is also, simultaneously, "a creator of its future" (Dewey 1931, in Carr 2005). In this way we should recognise that the importance of all of the perspectives analysed in this chapter as extending from the period in which they were developed through until the present day.

Through the analysis of each perspective the aim is therefore to outline how different philosophical views about 'how man should be in the world', gave rise to different and correlative views about the aims of education, that were both of their time, but which have also influenced and continue to influence the philosophy of education to this day. At the same time it is necessary to read these perspectives as *arguments* for particular ways of constituting the subject and particular aims of education which have had differing levels of influence in actuality.

5.2 NATURAL DEVELOPMENT - JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

Emile: Or ; On Education, was published in 1762, and was Rousseau's principal work on the subject of education. Published as a novel about the child Emile, it reached a wide audience. In the novel, Rousseau develops the notion of what we in more recent times have come to call child-centred education. Rousseau is at pains to allow Emile to develop 'naturally'. Throughout the book he argues against constituting the child as anything other than a child. "He should be neither beast nor man, but a child..." (p.47). Rousseau does not want to frame the child, but instead seeks to allow the child to develop and grow in his own way, so that:

... the education of the earliest years...consists, not in teaching virtue or truth, but in preserving the heart from vice and from the spirit of error. If only you could let well alone, and get others to follow your example; if you could bring your scholar to the age of twelve strong and healthy, but unable to tell his right hand from his left, the eyes of his understanding would be open to reason as soon as you began to teach him. Free from prejudices and free from habits, there would be nothing in him to counteract the effects of your labours. In your hands he would soon become the wisest of men; by doing nothing to begin with you would end with a prodigy of education. (p. 55)

As such Rousseau argues for discovery based learning from around the age of 2 through to 12 which follows the natural development of the child. He contrasts this with a model of education based a pre-determined curriculum, where the task is for the teacher to impart knowledge onto the child (Bertram, 2010). However, Rousseau recognises the difficulty of the task of developing a child away from the influences that will inevitably shape him and constitute him:

But where shall we find a place for our child so as to bring him up...? Shall we keep him in the moon, or on a desert island? Shall we remove him from human society? Will he not always have around him the sight and the pattern of the passions of other people? Will he never see children of his own age? Will he not see his parents, his neighbours, his nurse, his governess, his man-servant, his tutor himself, who after all will not be an angel? Here we have a real and serious objection. But did I tell you that an education according to nature would be an easy task? Oh, men! is it my fault that you have made all good things difficult? I admit that I am

aware of these difficulties; perhaps they are insuperable; but nevertheless it is certain that we do to some extent avoid them by trying to do so. I am showing what we should try to attain, I do not say we can attain it, but I do say that whoever comes nearest to it is nearest to success. (p. 56)

Rousseau proposed that Emile's environment would need to be highly structured if the "wrong desires, the wrong dependencies, are not to develop" (Gauthier, 2006, p. 34). This he called a negative education. Only then from the age of twelve or thirteen, on approaching adolescence, Rousseau argued, should children be asked to undertake a positive education that would develop an understanding of abstract concepts. From this age they would have the faculties to make rational choices and to understand that which they were being taught in a fashion which would enable them to critically challenge it. In other words, they would receive an education, rather than be indoctrinated into certain ways of thinking.

Rousseau was a deeply religious man, but he proposed no religious education for Emile. Denying the concept of original sin, he maintained that the child is naturally good and corrupted only by his environment (O'Hagan, 2001, p. 55). As a consequence Rousseau saw no



Scene from *Emile*. Here Emile is with the priest from Savoy who is advocating the 'Theology of Nature' which assumes man to be naturally good, and thus contradicts the doctrine of original sin.

Figure 5.2 | Moreau, Jean Michel the Younger, (1778), *Profession of faith of the Savoyard vicar*, illustration from Rousseau, J.J., (1762) *Emile: Or ; On Education*.

urgency in teaching Emile the ways of God. For Emile "At fifteen he will not even know that he has a soul ... If I had to depict the most heart-breaking stupidity, I would paint a pedant teaching children the catechism". At this age Emile has received no religious education, not because Rousseau was atheist, but because he proposed that it was wrong to teach the child abstract concepts (Darling, 1985). Rather than constitute Emile by teaching him to be a subject of God, Rousseau wishes to delay teaching religion until such time as Emile can more fully understand what is being taught so that he could choose to accept or reject it.

Rousseau's ideas helped further promote the notion of childhood and played its part in the Romantic movement, but its direct uptake was limited to the upbringing of a relatively small number of bourgeois children. Rousseau mocked their parents for reading *Emile* so literally, claiming that it was a work on the philosophy of the principle that man is naturally good (Simpson, 2007, p. 108/109). Nonetheless it does however serve to provide a very strong contrast to other movements, which rather than seeking to allow the child to constitute themselves, instead actively sought to impose a very definite conception of how they should be.

By suspending *Emile's* exposure to a formal education, Rousseau sought to avoid the identification of any positive educational aims and in so doing he sought to avoid directly constituting the subject. He wanted *Emile* to avoid being exposed to any construction of truth that would establish relations between *Emile* and that truth. *Emile* was not obligated in any way, his relationship to others remains equal, whilst his relationship to himself is one where he doesn't have to judge himself / know himself against any construction of truth since he has not been exposed to any. None of this meant that after the age of 12 *Emile* wouldn't be constituted but in the first instance Rousseau's philosophy aims to avoid framing *Emile* in any directed way.

Rousseau's work anticipated the romanticism of the nineteenth century and strongly influenced the development of the concept of childhood which has underpinned the development of education through until this day. He wanted the child to be a child – to develop freely, no knowledge imposed upon him until such time as he could rationalise it and decide whether to accept it or reject it himself. Education is 'natural' diffusing the effects of power by creating an almost vacuous space filled with nature, and absent of man. In this way Rousseau seeks to constitute the subject in egalitarian terms. He seeks to avoid a relationship to truth at an early age, seeks to avoid obligating the subject in any way, and by virtue of this seeks to create equality between the subject and others such that no one would have authority or power over another. It is this desire to ensure that the child is able to develop freely and the sense of regret that he is unable to do so that is espoused in his opening of the *Social Contract* of 1762 'Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains'.

5.3 UTILITARIANISM

A number of thinkers in the 18th century developed their views along utilitarian lines. Jeremy Bentham and the economist Adam Smith are perhaps most celebrated thinkers from the period, along with a number of disciples such as JS Mill who followed in their footsteps. Each sought to extrapolate utilitarianism along different lines. Smith's line of development was significantly an economic one, whilst Bentham's perspective was focussed on benefits to society as a whole.

Smith's philosophy attempted to combine the moral bent of Hume, the science of Newton and the empiricism of the Scottish Enlightenment. His most famous work, the *Wealth of Nations* (1776) is often seen as a capitalist manifesto, although it is underpinned by earlier and broader philosophy which provided an egalitarian, moralistic commitment to the poor. In recasting the definition of wealth from one of mercantilism (the amount of money and goods within a country) to one which privileged labour (Weinstein, 2008), Smith's work did much to develop the concept of human capital. This, and other economic concepts that Smith developed, were heavily employed in the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries. Smith argued that:

... education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise that of the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit. (Smith, 1776 [1925], p. 189)

Here, in constituting the subject as capital, Smith develops the idea of education being a form of capital investment. In a work which can be seen to be very much of its time, he is positing the subject in an economic domain and drawing direct comparisons between the workman and the machine. Smith elaborates the point by further comparing the uncertain return on investment in education with the more certain return from machines. He says:

When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be performed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A Man educated at the expense of much labour and time to any of those employments which require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense of his education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. It must do this too in a reasonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain duration of human life, in the same manner as to the more certain duration of the machine. (Smith, 1776 [1925], p. 67)

On the one hand Smith's theory appears totalizing – making all subjects into a form of capital and at the same time individuating by means of the division of labour. Whilst Smith's egalitarian and moralistic philosophy aimed at improving the lives of the people, he ultimately sought to constitute the subject in economic and utilitarian terms. The subject is framed based on the extent that he is of use to the economy. The idea of usefulness to the economy is one which then frames what education he should receive: what he is taught and the degree to which he is taught is directly correlative with the return on investment that that education provides. To achieve this Smith suggests that education should be highly structured with inputs and outputs of education closely monitored to identify return on investment. Moreover Smith suggests that subjects be divided and categorised to fulfil different roles in the economy. Such a conception puts forward the notion that the subject is an object of the economy to be defined and manipulated to meet its ends. In this way Smith constitutes the subject as the object of the capitalist classes - the subject is both subject to, and subservient to, capitalists.

Whilst Smith's thought is very much of the moment - steeped in relevance to the industrial revolution, concepts such as human capital, and division of labour have persisted and endured and can be seen throughout the development of the education system such that today, the needs of the economy are often synonymous with the aims of education.



Figure 5.3 | Bank of England, (2007), *Adam Smith £20 banknote*.

Adam Smith's concept of human capital remains a prominent economic theory. Here, his concept of division of labour is portrayed on a £20 note, which unifies money, the division of the subject, and the constitution of the subject in economic terms. The banknote depicts the division of labour in pin manufacturing.

In contrast to Smith, Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism was broader, characterised by his most famous and influential idea, the 'happiness principle' which uses notions of pleasure and pain to determine a definition of happiness.


Bentham argued that through the twin forces of pain and pleasure we would find a motivating force to drive us towards happiness, usefulness and public good. In his words:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think ... (Bentham J. , 1789, p. 1)

Whilst Bentham defined the causes of happiness and sources of pain at an individual level in *Springs of Action* (1776), his philosophy was collective, not individualistic, arguing that the subject should be constituted so as to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number (1776, p. ii),. To this end he believed that relations, and in particular, obligations to the law, should be aligned to drive subjects towards this principle.

Seeing little value in religion, his philosophy was at odds with Christianity and in particular the way in which it controlled education for its own particular ends. He attacked the Church through numerous publications such as *Strictures on the Exclusionary System as pursued in the National Society's Schools* (1816), and *Church of Englandism and its Catechism Examined* (1818) (Taylor, 1979), and *Not Paul But Jesus: and Schools for All, Not Schools for Churchmen only.* (1823).

At the same time Bentham's own views on education were positively set out in his treatise *Chrestomathia* (from the Greek meaning useful in learning). The Chrestomathic school was a proposal for "*the Extension of the New System of Instruction to the High Branches of Learning for the Use of the Middling and Higher Ranks in life*" (1816). To support school management Bentham's Chrestomathic school was designed to utilise utilitarian architecture that he had previously set out in *Panopticon* (1791). Whilst the Panopticon was never built, its plans and its mechanism of efficient control did much to influence the architecture and disciplinary structure of schools at the time. Schools were beginning to be operated increasingly against economic imperatives with school managers, like factory managers, consciously aware of the need to allocate and manage limited resources (Miller, 1973).



THE PANOPTICON

The Panopticon is symptomatic of the gradual shift in emphasis from sovereign and pastoral power towards disciplinary power. Triumphant architecture is replaced by utilitarian designs, constructed for efficiency, effectiveness and control. The development of disciplinary power, based around hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and the examination ensures both:

... binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal); ... [together with] coercive assignment of differential distribution (who he is; where he must be; how he is to be characterized; how he is to be recognized; how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him in an individual way...

Bentham's Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition... at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. (Foucault, 1977)




Top Left: Figure 5.4 | Reveley, W, (1791) *Elevation, section and plan of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon penitentiary*, in Foucault, M, (1977), Penguin, London.

Bottom Left: Figure 5.5 | Friman, I, (2005) *Inside one of the prison buildings at Presidio Modelo, Isla De la Juventud, Cuba*. (Built according to panoptic design principles)

Concepts such as the Panopticon reflected industrialisation and the rise of utilitarianism which was bringing school management into sharp focus. Working with Bentham, Andrew Bell had described the issue as it was seen at the time:


Machinery has been contrived for spinning twenty skeins of silk, and twenty hanks of cotton, where one was spun before; but no contrivance has been sought for, or devised, that twenty children may be educated in moral and religious principles with the same facility and expense, as one was taught before. (Bell, 1807, p. 17)

Seeking to resolve this, Bell, together with Joseph Lancaster developed the monitorial system which allowed “one master alone [to] educate one thousand boys, in Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic, as effectually, and with as little trouble, as twenty or thirty have ever been instructed by the usual modes of tuition” (Lancaster, 1807, p. 24). The similarities to the division of labour, which (following Smith) was now prevalent in factories drew many admirers and for a period had significant influence. Like Smith, Bentham’s ideas were in keeping with the time in which he lived. Whilst the Chrestomathic school was never built his designs which drew inspiration from the factories of the industrial revolution had a significant impact on the development of the monitorial system. The system evolved and while its scale and mode of operation changed, the fundamental principal of children sitting in rows in the gaze of the supervisor remains the dominant form of classroom organisation to this day. Moreover, Bentham’s thought did much to promote the idea of state education and served as an effective attack on Church-led schooling. The idea of the greatest happiness for the greatest number has served as platform for the development of the nation state, and the idea that the purpose of education is to align the subject to its aims.



Above: The Royal Free School, Borough Road, London, epitomised Lancaster’s system (see overleaf).

Figure 5.6 | Artist Unknown, (1805), *The Interior of the Royal Free School, Borough Road*, Private Collection, Bridgeman Education (Image number: XJF264794)



THE RISE OF DISCIPLINARY POWER – THE MONITORIAL SCHOOL

Joseph Lancaster describes his monitorial system in *The British system of education: being a complete epitome of the improvements and inventions practised at the Royal free schools* (1810). Included in his book are the design shown left and the follow explanation of the design.

No.1 The parallelogram at the head of the school, represents the platform, on which the master's desk is placed. The numbers represent the classes of children as seated in the order of their proficiency in learning. The surface of the form and desks are represented in the plan as nearly filled with boys, occupied in writing on their slates: the boys are represented at the desks. There is a dot at the front of each desk in every class, intended to represent the monitor of the class, whose business is to move up and down the desks, and examine the performance and progress of the boys in writing on their slate. PLACES FOR BOYS WHEN GOING OUT TO READ.

The spaces marked thus (.....) represent places where boys stand in drafts, with each draft under its respective monitor, when going out of their seats to read. There are eight of these drafts, one from each class. In every class a vacancy is left at the desks, where there are no dots, representing the vacant space left unoccupied by boys who are gone out to reading, &c. On the other side of the school-room is represented blank semi-circles, which are reading stations, where boys stand when reading.

The blank spaces thus, () represent the place where, on the ringing of a bell, the boys return from their reading stations, and form into single file, in which order they return round the school-room, going into their respective classes, and fill up every seat.

Above Left: Figure 5.7 | Lancaster, J, (1810), *Plate No. 1*, Plan of the school room, in Lancaster, J. (1810), *The British system of education...*, London, p56

5.4 THE RADICALS' AIM FOR INDEPENDENT RATIONAL SUBJECTS.

The 1789 revolution in France provoked a major upsurge in pamphleting and publications in Britain. It was a time when the enormous social and political upheavals caused a war of opinions which combined with advances in technology (most notably the printing press) facilitated the cheap and effective distribution of ideas. It was a time when writers, thinkers, politicians and the clergy all sought to disseminate their message and convince readers of *their truth*, and at the same time discredit those of others (Hodson, 2007). At a time when general, non-partisan newspapers, were yet to be established “the pamphlet was the most important medium for public discussion of a wide range of issues” (Queens University, 2002-2008). Whilst pamphlets appeared on almost all subjects, many pushed for change. Publications from radicals such as Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin argued for reform, criticising the monarchy, aristocracy and privilege.

The Enlightenment gave birth to the radical view that man's place in society was not god given as had been widely accepted for over a thousand years. This new perspective denounced privilege, status and position in society as rights given by God. As a consequence of this it followed that rationalist thinkers saw education as being fundamental to the Enlightenment project and were keen to further it. Thomas Paine was no exception writing that “Men are physically the same in all countries: it is education that makes them different” (1797 [1824], p. 205). As with the majority of Enlightenment thinkers, Paine was keen for education to expand, however his view on how this should happen stood in opposition to many. At the time, outside of the Church, the general consensus was that the state should do more to expand education. But Paine believed that it was high taxation which caused low disposable incomes which then did not allow for education to be more widely bought on a private basis. For Paine, tax should be lowered and revenues redistributed so that parents could afford to buy education.

Paine's project was one of equality and his views on funding education were simply a practical means for attempting to create a more level playing field in access to education. The curriculum and purpose of that education was not fully explored by Paine, but his distaste for religion and the monarchy pointed to a view that education should develop a critical perspective that was free from the dogma of the past. This is summed up in the *Rights of Man* where he wrote: “A nation under a well regulated government, should permit none to remain uninstructed. It is monarchical and aristocratical government only that requires ignorance for its support.” (Paine T. , 1791 [1848], p. 173)

Whilst the concept of parent as purchaser of education appears to resemble a contemporary neo-liberal marketisation of education, Paine proposed a crucial and fundamental difference in the role of state. Whereas in present-day education, the notion of choice is promoted from within a state controlled system where the state controls the curriculum, inspection regimes and so forth, Paine's notion of choice stood very clearly outside of state influence. For Paine one of the key reasons for promoting choice was that it would distance the state from education. As West puts it, "...the dispersion of decision making was one [Paine's] answer to ... fear that central government control of education would lead to government's 'despotism over the minds' of people" (West, 1967, p. 22).

The radical Mary Wollstonecraft shared Paine's concerns, whilst at the same time developing a very specific, and focussed perspective on education and the rights of women. Wollstonecraft argued that it was erroneous educational aims that had shaped the minds of people such that women had been constituted in a way that had made them subservient to men. As she put it:

If women are in general feeble both in body and mind it arises less from nature than from education ... instead of hardening their minds by the severer principles of reason and philosophy, we breed them to useless arts, which terminate in vanity and sensuality (Wollstonecraft , 1792 [1891], p. 67)

... the grand source of the misery ... I attribute to a false system of education, gathered from the books written on this subject by men, who, considering females rather as women than human creatures, have been more anxious to make them alluring mistresses than affectionate wives and rational mothers. (Wollstonecraft , 1792 [1891], pp. xxvii-xxix)

Whilst Rousseau and others held the view that only men possessed the capacity for reason, Wollstonecraft turned this thinking on its head. Having placed the cause of women's current position in the hands of a misguided or neglected education, she then argued that since women had been denied an education to develop reason, it was impossible to know if they possessed it (Martin, 2001, p. 71). In Wollstonecraft's words:

... if they be really capable of acting like rational creatures, let them not be treated like slaves; or, like the brutes who are dependent on the reason of man, when they associate with him; but cultivate their minds...Teach them, in common with man... (Wollstonecraft , 1792 [1891], pp. 56-57)

In setting out a vision for the education of women, rather than seek to develop her own thesis, she instead appropriated Rousseau's to her cause. As such she sought for women, the same of freedom to develop naturally that Rousseau had set out for men. Wollstonecraft's thought was bold and revolutionary, taking on not just the historical conditions of the past but challenging the likes of 'enlightened' thinkers such as Rousseau who continued to argue that women were subservient to men:

The man should be strong and active; the woman should be weak and passive...woman is specifically made for man's delight (p616)... What is most wanted in a woman is gentleness; formed to obey a creature so imperfect as man, a creature often vicious and always faulty, she should early learn to submit to injustice and to suffer the wrongs inflicted on her by her husband without complaint... (Rousseau, Emile: Or ; On Education, 1762 [2008]) p641

The education of women reflected this position, repeating and continually renewing women's position as subordinate to men. Wollstonecraft's arguments on education revolutionised this thinking, re-constituting women on a par with men. Whilst it can be disputed that the effects of Wollstonecraft's argument have still not been fully borne out by society, her philosophy of education had a major impact on education and the constitution of the female subject. Moreover it added significant weight to the notion that the role of education is to develop rational, autonomous subjects.

From this point forward I refer to the subject as female. At times this will jar with the reader. Each time this occurs it serves to announce and recognise the dominant misrecognition of the subject as male, which, developed since the arrival of Augustine, remains largely uncorrected.

Mary Wollstonecraft's husband William Godwin, positioned education at the very heart of his radical philosophy. Godwin, like Paine, was against state involvement in education, and like Wollstonecraft he championed the power of education to deliver equality whilst raising concerns of the potential for education to constrain and control. His *Political Justice* (1793) contains an attack on national education systems developed and managed by the state which he saw would lead it to become a means of social control, a formalised system of state indoctrination and a mechanism of self-perpetuation. Government, he said:

... will not fail to employ it to strengthen its hands, and perpetuate its institutions...Their views as institutors of a system of education, will not fail to be analogous to their views in their political capacity: the data upon which their conduct as statesmen is vindicated, will be the data upon which their instructions are founded. (Godwin, 1793, p. 671) .

Godwin's fear was that a state run national education system would radically constrain enquiry, prescribing a set of knowledge clearly aligned to reinforcing the power of the state and its institutions.

Seeking to promote the cause of education and at the same time avoid the inculcation of the mind led Godwin to initially follow the thinking of Rousseau. Acknowledging his debt to

Rousseau in the introduction to *Account of the Seminary* (1783) he advocated natural development suggesting that we should “prefer, wherever we can have recourse to it, the book of nature to any human composition.” He continued by saying that books should not be introduced until absolutely required – to be used as “as late as may be consistent with the most important purposes of education” (Godwin, 1783, p. 37)

Godwin, was therefore, like Paine, suggesting that education be taken forward in a manner which avoided inculcation, and like Rousseau in privileging the notion of nature in education. Godwin remained wary of the views of those who sought to construct education in such a way so as to promote a scientific understanding of the world, of those who sought to set out a carefully ordered and constructed set of knowledge which corresponded to the orderly world man was creating through science. Godwin called it ‘madness’ to “undertake to account for everything, and to trace out the process by which every event in the world is generated” (Godwin, 1797, p. 24). He considered such an approach ‘artificial, repulsive and insipid’ which completely missed that ‘most essential branch of human nature, the imagination’ (Scholfield [Godwin], 1802) (Bottoms, 2004).

Bottoms (2004, p. 267) sums up Godwin’s position arguing that for him the most important purpose of education is to develop an ‘awakened mind’ and that subject matter is wholly subordinate to developing the ‘habits of intellectual activity’. “In a word, the first lesson of a judicious education is, learn to think, to discriminate, to remember and to enquire” (Godwin, 1797). This awakened mind, this desire to enquire, the emphasis on imagination and on thinking were crucial to Godwin’s view that all existing knowledge belongs to the ‘ghost of departed man’. As such:

... the true object of education is not to render the pupil the mere copy of his preceptor...various reading should lead him into new trains of thinking; open to him new mines of science and new incentives to virtue; and perhaps, by a blended and compound effect, produce in him an improvement which was out of the limits of his lessons, and raise him to heights the preceptor never knew.” (Godwin, 1797, p. 146)

To Godwin the student must go beyond the tutor, surpass her in knowledge, enquiry, intellect and imagination. Failure to do this would simply result in the repeat of past failures and mistakes. To Godwin the ability to go beyond was essential to any sense of optimism, to any sense that the future might in any way be better than the past, to any sense of progress.

And so with the Radicals, Paine, Wollstonecraft and Godwin we have three related but differing strands of thought. Whilst Paine wanted state fiscal reform to fund education, like Godwin he was against the objectives of the state being played out through education.

Wollstonecraft extended this to promote the education of women, whilst in essence what they all supported was the development of independent rational subjects, free from constraint and mechanisms of social control.

5.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I set out to examine how the great flux in thought which was produced when the foundational reference points of God and the Bible had been thrown into doubt. By examining the ways in which philosophy sought to construct new knowledge about man I aimed to illuminate the contested nature of the constitution of the subject, and illustrate how through this, contested aims of education came to be generated.

The emphasis on natural development from Rousseau, the promotion of utilitarian aims from Smith and Bentham, and the emancipatory ideals of Paine, Wollstonecraft and Godwin, remain comparable to concerns which are still held today: concern about the extent of State prescription, the influence of the economy and the Church and the extent to which the child is able to develop freely. Nonetheless there is a fundamental difference. Whilst today the arguments that are held are about the nature of the education system and the aims it should serve, in the eighteenth century the argument was first and foremost not about contested education, but about different ways of seeing man (sic). It was about different ways of knowing and recognising the subject. This was a debate about how man (sic) should be in the world - about how to constitute the subject: constituted in the eyes of god – god fearing, a sinner or redeemed; constituted in the eyes of nature – the innocent child or tainted by arbitrary sources of authority; constituted in the eyes of the economy – useful and productive or a burden on society; constituted as the autonomous subject – free and agentive or constrained by chains of control.

Despite this flourish in the philosophy of education, at the time none of the ideas attracted the means which would see them put into practice in any widespread way. Nonetheless the combined significance of the debates which took place at this time fuelled a rapid increase in education which would help to underpin the development of mass schooling in the late eighteenth century.

Whilst most philosophy at the time shared broad ideals about education supporting the emancipation of the subject from the dogma of the past, it was, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, only the Church which had the means at the time to develop mass schooling. Despite this, the Enlightenment optimism about the potential for education to create the emancipated, rational, autonomous subject remains as the characteristic, idealised aim of education to this day. In contemporary times, government rhetoric seeks to reinforce this

perspective by oversimplifying and exaggerating the role of education in 'social mobility' and by propagandising the achievement of its aims as the path to becoming an agentive, aspirational subject. In this way the idealised aims of education act against themselves by obfuscating education as it is manifest in its actuality leading to the unquestioned acceptance of education as an emancipatory public good.

CHAPTER 6

Constituting the Sunday School Subject




Figure 6.1 | New, Sarah (1841), *Early Victorian silkwork sampler*, Private Collection, Bridgeman Art Library (Image number: DRE72803)

6.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 3, I set out how the Christian subject had been constituted by the Church and how this had remained the dominant system of thought for over a millennium. This dominance was supported by education: the clergy were trained through schools which were established for that very purpose, whilst the majority of the population were educated, or perhaps to put it more accurately, indoctrinated, through the church itself. The Church established a set of truths based around the Bible and in tandem with this constructed a set of technologies of power to ensure the constitution of the subject. This ranged from laws enforcing baptism, to systems of penance and confession. Ultimately this constructed a set of obligations on the subject that he (sic) had to uphold to ensure safe passage to the afterlife.

In Chapter 4, I explained how with the Enlightenment, the rise of science and in particular the astronomy of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton threw into question the legitimacy of the Church. In so doing it fostered the space for philosophy to create a new epistemological dialogue which would lead to the development of the scientific method and a new basis for knowledge. Whereas under Christianity the purpose of knowledge of man was to serve God, in this new era of science, questions remained as to the direction that man would now direct himself.

In the last chapter, I outlined a number of contrasting answers to this question. The Enlightenment had created the space in which man could constitute himself anew for the first time in over a thousand years and to fill that space there was no shortage of ideas: Rousseau's ideal of natural development whereby the child would receive no schooling until he was 12; the utilitarianism of Smith and Bentham; and the radical view of the rational, autonomous subject. These competing views helped to fuel a rapid growth in interest in education, yet by themselves none commanded the necessary means to put themselves into action in any large-scale, sustained way. Schooling therefore remained limited and right up until towards the end of the eighteenth century no mass schooling system existed in England.

This was an infrastructure problem. Whilst many ideas were developed there was no widespread education system which could put them into practice. And so whilst the Enlightenment spawned both an increase in demands for education and new ideas and ideals as to its aims, aims which challenged orthodox religion and traditional structures of society, somewhat paradoxically only the Church possessed the infrastructure to capitalise. Thus, ironically, it was from within the Church that the first system of mass education emerged.

In this chapter I aim to explore the development of this first system of mass schooling, which both exploited the emancipatory Enlightenment ideals explored in the previous chapter and at the same time sought reinforce the dogma of the Christian church.

The chapter begins by outlining the conditions that enabled Sunday schools to emerge, before investigating the aims of the movement and its founders. I then outline how, as these aims begin to evolve to encompass secular requirements for orderly citizens, there is a corresponding shift in the mode of operation from one which privileged pastoral power, to one which at first enforced attendance through sovereign power, before developing and producing the orderly, obedient citizen through the imposition of disciplinary power.

6.2 THE CONDITIONS FOR THE CREATION OF THE MASS SCHOOLING

As I outlined in Chapter 4, the Enlightenment challenged the authority of the Church. Whilst for the most part Enlightenment thinkers were not against God, the majority were against monotheist Christianity. It is therefore appears contrary to expectations to find that the Enlightenment created the conditions for the Evangelical Revival in the later part of eighteenth century which led to a rapid increase in church membership. The Enlightenment allowed for traditional structures of church membership to be overthrown, and for a new confidence in the church to be expressed with zeal by men like John Wesley. Congregationalist churches (where each congregation runs its church independently and autonomously) doubled between 1750 and 1800, and increased fourfold again by 1838; Baptists almost tripled their membership in the second part of the 18th century and more than trebled it again over the following thirty years; the Methodists expanded from just over 22,500 members in 1767 to just under 100,000 by the turn of the century, and then to over 500,000 by the middle of the 19th century (Laqueur T. W., 1976, p. 3).

Men like Wesley believed that education could play an important role in cultivating moral and religious achievement (Rack, 2001, p. 51) and so as people renewed their interest in religion, particularly the poor and working class, the “education of the young in the ways of godliness” (Laqueur T. W., 1976, p. 4) became a product of that revival. It is in this context that the Sunday school movement originated, and flourished.

Lacquer points to three principal reasons for the prominence of its growth. Firstly there was the moral rescue of the poor and the destitute. At a time of great social upheaval, the industrial revolution combined with urbanisation and a population explosion ensured that the plight of the poor arrived on the doorstep on the middle classes. In the eyes of many this was an ill that required a remedy. Secondly, in line with the growth of the Church and the spread of the word of God, there was a need to ensure that the underpinning moral code was

effectively extended to the poor to save the soul of the destitute. Thirdly, there was an emerging concern for the child. Developed in the philosophy of Rousseau and the Radicals, the industrial revolution and urbanisation brought the plight of children into sharp view. Whereas in an agricultural economy, children were dispersed across the land, working on the farm, in the open air, now they were concentrated in cities, working in factories, and as chimney sweeps; or worse still, destitute and not working at all. As Lawson and Silver put it:

It was the concentration of population that produced the main and unprecedented educational problem. It was also a profoundly cultural problem, since the canals, the cotton mills, iron foundries and – later – the railways, brought into being communities working to new forms of industrial discipline, dislocating old patterns of life and the traditional culture and pursuits of the countryside. Child labour and child crime became major social phenomena. Familiar landmarks of behaviour and relationships were destroyed. The new urban communities were cut off from the familiar attentions of squire, vicar, poor-law overseer and school-master. The new towns spread without planning, without local government, franchise, churches or schools...The disturbance of a way of life was accompanied by no signposts or compensations. (Lawson & Silver, 1973, p. 227)

There were then a number of contingent factors which came together at this point in time: the spread of religion; industrialisation; urbanisation; poverty; concern for the child; fear that within all of this sin was flourishing: these were the conditions for the birth of a new found philanthropic age, and the birth of mass schooling as we recognise it today.

However there is a further and fundamental reason to add to those which Lacquer points, which is the change in *episteme* that was brought about by the Enlightenment. As Carr notes up until the late eighteenth century:

... it was commonly assumed that individuals were 'by nature' unequal and that everyone had a pre-ordained position in the social order...[but for] Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and Rousseau, the idea of a 'natural order' in society was no more than a mythical device for denying freedom and dignity to the mass of ordinary people and confining them to a life of servitude. (Carr, 1996, p. 73).

In pre-modern times, schooling for the poor had therefore seemed to a large degree irrelevant. Anyone attempting to improve themselves though education was seen as "a disaffected person, who was not satisfied with the station in which God had placed him ... contriving to raise himself out of his proper place" (Booth, 1858, p. 222). But the Enlightenment changed this, creating an optimistic, idealised notion of education as the great emancipatory tool of the time. The increasing interest in education which was fuelled by the Romantics, Utilitarians, and Radicals, ensured that now, as never before, the time was right for the development of mass schooling.

6.3 THE CONCEPTION OF SUNDAY SCHOOLS

Thus mass schooling, as Rodgers describes, originated in “the golden age of philanthropy, which blossomed so fully just at this point in history because the economic and social conditions of the poor demanded immediate notice ...” (1949, p. 3). It was these demands which struck Robert Raikes, a publisher and Anglican layman, who is commonly attributed with starting the Sunday school movement. In 1784 Raikes wrote:

... leading me one morning into the suburbs of the city, where the lowest people (who are principally employed in the pin-manufacture) chiefly reside, I was struck with concern on seeing a groupe of children, wretchedly ragged, at play in the street. An enquiry of a neighbour produced an account of the miserable state and deplorable profligacy of these infants, more especially on a Sunday, when left to their own direction. (Raikes, [1784] 1812)

This encounter generated an idea: “that it would be at least a harmless attempt, if it should be productive of no good, should some little plan be formed to check this deplorable profanation of the Sabbath” (Raikes, [1784] 1812). Raikes’ account continues by outlining an agreement which was then made “with proper persons to receive as many children on a Sunday as should be sent, who were to be instructed in reading and in the Church catechism...” (Raikes, 1812, p. 430).

Raikes recorded some early success and in November 1783 he wrote in his Gloucester Journal that:

In those parishes where this plan has been adopted, we are assured that the behaviour of the children is greatly civilized. The barbarous ignorance in which they had before lived being in some degree dispelled, they begin to give proofs that those persons are mistaken who consider the lower orders of mankind as incapable of improvement, and therefore think an attempt to reclaim them impracticable, or at least not worth the trouble.
(Raikes & Power, 1783 [1863], pp. 35-36))

Among those who shared Raikes desire to ‘save’ the poor and the destitute from their pitiful plight was Jonas Hanway. Hanway was a merchant who founded the Marine Society for Educating Poor and Destitute Boys, was vice president of the Foundling Hospital, a children’s home for the “education and maintenance of exposed and deserted young children” (Foundling Hospital, 1799), and founder of the Magdalen Hospital for repentant prostitutes. Throughout this philanthropic endeavour lay a profound moral and religious streak. In Hanway’s publication describing his plan for Magdalen Hospital he wrote:

It will be a glorious task, indeed, to co-operate with heaven, as far as blind and indigent mortals can imitate their Maker, in curing a disease of the mind, more fatal than frenzy...Therefore if you can convert bad women into good ones, your work will be worthy of the applause of Angels... (Hanway, 1759, p. 4).

Hanway was among those who were quick to set down in print their expectations of what the Sunday school should be, why they were needed, who they were for, their objectives, their curriculum, and the consequences that would be faced by those who did not attend. Hanway's (1786) book *A comprehensive view of Sunday schools, for the use of the more indigent inhabitants of cities, towns, and villages, through England and Wales*, is a 338 page description of the moral and religious need for Sunday schools. Extracts from the opening pages of the book provide a clear indication of Hanway's position. He writes:

The institution of Sunday Schools is in effect a public additional mode of teaching the gospel of Christ to the rising generation. p1

All persons who mean to do their duty as *Christians* will delight in seeing children nurtured in the fear of the *Most High*, well knowing that when they become adults, they will otherwise add so many to the number of the subjects of the Prince of Darkness! p3

...many young persons, who have been hitherto employed during the six days in useful labour in manufactures, were so ill disciplined in religious duties, that the Sabbath has been the day of leisure to learn wickedness. p5

It therefore follows, that far from realising the emancipatory aims of education that the Enlightenment had promised, early mass schooling in the late eighteenth century, as produced through the Sunday school movement, merely reinforced the dogma of the past.

6.4 SINNER VS GOD FEARING

Thus what began to emerge in the early days of Sunday schools was the reaffirmation of the Christian binary that had been established over a thousand years before: a binary between those who did and those who didn't attend, between the sinners and the God fearing, between those who would learn to read (the Bible), and the illiterate, unable to read the words of God and therefore forever condemned to a life of sin and suffering. Whereas since Augustine until the advent of the Sunday school the constitution of the subject had been achieved from the pulpit, in the church as a building, now the institution of the Church had a new vehicle for achieving its aims: the school.

The aims of early Sunday schools were clear re-presentations of earlier Christian objectives. Hannah More, an early proponent of the Sunday school was a prolific writer, whose works were published in significant volume. Her book, *Sunday School* (1795), is an instruction book for how to set up a Sunday school – how to recruit staff, recruit pupils, raise funds and deal with any objections that may be raised along the way. Written in the form of a fictional diary account, More recounts the process Mrs Jones goes through in establishing a Sunday school and in recruiting pupils.

Mrs Jones has gathered the mothers of the village together:

My good women, on Sunday next I propose to open a school for the instruction of your children. Those among you who know what it is to be able to read your Bible, will, I doubt not, rejoice that the same blessing is held out to your children. You who are not able yourselves to read what your Saviour has done and suffered for you, ought to be doubly anxious that your children should reap a blessing which you have lost. Would not that mother be thought an unnatural monster who would stand by and snatch out of her child's mouth the bread which a kind friend had just put into it? But such a mother would be merciful, compared with her who should rob her children of the opportunity of learning to read the word of God when it is held out to them. Remember, that if you slight the present offer, or if, after having sent your children a few times you should afterward keep them at home under vain pretenses, you will have to answer for it at the day of judgment. Let not your poor children, then, have cause to say, 'My fond mother was my worst enemy. I might have been bred up in the fear of the Lord, and she opposed it for the sake of giving me a little paltry pleasure. For an idle holiday, I am now brought to the gates of hell!' My dear women, which of you could bear to see your darling child condemned to everlasting destruction? Which of you could bear to hear him accuse you as the cause of it? Is there any mother here present, who will venture to say, 'I will doom the children I bore to sin and hell, rather than put them or myself to a little present pain, by curtailing their evil inclinations! I will let them spend the Sabbath in ignorance and idleness, instead of rescuing them from vanity and sin, by sending them to school?' If there are any such here present, let that mother who values her child's pleasure more than his soul, now walk away, while I set down in my list the names of all those who wish to bring their young ones up in the way that leads to eternal life, instead of indulging them in the pleasures of sin, which are but for a moment.

When Mrs. Jones had done speaking, most of the women thanked her for her good advice, and hoped that God would give them grace to follow it...(p7-8)

The account provided by More gives a very real sense of the practices that were being employed to encourage enrolment into Sunday schools, and once there the curriculum followed in a similar vein to actively constitute the subject to fear God. One girl, Annie Hoile, told the Commissioners on Child Labour in the Mines in 1842: "If I died a good girl I should go to heaven – If I were bad I should have to be burned in brimstone and fire: they told me that at school yesterday, I did not know it before" (Hammond & Hammond, 2003, p. 73)

It is because of practices such as these that E.P. Thomson questions the extent to which some of the activities that were taking place in Sunday schools can ever be described as 'educational', suggesting that instead they should be looked upon as indoctrination (Thompson, [1963] 1991, p. 375). Thompson suggests that through Wesley the Sunday school movement, in direct contrast with Rousseau, followed the doctrine of original sin upholding

that children were by nature, sinful, and that this impiety had to be broken.. As Wesley himself put it:

Break their will betimes. Begin this work before they can run alone, before they can speak plain, perhaps before they can speak at all. Whatever pains it costs, break the will if you would not damn the child. Let a child from a year old be taught to fear the rod and to cry softly; from that age make him do as he is bid, if you whip him ten times running to effect it... Break his will now, and his soul shall live, and he will probably bless you to all eternity... how dreadful are the consequence of that accursed kindness, which gives children their own will, and does not bow down their necks from their infancy...Why is this,...because their wills were not broken at first, because they were not inured, from their early infancy, to obey their parents in all things, and to submit to their wills as to the will of God? Because they were not taught, from the very first dawn of reason, that the will of their parents was, to them, the will of God; that to resist it was rebellion against God, and an inlet to all ungodliness. (Wesley J. , 1829)

Thus at an individual level, attendance at Sunday school denoted the difference between sinner and God fearing, between sinner and redeemed, between being 'condemned to everlasting destruction' or the taking the path which 'leads to eternal life'. The development of the Sunday school in this way is a clear expression of Pastoral Power. Whilst Wesley's tone and expression is forceful and violent, behind it lay the subtler expression of pastoral power.

As I set out in Chapter 3, Foucault argues that Christianity sets out "strict obligations of truth, dogma and canon... [including] ... The duty to accept a set of obligations, to hold certain books as permanent truth, to accept authoritarian decisions in matters of truth, not only to believe certain things but to show that one believes, ..." (Foucault, *Technologies of the Self*, 1988). Where once these duties and obligations were proclaimed and directed towards the church, now, in the latter part of the 18th century they are additionally proclaimed and directed towards the school. Where once this duty focussed on knowing oneself in relation to the Christianity and the Bible, now begins the requirement for one to know oneself in relation to the school.

It is then, through the Sunday school movement that the Church sought to direct the conscience of the country, seeking to operate on the individual by promoting the effects of attendance on the soul. Pastoral power, under the direction of Church, ensured that the objective of the school was leading people to salvation in next world. Nonetheless whilst the Sunday school emerged with heavy religious objectives, there was at the same time a clear emphasis on social control.

Hannah More, in a letter from c.1795 wrote

...my plan for instructing the poor is very limited and strict. They learn of week-days such coarse works as may fit them for servants. I allow of no writing. My object has not been to teach dogmas and opinions, but to form the lower class to habits of industry and virtue. (More H. , 1795 [1859], p. 6)

The Sunday school, at this time, was therefore not a place for aspiration. On the contrary it was very much a place where the child learned to confirm their place in society, so much so that the point which More makes 'I allow of no writing', needs further explanation.

6.5 THOU SHALT NOT WRITE – CONSERVATISM IN THE SUNDAY SCHOOL

More's decision not to allow writing to be taught reflects the belief that for the working class there was no need to learn to write, as Jonas Hanway explains:

As to the connexion between *reading* and *writing*, as vulgarly understood, I discover none that concerns those who depend for their bread on their *manual labour*, and not on the *pen*. The first is necessary to *them* for learning their religion ,... the last is not necessary nor expedient. (Hanway, 1786, p. xiii) original emphasis.

Whilst writing was therefore seen to serve no vocational purpose for the working class, it furthermore aroused a concern that the development of writing skills would increase pamphleting from unauthorised sources, spreading the opinions of the working classes, and undermining orthodox authority. Not only is this evident in the way in which Sunday schools devised their curriculum, but it was also evident in the way in which publishing was controlled by the state. As Carr notes, the state was extremely concerned about the spread of the 'dangerous and subversive ideas that had fuelled the French Revolution' (Carr, 1996, p. 79). In fact such was the concern that those who published anything which might be deemed to be inflammatory found themselves on the wrong side of the law and facing the prospect of prison. In 1795, for example, James Montgomery, published a poem in the Sheffield Iris newspaper which celebrated the fall of the Bastille - he was subsequently sentenced to prison for three months.

This was then, at a time of great change, a period in which the Sunday school emerged as a vehicle for trying to retain the social order, for keeping the working classes in their places: well behaved, ordered, civilised, and above all god fearing. It was as Dewey put it, aimed to "adjust individuals...to fit into present social arrangements and conditions" (Dewey, [1935] 2008, p. 205). But the early Sunday school was about more than fitting individuals into present arrangements, it was about trying to preserve those social arrangements, reinforce them, fortify and shore them up. This wasn't simply about the maintenance of the existing order it was an attempt to strengthen it.

Nonetheless, from around the turn of the nineteenth century there is evidence that as the Sunday school movement started to become more mature it slowly began to become less conservative. As the movement developed and expanded so the schools began to be less dependent and less tied to the strong moral and religious conservatism of the likes of Raikes, Hanway and More. As the table below illustrates, the movement grew rapidly, and with it control became distributed allowing for differential practice to develop.

Table 6.1 Enrolment in English Sunday Schools 1788-1851				
Year	Number	% Population	% those aged 5-15	% working class aged 5-15
1788	59,980	-	-	-
1795	94,100	-	-	-
1801	206,100	2.5	10.3	13.8
1811	415,000	4.4	18.2	24.2
1821	730,000	6.5	27.0	36.0
1831	1,096,000	8.4	37.2	49.6
1841	1,679,000	11.4	49.8	66.4
1851	2,099,611	12.5	56.5	75.4

(Laqueur, 1976, p. 44)

As the Sunday school movement expanded writing began to be taught from the 1820s. At first it remained prohibited on the Sabbath, but Sunday schools operating during weekdays were now starting to teach writing to the working classes. The practice of writing in schools was far from universal however and was the subject of significant social disputes. When for example the celebrated Methodist minister Jabez Bunting, saw children learning to write in his ministry in Sheffield in 1808 'his indignation knew no bounds' for the 'awful abuse of the Sabbath' (Thompson, [1963] 1991, p. 389). A battle commenced. Bunting fought to ensure writing was forbidden, whilst James Montgomery defended the rights of children to learn in his newspaper, the Sheffield Iris. Battles such as this would continue until the 1840s when writing was taught on a near universal basis.

When Montgomery died in 1854, a statue was commissioned which today stands in a prominent position outside the cathedral in Sheffield city centre. It reads "The teachers scholars and friends of Sunday schools in Sheffield, assisted by public subscription have erected this monument in memory of the revered townsman". This memorial and the battle to ensure that schools taught writing gives an indication of the struggles that took place to usurp the existing social order.

Montgomery had played his part in developing a more progressive concept of the Sunday school education where "The doctrine of self-help and advancement through merit replaced older views of working-class education as an exercise in the creation of deference."




Figure 6.2 | Harrison, P. (2013) Montgomery's Memorial, Sheffield.

(Laqueur, 1976, p. 193). But far from giving rise to any sense of unbridled aspiration, the opportunity to advance through merit was still very much restricted. The pamphlet “Advice to Sunday Scholars” provides an indication as to the extent that the working classes could advance, suggesting that “those who were clever and promising and who have honest and industrious parents’ might rise so far as to become servants to the rich” (Ibid). This doesn’t appear to be far removed from More’s instruction for servants, but the notions of being clever, promising and rising represent a significant shift. It is not that social climbing had never happened before – of course it had, but the school system had never been constructed to support it. Now there was a glimpse that it was. For the first time we begin to see the opportunity for subjects to ‘aspire’ through education, the opportunity for subjects to find for themselves, through education, a new place in the social order.

6.6 SCHOOL ORGANISATION AND DISCIPLINE

Whilst the Sunday school emerged under the auspices of pastoral power with clear intentions to constitute the subject in Christian terms, it also sought to enforce strict social and disciplinary control.

At Caistor in Lincolnshire Sunday school teachers had clear instructions concerning deviant behaviour. They were instructed to:-

...tame the ferocity of their [the pupils] unsubdued passions- to repress the excessive rudeness of their manners-to chasten the disgusting and demoralizing obscenity of their language-to subdue the stubborn rebellion of their wills-t render them honest, obedient, courteous, industriousness, submissive, and orderly... in (Thompson, [1963] 1991, p. 401)

Gradually through a combination of pastoral power and sovereign power attendance at Sunday school became the norm with over half of all working class 5-15 year olds attending on a regular basis by the 1830s. As attendance at school became a norm in society so aggressive forms of sovereign power began to fade to be replaced by the imposition of disciplinary power. By this stage, with attendance reaching 75% of the working class by the 1850s, the Sunday school was having a significant impact on society. This according to Laqueur:

... had less to do with what was taught, than how things were taught, with the structural and operational organisation of the institution. The structure of authority, the discipline of time and place...rules governing appearance, and the system of rewards and punishments all arose out of the school *qua school*. (Laqueur, 1976)

Thus the school became a principal site for the development of disciplinary power with its emphasis on three primary techniques of control : hierarchical observation, normalizing

judgment, and examination. Whilst pressure for discipline was initially linked to the morality of Christianity, now the school enacted it for its effective operation and the production of the dutiful, orderly subject. This sense of order embodied the spirit of the time. Just as science was making order out of nature, man was himself making society ordered and disciplined. Lacquer sums this up;

...the ascendancy of bourgeois sensibilities – the decline of bear-, bull-, and badger baiting, the end of old style pugilism, the growth of the temperance movement, the decline of public violence, and not least the establishment of the Evangelical Sabbath – were all part of the cultural underpinnings of the new industrial society which Sunday schools helped to establish.” (Laqueur, 1976, p. 228)

6.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined how, in contrast to the general enlightenment educational aim of developing a rational, autonomous subjects, the first mass system of education, far from emancipating the subject, set out to constitute the subject in traditional Christian ways. Thus the aims of Sunday school education were from the outset entirely religious. The purpose of learning to read was to enable subjects to read the bible. Other instruction, such as writing was either not permitted or extremely limited since it didn't serve the purpose of the Christian schools. As before, subjects were divided into those who dutifully followed the word of God and who would therefore go to heaven, and those who didn't and would therefore end up in hell. In the past a good Christian could achieve salvation through attendance at church. The difference now was that attendance at school was also seen as a requirement, for without it, subjects would not learn to read and they could therefore not study the Bible adequately. This extension of pastoral power to include the requirement to attend school was one of the key driving forces behind the initial take up of education at the beginning of the Sunday school movement.

Over time the role of the Sunday school took on broader objectives and by the 1830s it is clear that this included the construction of orderly subjects who were able to conform to the structure of authority, the regulation and discipline of time and place, social norms, rules governing appearance, and the managerial systems of rewards and punishments. This production of disciplinary power was crucial to the effective development of the economy, playing a pivotal role in making available a workforce able to support continued industrial growth.

Whilst the Sunday school subject was initially constituted in relation to truths established by the Church, gradually, as the aims of schools evolved so too did the constitution of the subject. As science and society sought to create an ordered world and as the industrial revolution sought a disciplined workforce, so the constitution of the Sunday school subject began to

extend to encompass secular notions of the orderly subject – a God fearing subject, who was also a well-disciplined, hard-working, dutiful individual who would fit into an ordered society. Whilst initially the subject was bound by Christian truths and obligations now she becomes tied to secular knowledge. Thus, both at the start of the Sunday school movement and as it evolved, the emancipatory objectives of the Enlightenment remain illusory.

CHAPTER 7



Constituting the Orderly Subject



Figure 7.1 | Hayter, Sir George (1833-1843), House of Commons 1833, National Portrait Gallery, London, UK, oil on canvas, National Portrait Gallery

The picture commemorates the passing of the Great Reform Act in 1832. It depicts the first session of the new House of Commons on 5 February 1833 held in St Stephen's Chapel which was destroyed by fire in 1834. The picture includes some 375 figures. In the foreground Hayter has grouped the leading statesmen from the Lords; Charles Grey, John Russell, William Ewart Gladstone, Lord Brougham and Vaux and Arthur Wellesley (National Portrait Gallery 2013).

7.

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 5 I set out a number of competing views arising from the Enlightenment, which collectively might be viewed as characterising an Enlightenment ideal and belief that education would emancipate the subject from the past to create a rational, autonomous subject. In the last chapter I showed how this aim remained an illusion as the manifest aims of early mass schooling were inextricably tied to reproducing the Christian subject. At the same time I also began to identify how the impact of science and the industrial revolution, slowly enabled a new, orderly, obedient, secular subject to emerge.

In this chapter I now want to explore in more detail how the manifest aims of mass schooling began to shift from those which were tied to the aims of the Church towards supporting secular objectives, and how as this occurred the latent aims of the Enlightenment remained unfulfilled. Specifically this chapter charts the development of state involvement in education. It investigates the origins of formal state interest in education and the tensions which constrained subsequent action. The chapter then analyses the conditions which produced the tipping point, prompting the government to act and to invest in education for the first time. Throughout the chapter seeks to develop an understanding of the state's manifest aims for education. The chapter concludes by considering the tripartite struggle that occurred during this period between the latent aims of the Enlightenment, the manifest aims of the Church, the emerging objectives of the state.

7.2 STATE INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION PRIOR TO 1833

The origin of state education arises with the advent of statistics as the reason of state began to shift from one concerned with the strength of the sovereign to one which was aimed at the development of the population. As government becomes concerned with governing the conduct of the population we see the creation of “the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics... resulting ...in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses. (Foucault, 1980, pp. 102-103) . State interest in education is conceived at this point.

Evidence of this appears with the commissioning of the 1816 inquiry into the *State of Education among the Lower Orders in the Metropolis*. Recapping on the purpose of the report in its introduction, Lord Brougham and Vaux (MP for Winchelsea, Sussex) states that the Select Committee were:

... instructed to consider what may fit to be done with respect to the Children of Paupers who shall be found begging in the Streets in and near the Metropolis, or who shall be carried about by Persons asking Charity, and whose Parents, or other persons who they accompany, have not sent such Children to any of the Schools for the Education of poor Children. (Brougham and Vaux, 1816)

Within this introductory sentence the terms of report contain the establishment of clear norms and expectations: that children should attend school; the role of government as being concerned with conduct of the population; and the role of government as taking steps to influence this conduct.

Whilst the evidence that was collected was considerable, the report which followed was incredibly short, amounting to just a single page of text¹. The report found that a “very large number of poor Children are wholly without the means of Instruction, although their parents appear to be generally very desirous of obtaining that advantage for them”. The inquiry led to further research and ultimately resulted in Brougham taking the 1820 Education for the Poor Bill to the House of Commons. By this time Brougham estimated that despite the growth in education, principally through Sunday schools, the number of “children receiving education was 750,000; according to which calculation no less than 2,000,000 of the population of England was left in this respect unprovided for” (Brougham and Vaux, 1820).

Through the bill, Brougham sought to rectify this by establishing parish schools that would be maintained by the rates. However in the bill, Brougham privileged the clergy “requiring schoolmasters to be members of the Church of England” (Maclure J. S., 1979, p. 18). Brougham’s view here was a conservative one which privileged the established church² but this brought widespread opposition from Dissenters and Roman Catholics and it never became law³. The decision to place the Church of England in this privileged position was not a straightforward one, and is discussed in relative detail in the 3rd Report to the Parliamentary Committee, 1818⁴. Brougham was caught in an impossible position and in reality it is unlikely that he would have got it through whichever way he tried to play it: if he sought to side-line the Church of England they would have objected, but without them he would get objections from dissenters. From both sides, the objections were about control –the control of the constitution of the subject.

¹ Digitized copies of the complete body of evidence as well as the 1816 report can be found at <http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk/>

² Established Church is the name given to a state backed church. In the case of England this has been the Church of England since the time of the reformation. The British monarch is the head of state and is also the Supreme Governor of the Church of England.

³ See: [House of Commons Debate 11 July 1820 vol 2 cc365-7 365](#))

⁴ The Committee produced a series of reports published throughout 1818. The first contains a covering introduction of no more than one page. The second contains a large volume of evidence, but little by way of interpretation by the Committee. The third report, 166 pages in all, contains five pages of commentary followed by further evidence. This commentary is focussed largely on the role of the Church in education. The fourth and fifth reports are appendices containing statutes from Eton College and Cambridge University. All reports available from : <http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk/>

After the bill was rejected, state involvement in education stalled until after the passing of the 1832 Reform Act. But to understand how state involvement in education shifted it is first necessary to understand the significance of the Reform Act.

7.3 1832 REFORM ACT.

The 1832 Reform Act was a reaction to long-standing inequity in society which was manifest in who had the right to vote. As far back as 1432 it was established in law that only male freeholders with land and property worth more than forty shillings⁵ would be eligible to vote in county elections. This law persisted through the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and was still in force at the time of the general election of 1802. Throughout this period the amount was never adjusted for inflation and so the electorate grew. Nonetheless, even by the early 19th century it still only amounted to around 200,000 people out of a population of 10.5 million⁶.

But now, with the Enlightenment, came calls for reform. The American Revolution in the 1770's and the French Revolution 1789-1799, inspired the development of the radical movement in England. Writers like Wollstonecraft and Paine, who had been at the heart of the American Revolution, called for democratic reform, the rejection of the monarchy and aristocracy and the redistribution of wealth. At the heart of the movement was the demand for an extension to the right to vote. With criticism of the Church also gaining ground there was a genuine fear that Britain might follow America and France with its own revolution. Whilst in reality most people wanted reform, not revolution, the government sought to reinforce its rule and stamp out any act which might provoke an uprising (for example the imprisonment of Montgomery for publishing a poem about the French revolution as noted in the previous chapter).

At the end of the Napoleonic wars (1803-1815), unemployment and widespread famine exacerbated by the introduction of the Corn Laws, led to widespread discontentment and the growth of the radical movement. At a demonstration of 60,000 people in St Peter's field, Manchester (1819), in attempt to keep control, the cavalry charged. Killing 15 and injuring a further 600, the event was named Peterloo in ironic reference to the battle of Waterloo which had taken place just four years earlier. The horror of event was widely publicised but far from resulting in reform it merely caused the government to introduce new acts of parliament to prevent further disturbances. Known as the six acts they covered everything from the prevention of 'military training', the seizure of arms, prevention of any meeting involving more than 50 people unless for church of state purposes, and increased sentences for the blasphemous or seditious publication. The acts were designed to reinforce the mutuality of the Church and state something evident in Brougham's decision to privilege the clergy in his unsuccessful 1820 bill.

⁵ Estimated to be worth forty shillings in annualised rental value.

⁶ Population returned by the census of 1801.

The death of King George IV in 1830 led to the dissolution of parliament and the holding of a general election during that year, with the Tories and Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington returning again to power. Electoral reform had been a major campaigning issue, and once more it was raised in the social consciousness. Riots and civil disturbances took place during the summer and autumn of 1830 with Earl Grey, leader of the Whigs backing the call for reform in the House of Commons. On 2nd November, Prime Minister Wellesley, strongly defended the existing arrangements claiming that “the Legislature and system of representation possessed the full and entire confidence of the country...” (Wellesley, 1830). Wellesley had previously shown himself capable of reform, passing the Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1829, but he’d done so only after Peel advised him that whilst “emancipation was a great danger, civil strife was a greater danger”. Wellesley had seen the balance shift and had backed the need to reform. But on suffrage he refused to listen. Unfortunately for Wellesley the tide was turning. Whilst within his party there may have been many that would have agreed with him, his speech was out-of-step with the mood of both Houses. A vote of no confidence was called. Wellesley and the Conservatives lost and William IV called the opposition leader Earl Grey to form a government.

Now in office the Whig reformer Earl Grey’s first act was to announce a pledge to undertake parliamentary reform. The Reform Bill appeared early the following year, but with fear that reform would lead to unrest, passage through the Commons and Lords was far from straightforward.

The Earl of Darnley in a House of Lords debate sums up this fear:

No man amongst their Lordships more earnestly deprecated that wild reform, denominated Radical Reform, which had universal suffrage for its basis, and which, in his opinion, would lead to anarchy and revolution, than he did; but he was perfectly convinced, that the period had now arrived, when the general, he might say the unanimous, feeling of the country—the feeling of those who were enemies to disorder, he meant the middle classes, amongst whom education was extensively diffused—was in favour of a measure which should embrace all the essentials of reform. *House of Lords Debate 03 February 1831 vol 2 cc117-21*

Whilst from the radical perspective reform was progressive, Darnley and many others like him, had argued that maintaining existing suffrage arrangements was essential to maintaining control of the population. Now however, even for traditionalists like Darnley, reform was seen as a necessary evil.

Following rejection of the Bill by the House of Lords in 1831 violence ensued with riots and serious disturbances in London, Birmingham, Derby, Nottingham, Leicester, Exeter and Bristol. The riots raised significant concerns. In Bristol alone buildings were set on fire, and twelve people died. In response over 100 people were arrested and 31 were sentenced to death (National Archives, 2012).

7.4 THE PASSING OF THE REFORM ACT 1832

When a revised version of the Bill was put forward in 1832, on the assumption that it too would be rejected, there was a genuine fear of revolution. In the Commons talk of revolution was common place - Wilson's argument at the third reading of the Bill was symptomatic of the feeling at the time:

Would hon. Gentlemen opposite deny that if the people of this country desired a revolution, it was not infinitely preferable that such a revolution should be effected within these walls, rather than out of doors by the people themselves. (Wilson, R. House of Commons debate, 22 March 1832 vol 11 cc650-780)

Despite this feeling Conservative opposition to the Bill only gave ground when Lord Grey planned to persuade the King to create additional Whig peers in the House of Lords to guarantee its passage. Seeking to avoid the increase in Whigs, Tory peers abstained from the vote and it was passed (Parliament UK, 2012).

The Reform Bill disenfranchised 56 boroughs and reduced a further 31 to one MP. This resulted in the abolition of 143 seats which were deemed to no longer represent sufficient areas of land or population. In their place 67 new constituencies and a total of 135 new seats were created. This reflected both industrialisation and urbanisation which had seen significant shifts in population to towns and cities. The Reform Act extended the franchise to include small landowners, tenant farmers and shopkeepers and anyone who paid a yearly rental of £10 or more. Whilst it had extended the franchise, requirements were still based around land and property and now the Bill explicitly stated that voters had to be male whereas previously this had always been implied. Prior to the Reform Act around 366,000 people had the vote. After the Act was passed this rose to around 650,000, but out of a population of around 13m, whilst change had been achieved it was limited and there remained considerable discontentment from the working classes. Read today it therefore seems that the movement achieved by the Reform Act was minimal, but whilst the size of the newly enfranchised population was small, the fact that the Government had responded to the demand of reformers was hugely significant. This was a moment when the balance had been tipped from a position where parliament tried to hold on to tradition to ensure control of the population to one where they were prepared to concede reforms to do so. However small the changes were to voting rights, this was a significant shift in the constitution of the subject, one which would bring renewed interest from within Parliament in education.

The opportunity was seized upon by the radical MPs to present a resolution calling for the establishment of a system of national education. Leading the way was, John Roebuck, Liberal MP for Bath and later Sheffield. Roebuck, a friend of JS Mill and through him an advocate of the thinking of Bentham (Beaver, 2004), presented his resolution on National Education to the House of Commons in July 1833 (HC Deb 30 July 1833 vol 20 cc139-74 139). Since Roebuck's

resolution is highly significant in explaining how the subject was constituted at the time and the shifts that were occurring to that constitution, it is worth exploring in some detail.

Roebuck introduced his resolution calling for the House to “with the smallest delay possible, consider the means of establishing a system of National Education”. Roebuck appealed to notions of the good citizen with parallels to the God fearing, well disciplined, hard-working, individual we saw developing through the Sunday schools in the last chapter. Education he said:

... means not merely the conferring these necessary means or instruments for the acquiring of knowledge, but it means also the so training or fashioning the intellectual and moral qualities of the individual, that he may be able and willing to acquire knowledge, and to turn it to its right use. It means the so framing the mind of the individual, that he may become a useful and virtuous member of society in the various relations of life. It means making him a good child, a good parent, a good neighbour, a good citizen, in short, a good man.

For Roebuck, it was essential that good citizens knew their place in society:

Of all the knowledge that can be conferred on a people, this is the most essential; let them once understand thoroughly their social condition, and we shall have no more unmeaning discontents—no wild and futile schemes of Reform; we shall not have a stack-burning peasantry—a sturdy pauper population... We shall have right efforts directed to right ends. We shall have a people industrious, honest, tolerant and happy.

In both these parts of his speech it is easy to see the influence of Bentham. The subject is being constituted along utilitarian grounds, asked to renounce themselves as individuals, in order to generate the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

Roebuck then pressed home the link between education and an ordered society, by linking education directly to the law, and making education of ‘matter of police’:

We all of us seem to feel the necessity of supervising our Criminal Code—our Code of Prison Discipline—our Poor-laws; but all these are only off-shoots of, or adjuncts to, a system of Education. That is the great touch—the main-spring of the whole. We allow crime and misery to spring up, and then attempt, by a vast and cumbrous machinery, to obviate the mischief. We punish, we do not prevent—we try to put down effects, without caring for the cause. Like ignorant physicians, our minds are absorbed by a consideration of symptoms, while the disease is making head, to the utter destruction of life.

No one, I suspect, will dispute that it is the duty of the Government not merely to punish all infractions of security, whether as regards person or property, but also to prevent, as far as possible, all such infractions. Neither will it be denied, I think, that among the most potent means of such prevention is a good education of the mass of the people. If, then, we seek no higher ground, we may here safely rest, and say,

that, as mere matter of police, the education of the people ought to be considered as a part of the duties of the Government.

Underpinning all of this was recognition from Roebuck, that what had emerged was the problem of population:

Within these few years a new element has arisen, which now ought to enter into all political calculations. The multitude—the hitherto inert and submissive multitude—are filled with a new spirit—their attention is intently directed towards the affairs of the State—they take an active part in their own social concerns, and however unwilling persons may be to contemplate the fact, any one who will calmly and carefully watch the signs of the times, will discover, and if he be really honest and wise, will at once allow, that the hitherto subject many are about to become paramount in the State. ... and I therefore cast about me to learn in what way this new force may be made efficient to purposes of good, and how any of its probable mischievous results may be prevented.

Neither will I attempt to disguise from this House my opinion that good government can only be obtained by instructing the people as I have already asserted, any one who will look before him must see the growing political importance of the mass of the population. They will have power. In a very short time they will be paramount. I wish them to be enlightened, in order that they may use that power well which they will inevitably obtain.

Once more we see education as a means of control, but moreover we see an acknowledgement that the population are “about to become paramount to the state”. This idea that the population is both a problem of the state and at the same time a potential source of the solution to the state’s problems is one which begins to appear at this time.

Whilst there was general agreement with the principles of Mr Roebuck’s thought, ministers did not think the House should commit itself in principle to a system of national education. Instead what ministers agreed was that a detailed plan should be brought to the House which could then be agreed upon on practical rather than theoretical grounds. Mr Roebuck accepted ministers’ opinion and withdrew the motion. Nonetheless it wasn’t long before the first formal government funding for education was granted when in 1833, expenditure of £20,000 was approved by the House of Commons (*HC Deb 17 August 1833 vol 20 cc732-6*). The award was debated at some length, but tellingly the focus of the debate had shifted. Whilst before the Reform Act the focus was on whether the state should be involved in funding education, now the focus shifted to how much it should spend and how this should be distributed. The motion passed through with 50 ayes to 24 noes⁷, with the money awarded for school buildings, and

⁷ That only 74 members voted should not be taken as indicative of the importance the House gave to the issue. The Order of the Day was not received until very late in the session, with more than one Minister expressing their ‘surprise and regret’ that such an important order be received so late when “so few Members were in town”.

being channelled through two religious education organisations, the National Society⁸ and British and Foreign Schools Society⁹

7.5 THE POPULATION PROBLEM

According to Foucault (Foucault, 1978 [1997]), up until the eighteenth century the state functioned by focussing activities on the 'family' but fundamentally this unit of aggregation was 'too thin, too weak, and too insubstantial' to allow the art of government to develop. Foucault argues that it was not until this changed, with the emergence of statistics that the state was able to begin to flourish. Foucault suggests that at this point the unit of aggregation changes from the 'family', to the 'population'. Statistics now reveal that 'population has its own regularities' which are irreducible to the level of the family: birth, death and disease, cycles of scarcity, wealth, labour (Ibid). The family retains importance because it is through the family that statistics about the population are collected, but the family now operates at the level of an instrument, rather than being the model. Population now emerges as the purpose of the state:

. . . population comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on; and the means the government uses to attain these ends are themselves all, in some sense, immanent to the population; it is the population itself on which government will act either directly..., or indirectly...without the full awareness of the people. (Foucault, 1978 [1997], pp. 216-217)

The extent to which population is the ultimate end of government as Foucault argues, or whether it is rather simply a necessary concern for the continued legitimate authority of the state might be debated, but nonetheless during the eighteenth century there is a marked shift from a state struggling with the art of government to one which develops a political science, "from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to one ruled by techniques of government" (Foucault, 1978 [1997], p. 101).

Whilst statistics undoubtedly facilitated this shift it is the problem of population which arises out a number of converging shifts at this time. The Enlightenment, industrialisation and urbanisation combined in this period to mark a radical shift which results in the demand for reform and which causes government to adjust its modality of power in order to maintain

⁸ "National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church in England and Wales". Founded in 1811 its aim was that "the National Religion should be made the foundation of National Education, and should be the first and chief thing taught to the poor, according to the excellent Liturgy and Catechism provided by our Church." (National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church, 1812)

⁹ British and Foreign School Society for the Education of the Labouring and Manufacturing Classes of Society of Every Religious Persuasion.

order and control. The Reform Act of 1832, Roebuck's Bill and other measures proposed or introduced were designed to advance the interests of the population, only in so far as this was necessary for the maintenance of the existing structures of power and authority. For Roebuck and others there was a need to recognise the growing power of the population and to ameliorate their conditions. This was a strategy explicitly designed to convert large swathes of the population from opposition to the ranks of its supporters. This was then a strategy which aimed to build a new nation, one where the population was no longer controlled by forms of power and violence which sought domination, but where subjects were engaged as citizens with responsibilities for producing the nation themselves. As Boli, Ramirez and Meyer argue:

The state incorporates the individuals through the institution of citizenship, which grants participatory rights in political, economic, and cultural arenas and imposes strong obligations to participate in state-directed national development. In this model, education becomes the vehicle for creating citizens. It instils loyalty to the state and acceptance of the obligations to vote, go to war, pay taxes and so on. It also equips citizens with the skills and worldview required for them to be able to contribute productively to national success. (Boli, Ramirez, & Meyer, 1985)

In this way the state identifies not only the need to engage the immanent power of population in developing the nation-state, but it also begins to recognise education as being a key vehicle for achieving this aim.

7.6 CONCLUSION

At the very outset of the 19th century despite the ideals of the Enlightenment, the constitution of the subject continued to be dominated by a Christian truth. But in the next thirty years we witness a profound shift as the population suddenly becomes a principal object of the state. Through the Enlightenment the subject was thrust onto society, declared its presence and presented itself as a problem of the state. In this way it demanded recognition, a recognition which necessitated a new constitution of the subject. Embodied by the Reform Act of 1832 this was not aimed at reflecting the philosophical ideals of Enlightenment thought, but was instead a practical requirement for continuing to maintain authority and control. This requirement was reflected in the manner by which the government sought to engage in education; firstly with Brougham privileging the Established Church in his failed bill of 1820, and then later with the award of the first government expenditure on education going directly to the National Society and British and Foreign Schools Society. This then is a period when the latent aims of the state (creating the orderly subject) began to be placed alongside and in contrast with the manifest aim of the Church (creating the Christian subject).

In the Sunday school, and then in the manner in which the state began develop its own constitution of the educational subject, the Enlightenment aim of an emancipated, rational and autonomous subject, is manifestly absent. Instead, through early education controlled by the Church the aim was missionary – to convert and maintain the population's belief in

Christianity; in the early Sunday school movement, the same aims were played out , whilst later, and through the early involvement of the state the aims shift towards the disciplined, orderly and obedient subject. As such there is a mismatch between practice and the Enlightenment aim of developing emancipated, autonomous subjects.

If education is understood as a process for facilitating the development of rational, autonomous subjects, then it follows that questions must be raised about the extent to which practices through these periods can claim to be educative. If, as I have argued, this is not the case, then can we think of the teacher as an educator, or the schools a site for education? Or, would it be more accurate for teachers and schools to be viewed as the agents and structures of church indoctrination and state imposition of discipline and control?

In the next chapter I continue to explore the development of state education, examining how, once the instability caused by the Reform Act and the events which led to it subsided, the state increased its challenge to the Church for the absolute right to constitute the subject.

CHAPTER 8



Constituting the Responsible Citizen




Figure 8.1 | Artist Unknown, (1871), *A London School-Board Capture* from 'The Illustrated London News', 9th September 1871, Private Collection, engraving, Bridgeman Art Library (Image number: XJF265800)

Nationally, compulsory education was not introduced until 1880, but the Elementary Education Act made provision for school boards to introduce compulsion at a local level subject to the passing of by-laws. In London a by-law was passed in 1871.

8.

8.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter I set out how the state's formal involvement in education arose as the problem of the population appeared with industrialisation, urbanisation and the Enlightenment: the problem of population emerging as a problem of control. Only when the state's ability to control the population reached a critical point of decay did it concede the need for change, introducing the Reform Bill of 1832, and the first grant for education the following year. Whilst both measures were designed to defend the existing order, out of the moment of crisis a new view of the population began to develop which reflected the recognition that in the future, the strength of government would depend on aligning and harnessing the immanent power of the population towards fulfilling the aims of the nation state.

In this chapter I aim to set out how from these reactionary small steps, state education began to develop and evolve, laying the foundations for the vast education system of the present day. The chapter explores how the continuing tensions between Church and state over the control of the education restricted the development of state involvement to the funding and inspection of Church-led education. Then, as the Chartist movement grew in strength and the threat of rebellion increased once more, rather than amplify the sense of instability, the Church and state settled for an uneasy alliance which preserved the existing structure of authority and control within society. By the mid nineteenth century, economic and fiscal deficits then saw state spending on education begin to decline for the first time since spending began in 1833, before tensions once more brought issues to a head. As in 1832/1833, the decisive change arose not from an ordered sense of progress, but rather in reaction to the imminent threat of revolution. Once more the development of state education occurred not from origins of enlightenment philosophical ideals, but rather from the need for the state to implement changes to support and maintain its legitimacy and authority over the people. The chapter concludes by considering how the development of education was not progressed in order to emancipate the subject. Rather it was part of a strategy which conceded reforms to maintain legitimacy, and at the same time aimed to build allegiance to the state through the development of the responsible, orderly citizen.

8.2 CHURCH-STATE TENSIONS IN THE CONTROL OF EDUCATION

The moment of crisis which arose in the early 1830s soon passed. Britain had shown it wasn't immune to the effects of the Enlightenment, but at the same time the Enlightenment didn't lead to anything on a parallel with the revolutionary uprisings of the USA, France or Italy. Britain had succeeded in industrialising, it did not have mass immigration caused by war, and it did not have religious disputes of the kind that had produced pressure for literacy in the Netherlands (Carr, 1996, p. 78). In all these other states the problem of population had become apparent much more acutely than in Britain: in all these states the constitution of the subject was changing much more radically; and in all these states, state-led education was developing much more rapidly.

In Britain the gap in education left by the state soon began to be filled by an ever expanding movement made which was primarily made up of Sunday schools, and the day schools which ran alongside them. Whilst the Church was not alone in progressing and developing mass education: there were schools of industry, independent monitorial schools, ragged, infant, dame and elementary schools, the overwhelming dominant force in the development of the education system at the time was the Church. This Church-led school system was being taken forward by a number of denominational groups. Principal among these were the National Society¹, and the British and Foreign School Society. The National Society had been founded in 1811, so:

That the NATIONAL RELIGION should be made the Foundation of NATIONAL EDUCATION, and should be the first and chief thing taught to the Poor, according to the excellent *Liturgy and Catechism* provided by our Church for that purpose, must be admitted by all friends to the Establishment; for if the great body of the Nation be educated in other principles than those of the Established Church, the natural consequence must be to alienate the minds of the people from it, or render them indifferent to it, which may, in succeeding generations, prove fatal to the Church, and to the State itself. (Annual Report, 1812, p. 5) original emphasis.

The British and Foreign School Society² in contrast was non-denominational. The 'Plan' of the British and Foreign School Society was:

... calculated to comprehend the children of parents of every religious denomination. While it teaches the purest morality, and the most important points of religion from the page of divine inspiration, it excludes the creed or catechism of any particular sect, the Bible in the authorised version being the only religious book

¹ The full name of the organisation was *National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church in England and Wales*, commonly shortened to *the National Society*

² Originally founded as Society for Promoting the Lancasterian System for the Education of the Poor in 1808, renamed in 1814 as the British and Foreign School Society for the Education of the Labouring and Manufacturing Classes of Society of Every Religious Persuasion, commonly abbreviated to British and Foreign School Society

taught in the schools: and so carefully is every thing avoided, which could shock the religious feelings of any, or tend towards proselytism³, that all sects and parties send their children to these schools with the greatest confidence. It will be seen, however, in what high estimation the duties of religion are held by this institution, from the regulations adopted to promote and secure the attendance of children at that place of worship which their parents may prefer; those children who are not under the care of managers of any Sunday school, being obliged to state on the Monday morning what place of worship they had attended in the preceding day” (The British and Foreign School Society of London, 1816, p. vi)

Irrespective of the denomination, both societies emphasised morality, obedience, discipline and religion.

It is within this context, in 1833, Roebuck, tabled his motion in the House of Commons calling for agreement to a national system which led to the award of a grant of £20,000, as discussed in the previous chapter. The grant was issued to the British and Foreign School Society and the National Society to build new schools which led in turn to a further inquiry in 1834 to look at both “the state of Education of the People of *England and Wales*”, and “the application and effects of the Grant made in the last Session of Parliament for the erection of School-houses, and to consider of the expediency of further Grants in aid of Education” (House of Commons, 1834, p. 3)

The inquiry’s terms of reference clearly show how the debate had moved on. Despite wide ranging concerns there now appeared to be a consensus that the state should become further involved in supporting the expansion of education. For the most part the question was no longer if the state should become involved, but to what extent; not whether it should be involved, but in what way. And here lay the significant debate. It was not a debate on if it should be done, but on how it should be done and at the heart of this debate was who would constitute the subject.

When the report was published it contained no analysis or conclusions as we might expect today, but instead its 262 pages were a complete record of the interviews that took place between the Select Committee and the ‘witnesses’ that they assembled. The focus of the questioning was around the two dominant branches of education at the time – that which was allied to and provided under the auspices of the National Society and that which was linked to the British and Foreign Schools Society. It follows that the principal witnesses had significant representation from these organisations, including:

Mr William Allen, Esq, Treasurer, British and Foreign School Society

Mr John Thomas Crossley, Master, British and Foreign School

William Cotton, Esq., member of the General Committee of the National Schools Society

³ Proselytism in this context is the attempt of one religion to convert someone of another religion to their belief.

James Trimmer, Esq., Committee member National Schools Society
Rev, William Johnson, Clerical Superintendent, National Schools Society
Mr Henry Dunn, Secretary, British and Foreign National Society
Rev. Joseph Cotton Wigram, Secretary, National School Society

At the same time evidence was heard from those connected more specifically through the Sunday school movement, for example:

Mr William Freeman Lloyd, Secretary, Sunday School Union
Mr Henry Althans, Secretary East London Auxiliary Sunday School Union
Benjamin Braidley, Esq. Member of Bennet Street Sunday School, Manchester
(Church of England School with 2,700 pupils in 1834)

And from

Lord Brougham, Lord Chancellor, who had undertaken much investigation between 1816 and 1820

At the heart of the questioning was how the state could further support education without supporting particular denominations. As set out in the previous chapter Brougham's Bill in 1820 had failed. It had sought to extend education through the Church of England, resulting in widespread opposition from dissenters and Roman Catholics. The inquiry of 1834, with a clear remit to identify how to extend education saw these same denominational conflicts as the primary obstacle. The problem the Committee wrestled with was that if the state sought to provide substantial funds for the increase in education to the Church of England it would receive opposition from the dissenters and Roman Catholics; if it supported the dissenters it would be opposed by the Church of England; if it decided to exert control itself it would receive opposition from both quarters. And so the question the inquiry sought to resolve was how the state could extend education without directly supporting one or more religious groups on the one hand, and without excluding them on the other.

Much of the questioning throughout the inquiry was based on whether religious instruction could take place on general Christian principles, rather than the specific teachings of anyone church. For the state this would resolve many of the issues it faced. Indicative of this line of inquiry was the questioning directed to the Rev. Joseph Cotton Wigram, the then Secretary of the National School Society and later the bishop of Rochester.

Committee

831. Might you not so regulate your institution as to include them [dissenters]?

Wigram

I have said that I do not know how it could be done, if the present schools are to be maintained with their religious character, to satisfy those that have established

them. I do not know how they could give up so much as would, in the view of the dissenters, make them more acceptable than they now are.

Responses such as these posed further difficulties for the state. Wigram here is seeking to maintain the religious character of the schools to satisfy those who have established them. In other words, the provision of education is clearly to meet the ends of the Church. If this is modified then the individual would no longer be constituted in line with the aims of the Church. But if the education provided is for the aims of the Church and these are neither the aims of the state nor indeed the aims of the people then on what basis could the state invest in church-led education?

Wigram himself makes clear that for 90% of those attending National Schools, a religious education was not important.

Committee

781. Supposing that the doctrines of some other Christian sect were taught in a school in other respects arranged like yours, would you think yourself justified as a religious parent, in sending your son to profit by that instruction?

Wigram

I should object myself certainly, but there is a great difference between a person who understands the subject, and who feels some degree of interest in it, and a person whose moral life is not good, and whose only object is to get his child instructed in reading and writing. With respect to nine-tenths of the people who send their children to us, if our schools were to become inefficient and other schools could teach reading and writing better, the parents without at all thinking about the religious knowledge they get would send them to the others. Our schools depend very much upon their character as efficient institutions for success in those branches, and they are generally full.

And so although Wigram acknowledges that for the overwhelming majority of the population, the religious character of education was unimportant he maintained throughout a resolute, almost defiant position, a position which sought to maintain the right of the Church to use the school to constitute the subject in Christian terms. In this way the importance the Church places on the school becomes very clear. At the same time it is easy to see why the government found it so hard to extend its involvement in education despite widespread agreement from within the Commons of the need to do so.

Since the state found it difficult to invest in education because of curricula issues which revolved around how the subject was constituted, it sought to find alternative ways of addressing the problems it faced. Principal among these was inspection. This the government argued was necessary since now it was providing grant funding it was duty bound to ensure

that this financial support was being efficiently administered and effectively invested. But the call for inspection only led to further disputes. The Church saw that if a system of government inspection was developed it would simply lead to state interference: inspection meant standards, standards set by government, and not by the Church; standards meant judgements by government, and not by the Church; standards meant improvement, but improvement against state-led standards would simply result in a gradual push away from a Church directed and controlled system.

With such resistance and no solution in sight the government continued with the modest investments begun in 1833. In 1838⁴ for example £20,000 was agreed for the 'Erection of School-houses'. But such investment brought further debate in the House of Commons about the role of government and the extent and purpose of inspection:

Mr. Acland did not think the Government, being a human institution, ought to have the control of the religious instruction of the people. The institutions of this country were happily bound up with the Established Church, and that constitution of things ought to be respected. He must say, that there was a very efficient inspection of the national schools carried on by the clergy...

Mr. Villiers ... hoped the House would consider, that there had been nothing advanced against some improved system of superintendence; and when they voted the public money, it was surely their duty to see how that money was applied. That money at present was given to two societies... Now, it was clear that it ought to be applied fairly to the general purposes of education, and he sincerely trusted, that a better system of inspection would be established so as to insure a fairer distribution of the grant.

Sir R. Inglis could not consent to the doctrine, that because Parliament of late had interfered with the property of the Church, they had a right to interfere also with the religion and mode of instruction adopted and sanctioned by the Church. For himself, he should be sorry ever to see Government interfere in the instruction of the people to such an extent as some hon. Members seemed willing to sanction, as he believed, that such interference could only tend to retard rather than to promote the advance of instruction amongst the people. He objected to the mode in which the grant was disposed of at present, as he considered, that the education of the people ought to be in the hands of the national Church

Thus, the award of what were even at that time, relatively small grants, and the necessary inspection and reporting of the effectiveness of such awards, led to significant debates about the role of the state and the Church in education, and the extent to which they were free to constitute the subject as they saw fit. Whilst the Church welcomed the investment from the government, there was nonetheless a prevailing sense that the state was interfering, such that to inspect schools at the time the Government needed the consent and cooperation of the

⁴ [*HC Deb 09 July 1838 vol 44 cc42-6 42*](#)

Church of England. This was eventually granted through the signing in 1840 of a concordat with the Archbishop of Canterbury giving the Church the right to approve the inspectors, which in effect meant that the inspectors were members of the clergy. Even then the scope was modest:

...inspection is not intended as a means of exercising control, but of affording assistance; that it is not to be regarded as operating for the restraint of local efforts, but for their encouragement;...the Inspector having no power to interfere, and not being instructed to offer any advice or information excepting where it is invited. (Committee of Council on Education Whitehall, 1840 [1851])

Thus the pace of change was slow with conflict persisting at every attempt by the state to become more involved in education. Thus when the Committee of Council for Education was created in 1839 to establish a national college for the development of teachers, it, like all other efforts by the state to extend education, was hampered by denominational tensions. Ultimately it could not be agreed how it would spend the £10,000 that had been allocated and so these monies were eventually distributed to National Society and British and Foreign Schools Society.

At the same time as religious denominations could not agree a way forward with the state, the middle classes expressed concern about educating the working classes as did the industrialists who with some notable exceptions feared education might restrict their ability to employ children. With concern over revolution still in the air, all parties were keen to slow change down – this then was a time of conservatism (Simon, 1960, p. 339).

8.3 CHARTISM: A SHORT LIVED STRUGGLE

Frustrated by the pace of change the populist chartists movement emerged in 1837. Whilst universal male suffrage was at the heart of chartist demands, these extended to include “free Trade, Universal Peace, Freedom in Religion, and ... a thoroughly efficient system of Education for all.” (Sheffield Chartists, 1838 [1918]). The impasse created by the government/church increased the call from the working class for secular education, but this call for reform merely reinforced the conservative interdependence of Church and government.

Two publications of 1840 both called Chartism exemplify the frustration caused by the religious indoctrination and denominational in-fighting that characterised the state of education at the time.

The essayist and historian, Thomas Carlyle asked:

How teach religion? By plying with liturgies, catechisms, credos; droning thirty nine or other articles incessantly into the infant ear? Friends! In that case, why not apply to Birmingham, and have Machines made, and set up at all street-corners, in highways and byways, to repeat and vociferate the same, not ceasing night or

day?...Depend on it, Birmingham can make machines to repeat liturgies and articles; to do whatsoever feat is mechanical. (Carlyle, 1840, pp. 102-103).

He later answered his question – it was not to build machines in Birmingham but to ‘teach’ religion. Here Carlyle is appealing to the sense not that religion should disappear from the school, but that rather than being indoctrinated, it should be taught. Meanwhile Lovett in the same year called all parties to “dwell in peace and union”: for an end to the denominational disputes which were founded in “selfish desires and sectarian jealousies” and resulted in suffering “ignorance, vice, and disunion” (Lovett, 1840, pp. 40-41). Again this is not an appeal against religion, but rather as Samuel Bamford put it against “the priesthood, scrambling for worldly gain, and squabbling as to which sect or party shall have most hand in moulding the brains of the rising generation” (Bamford, 1840s [1893], p. 344).

The state was not unsympathetic to the appeal from the Carlyle, Lovett and Bamford, for whilst it had not sought to radically break education away from religion, it did try to dissolve the denominational lines along which education had been so clearly drawn. In the end, however far from softening the impact of the Church, the state in many ways simply reinforced it by providing it with grants for expansion and further development. The state had wanted change, but like the Church it had its own reasons to limit the pace of that change. Whilst change for the Church represented loss of control, the development of antichristian beliefs, immorality and sinfulness, for the state change was linked with a fear of social upheaval and revolution. Together the state and the church sought to resist change.

8.4 THE CALL FOR SECULAR EDUCATION

The Chartist call for political reform petered out but the demands for secular education continued. The National Public School Association⁵, first created in Manchester in 1847, quickly assumed a national role following significant support from elsewhere in the country, calling for religious education to be removed completely from the school:

On no great question which has agitated the public mind for a very long period, has the greater diversity of opinion existed than on the subject of Popular Education. Yet amidst all this variety of opinion, there appears to be a general recognition of the value of education, and an increasing belief in the necessity that exists for promoting its extension among the people.

For ourselves, we believe there is no safeguard for civil and religious liberty, no security for the rights of property and labour, nothing within the scope of merely

⁵ The National Public School Association was originally called the Lancashire Association for Promoting "Secular" Education. It dropped the word secular to reduce resistance to its aims, but those aims remained the same. Its "Plan for a General System of Secular Education" published in 1847 advocated secular education to be financed by local rates and controlled by local boards elected by the ratepayers.

There was opposition to the secular aspects of the "Plan", from the Church of England. Both bodies brought forward Bills and gave evidence at Select Committees on Education in Manchester and Salford. Neither of them, however, had any lasting success in Parliament, which in 1854, along with the rest of the country, turned its attention to the Crimean War. Source: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/a2a/records.aspx?cat=127-m136_2&cid=-1#-1

human agency which can conduce to the material, the moral, and the religious well being of the people, equal to a universal diffusion of education. Deeply impressed as we are with this belief, it is no less our conviction that the vast benefits of education may be, to a great extent, neutralized, if it be conducted on false or erroneous principles. If, as in countries governed by despotic power, the duty of educating is assumed by the government, the minds of the people may be pressed down unto bondage, rather than elevated to freedom. If, as with us, the education of the people is entrusted to the voluntary effort of certain sections only of the community, that large portion of the people unconnected with any religious denomination is abandoned altogether to chance, or to what is worse than chance, to utter exclusion from all instruction.

To adopt a course between these two extremes, we hold to be the part of a free and enlightened nation; and to point out the means by which we conceive such a course may be pursued, is the object we have in view. (Lancashire Public School Association, 1848, p. 3)

As with the sentiment expressed by Carlyle, the National Public School Association was not promoting atheism, but rather putting forward that school was not the place for religious instruction. The Association sought the “establishment, by law, in England and Wales, of a system of free schools; - which, supported by local rates, and managed by local committees, specially elected for that purpose by ratepayers, shall impart secular instruction only...” (National Public Schools' Association, 1851, p. Appendix A).

The plan set out how it would achieve this, most notably stating that “No clergyman of the Church of England, nor any dissenting minister, nor any ecclesiastic of the Catholic Church, shall be capable of holding any salaried office in connection with the schools” (Lancashire Public School Association, 1848, p. 7).

The aims of the association were brought to a motion in the House of Commons in 1851 and after a lengthy introduction by Mr W. J Fox, the ‘motion was made and question put’:

That it is expedient to promote the Education of the People, in England and Wales, by the establishment of Free Schools for secular instruction, to be supported by local rates, and managed by Committees, elected specially for that purpose by the ratepayers. *HC Deb 22 May 1851 vol 116 cc1242-98*

The motion was defeated: Ayes 49; Noes 139: Majority 90.

Despite the defeat the position of the National Association had pushed the case for secular education forward. That a motion was heard and voted on, and that it received support from a quarter of the house was a huge shift from the position just thirty years earlier when Brougham was obliged to promote a scheme that was exclusively dependent on the Church of England. This shift was a shift in the constitution of the subject, who by now was no longer framed unilaterally in Christian terms.

As Kay-Shuttleworth commented, the National Association had succeeded in promoting:

... the modes in which school rates can be levied and applied most equitably...They have successfully vindicated the right of the ratepayer to control these funds...They have shown how civil freedom may be protected,...and how the parent and child may enjoy the rights of conscience without interference... (Kay-Shuttleworth, 1853 , pp. 44-45)

In referring to rights of conscience, a term we might today substitute for freedom of thought, Kay-Shuttleworth was drawing on American President Thomas Jefferson who had himself, in relation to religion proclaimed : “No provision in our Constitution ought to be dearer to man than that which protects the rights of conscience against the enterprises of the civil authority” (1809 [1861], p. 147)⁶. This was an Enlightenment ideal, argued for by JS Mill in *On Liberty* (1859 [1868], p. 20), one which many in parliament subscribed to, but nonetheless struggled to realise.

And thus, the dispute over who should constitute the subject continued: the state, the Established Church, dissenting churches, the ratepayer, the self? All the while the persistent question who should control education, jumped past the question, should the state be involved in extending education? Thus, in the background of the disputes, all the while the idea of universal education was quietly becoming accepted. Nonetheless as the disputes continued the constitution of the subject remained relatively static. There had been challenge, but control was maintained: challenge from the Chartists to the state had petered out and so too had the challenge from the state to the Church. In short there wasn't sufficient political decay for change to take place: all the while the existing order could be preserved it was; there were minor changes, modifications and adjustments, there were motions, discussions and debates, but no fundamental shift.

8.5 THE NEWCASTLE COMMISSION

Following Roebuck's Bill of 1833, the increase in the number of educational grants being issued meant that government involvement in education was no longer unusual. However educational grants were still far from commonplace, and at this point it remained the case that no significant act of parliament had been passed on education, this despite a raft of bills being presented at Westminster: Sir John Graham's Bill (1843), W.J. Fox's motion of (1851), Sir John

⁶ The idea of the rights of conscience was an enlightenment ideal promoted by James Madison 4th President of the USA and Thomas Jefferson Founding Father and 3rd President of the USA. It was a phrase that entered the parliamentary lexicon in debates on education from 1839 onwards. Whilst it was never heavily used, it did continue to appear in the 1840s and 50s, was less prevalent in the 1860s, before spiking between 1867-1869 and into the 1870s with the debates around the second Reform Act and the Elementary Education Act. Its use is then patchy until the turn of the century when it dies away almost completely.

Russell's Borough Bill of 1855 and three other Bills in that year, amongst others - all had been defeated because of denominational disagreements (Maclure J. S., 1979, pp. 70-71).

Nonetheless, the debate in parliament around education persisted and led in 1856 to the creation of the Education Department, established as the administrative instrument of the Committee of Council of Education. Arising from this was the Newcastle Commission⁷, set up in 1858 as a royal commission whose terms of reference were "To inquire into the present state of Popular Education in England, and to report what Measures, if any, are required for the extension of sound and cheap elementary instruction to all classes of people".

The Newcastle Commission report ran to 720 pages and contained sections on the education of the independent poor, pauper children, vagrants and criminals, state schools and charitable endowments. Part VI of the report was given over to statistics, which, running for some 120 pages, provides clear evidence of the rise in statistical thinking at the time.

The report provides a useful summary of the way in which educational policy had stumbled into existence and the problems that were encountered when ministers sought to extend both the extent of education and government involvement in it:

The great practical obstacle in the way of such a proposal was the difficulty of settling the relations between the system to be established and the various forms of religious belief prevailing in the country...In order, however, that something might be done, a sum of 20,000*l* was voted annually from 1832 to 1839, which was administered by the Treasury, and was by them expended in grants to assist in the erection of school buildings. Applications for these grants were made through the National and British and Foreign School Societies, which were considered to represent the views of that part of the public which took an interest in Popular Education.

From 1839 to the present time the system of annual grants has continued, and their amount has been increased from 30,000*l* to about 800,000*l*. This arrangement has never been recognised as ultimate or permanent, but has grown up as a sort of compromise between the admitted necessity of promoting popular education and the difficulty of devising any general system for that purpose which would be accepted by the country. (Education Commission, 1861)

⁷ Formally called the Royal Commission to inquire into State of Popular Education in England, it is commonly referred to as the Newcastle Commission after the Chairman of the Commission and author of the report, Henry Pelham, Duke of Newcastle.

* List of grants in—											
			£				£				
1839	-	-	30,000	1847	-	-	100,000	1854	-	-	263,000
1840	-	-	30,000	1848	-	-	125,000	1855	-	-	396,921
1841	-	-	40,000	1849	-	-	125,000	1856	-	-	451,213
1842	-	-	40,000	1850	-	-	125,000	1857	-	-	541,233
1843	-	-	50,000	1851	-	-	150,000	1858	-	-	663,435
1844	-	-	40,000	1852	-	-	160,000	1859	-	-	836,920
1845	-	-	75,000	1853	-	-	260,000	1860	-	-	798,167
1846	-	-	100,000								

Figure 8.2 | List of grants by year in the Newcastle Commission Report, p34

There was a wealth of recommendations emanating from the report. Nonetheless “The main recommendations of the Commission were that the Committee of Council should extend its operations, but that the chief features of the old system should remain – no interference with denominational bodies, and no central control over school management” (Maclure, 2006, p. 71).

The report also made its position on compulsory education clear:

Any universal system appears to us neither attainable nor desirable... An attempt to replace an independent system of education by a compulsory system, managed by the Government, would be met by objections, both religious and political... And therefore, on the grounds of a long-established difference between our own position and that of the countries where a compulsory system is worked successfully; on the grounds of the feelings, both political, social and religious, to which it would be opposed; and also on the ground that our education is advancing successfully without it, we have not thought that a scheme for compulsory education to be universally applied in this country can be entertained as a practical possibility. (Education Commission, 1861, p. 300)

Ultimately whilst the report recommended the extension of state involvement in education, the privilege it gave to the conservative maintenance of the existing ‘independent system’ meant that ultimately only one recommendation was taken forward – payment by results, creating a mechanical system of teaching, tied to the examination which was focussed almost exclusively on the ‘three Rs’.

Established in 1862, Robert Lowe, the architect of this new system which was called the Revised Code, explained:

I therefore think I have a right to say that our system is at present neither efficient nor cheap. I am challenged to state what the amount of the Estimate will be. How can I possibly tell ...The thing will depend not as now upon inspection, but upon the results of examination. It will depend upon the amount of diligence which may be brought to bear upon the education of the children. How can I measure that diligence? I can only repeat what I have said before, that if the system will not be

cheap, it will be efficient; and if it will not be efficient, it will be cheap. *HC Deb* 27
March 1862 vol 166 cc137-231

It is impossible to look upon the outcome of the findings of the Newcastle Commission and the implementation of the Revised Code in isolation to the wider socio-political-economic situation of the time. When the Newcastle Commission reported it was “to a new ministry in which Gladstone, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was committed to a policy of retrenchment; expenditure on the armed forces now stood at some £24 millions, that on education was approaching £1 million – it was agreed on all sides that economies must be made” (Simon, 1960, p. 47).

The outcome then was not surprising. The report set out an estimated budget for education of £630,000 from central government, down from the £800,000 expended in 1860. The findings of the report fitted with the political-economic climate of the time. The only outcome from the report – the Revised Code, was designed and implemented in a way which made efficiencies, and by 1865 the cost of education had fallen to £600,000. Thus, the overarching objective of the report – to see what, if anything needed to be done to extend ‘sound and cheap elementary instruction to all classes of people’ was not borne out in action.

Prior to the Revised Code grant had been distributed in relation to the amounts that denominational bodies had raised themselves, but now the intention was to distribute funds in relation to results, whoever achieved them. It was argued that this would create a level playing field in the provision of education, however in reality very little changed, since those with the means to deliver results, those with the essential infrastructure of schools and teachers, were the same denominational groups as before.

It was now 30 years since the Reform Bill of 1832 and because there had been no significant political decay, no moment of crisis to signal the delegitimisation of the church, the state or the existing ‘independent system’ there was no radical shift in the way in which the subject was constituted. But the effect of the Newcastle Commission and the Revised Code was nonetheless significant. The Newcastle Commission had gathered an enormous amount of statistical evidence and had sought to use this evidence to identify norms and standards across all manner of educational issues, from the number of schools, ratios between teachers and pupils, the optimum time for entering and leaving school, the most effective way of training teachers, rates of pay and so on. At the same time the introduction of the Revised Code effectively established the academic standards for the three Rs and a system of examination to assess against these standards. As a consequence, through the Newcastle Commission and the Revised Code, the state sought to constitute the subject along disciplinary lines. It had sought to extend its control over education through a hierarchical system of observation, through the use of statistics it had developed a wide range of benchmarks and norms, and in the school it had introduced a comprehensive system of examination for the first time. Whilst the state was unable to influence the curriculum in the way it wanted it nonetheless succeeded in extending its influence on the constitution of the subject.

8.6 THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL DECAY RENEWED.

The Industrial Revolution brought a rapid shift from a land based, rural, agricultural society, to a machine-based, urban, industrial economy. This shift brought significant changes in the conditions and structure of employment. In the factories that had sprung up across the country, large swathes of employment required little or no skill at all, placing significant bargaining power in the hands of employers. For those that were skilled, the development of new manufacturing techniques brought threats, and the prospect of being replaced by unskilled alternatives, or worst still, by machines. Employees were keen to protect their interests from these threats as much as they were challenging employers for better pay and conditions (Thompson, 1963 [1991], p. 244), and so the trade union movement began to develop. By the mid 19th century the prevailing laissez-faire economic doctrine dictated that wages and employment levels would reflect market forces. In times and in areas where labour was scarce, unemployment fell and wages prices rose. Conversely an oversupply of labour resulted in unemployment rising and wage prices falling. Politicians and industrialists believed that in time balance would be restored. As a consequence when the union movement began to intervene and call for a just wage and the right to work, they were seen as being out of touch with economic reality.

The reforms that were being called for by the working classes were slow in coming and frustrations began to intensify. Unhappy with poor living conditions, poor working conditions, and poor pay, and frustrated by the pace of change in politics, education and in employment rights, the union movement grew. In industries such as steel production people were forced to work long hours, with little protection, in uncomfortable, unhealthy and dangerous working conditions. The continued success of industry was therefore something only being achieved at the cost of human suffering. Together these two factors fuelled the development of the union movement still further. It follows that the areas where the trade union movement grew the most were those areas which were the most heavily industrialised: areas such as Sheffield became centres for trade union organisation and agitation. With no outlet, the pressure of the workers' frustrations exploded into violence and vandalism: the Globe Works factory in Sheffield was blown up by a bomb in 1843, and the Kelham Wheel, Sheffield's largest grinding wheel, was sabotaged in 1847. By the late 1850s and into the 1860s, the conflict between capital and labour reached new heights in the 'Sheffield Outrages'. These culminated in a series of explosions and murders carried out by union militants: in 1859 James Linley was shot dead in the Crown Inn pub for refusing to join the Sawgrinders Union (which represented the vast majority of those working in cutlery production), and in 1861 a woman died when the house of non-union man, George Wastnidge, was blown up by a bomb

SHEFFIELD OUTRAGES.

Sheffield enjoys (or suffers) a singular reputation among English towns. It produces the best cutlery and hardware in the world, and also the most ingeniously wicked and detestable of crimes. It is famous alike for its knives and forks and for its assassinations. It breeds artisans who are exceptionally skilful and clever in their craft, and it also breeds cowardly and cruel ruffians who are a disgrace to human nature. A "Sheffield outrage" is a specific form of crime, happily unknown in any other part of the United Kingdom, though presenting many analogies to Irish agrarian murder. It is a carefully organised murder, or attempt at murder, perpetrated in the interests of a particular class, carried out with diabolical cunning and pitiless barbarity, and apparently sanctioned by the public opinion of at least a considerable number of those for whose supposed benefit it is committed. We all know but too well the familiar story. A working man breaks the rules of his trade union by working for some employer who has made himself obnoxious to the union authorities, or by accepting a rate of wages which the said union authorities disapprove; or else, perhaps, he refuses to belong to a trade union at all, and entirely repudiates the claim of his fellow working men to dictate to him in the management of his own private affairs. Thereupon he is brutally murdered, or his house is blown up with gunpowder in the dead of night, or some other horrible and deliberately planned catastrophe befalls him.

SHEFFIELD OUTRAGES



Figure 8.4 | Photographer Unknown, (1860s), William Broadhead, Secretary of Saw Grinders Union, Sheffield, (Sheffield Local Studies Library: Picture Sheffield s08365)

"Has anything been said to you or done to you by the Saw Grinders' Union for working in this way, not being a Union man and not paying this sum of money?"

"Yes, I got blown up for it."

Evidence of T. Fearnough, from Minutes of Evidence taken by Commissioners enquiring into the Sheffield Outrages. (Great Britain Royal Commission on Trades Unions, 1867)

Figure 8.3 | Liverpool Mercury, October 16, 1866, *Sheffield Outrages*, Gale/British Library, 19th Century British Library Newspapers.

According to the pamphlet, *The Sheffield Outrages: Tracts for the Times* (nd)⁸:

Sheffield, then the capital of English trade unionism, was the only town where the decrees of the union were enforced by the blowing up of factories or shooting capitalists. ... Like machine smashing or rick burning, they were an inheritance of the evil days of oppression and coercion.'

When strikes are criminal offences, and unions are smashed with all the might of law, what method is there left but outrage?'

In 1865 the outrages intensified and they did so again in 1866 after a bill for reform failed to gain passage through parliament. In October 1866, a Sheffield worker's house was blown up with a union leader declaring "he'd got what he deserved for not being part of the union". Shortly afterwards an official inquiry was launched into "the trade union outrages" (Reynolds Newspaper, Sunday 4th November 1866). Political decay was building. A new constitution of the subject was now on the horizon. JS Mill summed up the way in which decay had emerged at this time in *Principles of Political Economy*:

Of the working men...it may be pronounced certain, that the patriarchal or paternal system of government is one to which they will not again be subject. That question was decided, when they were taught to read, and allowed access to newspapers and political tracts; when dissenting preachers were suffered to go among them, and appeal to theory faculties and feelings in opposition to the creeds professed and countenanced by their superiors; when they were brought together in numbers, to work socially under the same roof; when railways enabled them to shift from place to place, and change their patrons and employers as easily as their coats; when they were encouraged to seek a share in the government, by means of the electoral franchise. The working classes have taken their interests into their own hands, and are perpetually showing that they think the interests of their employers not identical with their own, but opposite to them. Some among the higher classes flatter themselves that these tendencies may be counteracted by moral and religious education; but they have let the time go by for giving an education which can serve their purpose... the poor will not much longer accept morals and religion of other people's prescribing. (Mill, 1848-1871 [1871], p. 457)

Alongside the economic and socio-demographic upheavals pointed to by JS Mill, the Unionist victory in the American Civil War (1861-1865), once more aroused Chartist sentiment. Coupled with existing union discontent, it provided the impetus for the establishment of the Reform League in 1865. With universal manhood suffrage as its goal, it became the organising focal point of the struggles of the time. With union agitation continuing to spill over into violence and the increasingly vocal and visible Reform League pressing for change, there was a growing belief within government that political reform was now necessary. There was now a perceived

⁸ Also published in the Anarchist 1895, *Sheffield Local Studies Library: MP 1744 S*.

disconnect between the state and the needs of society. The legitimacy of the government was under threat. The point of political decay had been reached.

On the death of Palmerston, Russell became Prime Minister for the second time. He moved to enlarge the franchise through a further Reform Bill. During the first reading of the Bill in the House of Commons, Sir Francis Crossley highlighted the need for change.

...if in 1832 a step had not been taken we should have had a revolution. This Bill [the 1866 Bill] was another step in the same direction, and in like manner he believed it would preserve the peace and prosperity of the country for many years.
(Crossley, 1866)

But following what amounted to a vote of no confidence Russell for was forced to tender his resignation, Queen Victoria eventually accepting it on 26th June⁹. The Liberals were now in government, and led by Gladstone, withdrew the Bill on the 19th July¹⁰. The Reform League had seen the withdrawal coming, organising a demonstration in Trafalgar Square and a mass demonstration in Hyde Park with an estimated turn out of over 200,000 people.



The liberal newspaper, The Daily News, criticised the Government’s response to Reform League demonstrations.

Figure 8.6 | The Daily News, Tuesday, July 24, 1866; Issue 6308, Gale Document Number: Y3203001681

With recognition and engagement from the likes of JS Mill, the League grew in strength over the winter. In early 1867 a new reform bill was proposed, but for the League it didn’t go far enough. In May 1867 there was another mass rally in Hyde Park, again with an estimated 200,000 people turning out. This time the Home Secretary was forced to resign. Shortly

⁹ Hansard House of Lords Debate 26 June 1866 vol 184 cc654-82

¹⁰ Hansard House of Commons Debate 19 July 1866 vol 184 cc1143-5

afterwards a plot proposed by the Irish Republican movement and the Reform League to instigate civil war was overheard and reported in *The Times*. Though in reality the Reform League never appeared to be party to it, events now brought the issue to a head, and a revised Bill was put to parliament.

Parliament now recognised that significant change was an inevitable necessity. Whilst there was concern that reform would lead to a peaceful revolution, there was also fear that failure to reform would turn that revolution bloody. As Robert Lowe put it in the House of Commons:

Reform is a correction of abuses; but a wholesale transfer of power from one class to another is a revolution, and this measure to which we are asked to give a second reading is, I believe, nothing short of a revolution.

We have changed, not only the figure of the franchise, but we have virtually—as will be found to be the case whenever we come to deal with the matter again—changed the principle on which the franchise is conferred. The principle on which it was conferred used to be, as I take it, that it was a privilege, or trust, or agency, deputed to certain places which were deemed fitted to exercise it for the general good. The principle on which the franchise is now conferred is obviously ... of a right of every citizen who has a settled residence... (Lowe, 1867)

Consequently, in the end, the second Reform Bill was passed through Parliament relatively quickly. Support for it was weak, but whilst to many it was undesirable, nearly everyone now saw it as being necessary. The new act, enfranchised all male householders, and although this still excluded more than two thirds of the adult male population, and still excluded all women, for the period, the change was radical. As a consequence the Reform Act of 1867 reconstituted society. Whilst it had by no means created universal suffrage, it had suddenly enfranchised such a large proportion of the adult population that it simultaneously eroded traditional rights of the gentry, and created new responsibilities for the working class. The constitution of the subject had shifted significantly (if not absolutely) from that of dutiful subject who was required to know (and remain in) his/her place in society to that of the responsible citizen. This new role would have profound effects for education

With memories of the revolutions in France, Italy and America still fresh in the mind, the Reform Bill was passed because of the fear that the delegitimisation of the government might lead England to the same fate. Having extended the franchise there was now fear as to what the working classes, and the 'new mob', those who organised themselves through unions and reform leagues, might do with their new political power. As Hurt (1979, p. 68) puts it "The Reform Act of 1867 had taken the franchise a stage nearer this class [the new mob]. It had given the vote to those thought to be susceptible to the new demagogue of the 1860s, the trade unionist leader [Broadhead] held responsible for the Sheffield outrages."

It was in some measure, the response to this that drove education forward. Whilst there was a view that as in 1832, the 1867 Reform Bill made education a less, not a more politically urgent

matter (Hurt, 1979, p. 24) in that it diffused the agitation and the agitators, others such as Robert Lowe saw that with the Reform Bill the masses had been entrusted with “with the whole power of this country”, an ‘evil’ which could only be remedied “by the most universal measures of education that can be devised” (Lowe, 1867). There was then for Lowe, a need to extend education provision for the working class so that they could adequately fulfil their new position, or as Lowe put it: “The lower classes ought to be educated to discharge the duties cast upon them.” (Lowe, 1867, p. 32). Thus Lowe argued the need for the state to promote “a *mass* educational system in order to transform all individuals into members of the national polity...support[ing] a *uniform* system to build devotion to a common set of purposes, symbols, and assumptions about proper conduct in the social arena” (Boli, Ramirez, & Meyer, 1985) original emphasis.

It is clear that this new constitution of the subject called for a reformulation of education and thus a new wave of educational proposals followed. Firstly the Education of the Poor Act 1867 was brought to Parliament but it failed to pass through the Commons largely because it appeared to MPs that it hadn’t been properly considered. Subsequently the 1868 Elementary Education Bill was withdrawn at the second reading, because it didn’t propose to go far enough, the Government declaring that it was “expedient to withdraw a measure which dealt only fragmentarily with the education question” (*House of Commons Debate 24 June 1868 cc1983-2011*). This led to a sense of frustration that both the opportunity and the need created by the Reform Act were not being addressed. As a consequence of this frustration the National Education League was formed in 1869 to exert pressure on government to pass a bill which resolved to provide free, universal, non-sectarian education.

The league sought “The establishment of a system which shall secure the education of every child in the country”, with six specific objectives:

1. Local authorities shall be compelled by law to see that sufficient school accommodation is provided for every child in their district.
2. The cost of founding, and maintaining such schools as may be required shall be provided out of local rates, supplemented by government grants.
3. All schools aided by local rates shall be under the management of local authorities and subject to government inspection.
4. All schools aided by local rates shall be unsectarian.
5. To all schools aided by local rates admission shall be free.
6. School accommodation being provided, the state or the local authorities shall have power to compel the attendance of children of suitable age not otherwise receiving education.

(National Education League, 1869)

As such it stood in opposition to the National Education Union, which, formed the same year, sought to protect the interests of the Church. Both however campaigned for an expansion of education, particularly for working classes.

The passing in 1870 of the Elementary Education Act sought to resolve these issues. It set out a framework for schooling for children aged between 5 and 12 in England and Wales. Put forward by William Forster who had been responsible for previous education bills of 1867 and 1868, it is commonly referred to as Forster's Act. In his introductory remarks Forster talked of the deficiencies in the amount of education being delivered and the variable quality that an 'independent system' inevitably contained. He noted the disputes about the extent of both issues, but nonetheless asserted that despite this there was near universal agreement that both needed to be addressed.

The Act itself sought to tackle issues of coverage by establishing local school boards to oversee the adequate provision of education. Where there were gaps in existing provision, such as that provided via Sunday schools, voluntary schools and other day schools, the boards were tasked with creating new places.

As well as addressing issues concerning the extent and quality of education, Forster set out to confront the religious disputes, with his colleague William Cowper-Temple drafting a clause which stated that:

No scholar shall be required, as a condition of being admitted into or of attending or of enjoying all the benefits of the school, to attend or to abstain from attending any Sunday school, or any place of religious worship, or to learn any such catechism or religious formulary, or to be present at any such lesson or instruction or observance as may have been objected to on religious grounds by the parent of the scholar sending his objection in writing to the managers or principal teacher of the school or one of them. (Elementary Education Act 1870).

In practice this meant that provision in the majority of new board schools had religious instruction which was non-denominational, however for the most part schooling remained Church-led and denominational. Indeed the opportunity for the Church to apply for capital grants meant that Church based education expanded during this period. On religious issues therefore the Act was necessarily fudged: it neither fully satisfied the various denominations of the Church, nor appeased those calling for a wholly secular education system.

Eight further Acts followed the 1870 Bill. Collectively known as the Elementary Education Acts 1870-1893, among a raft of measures they extended the scope of the 1870 Act to make education compulsory for those up until the age of 10. Whilst initially local bye-laws were required, in 1880 the Lords quickly and quietly passed a further Bill which simply made more explicit and consistent a commitment to compulsory education which had been left by previous bills vague and open to interpretation.

8.7 CONCLUSION

There was then, during this period, a huge shift in the constitution of the subject, from a position whereby: the government first formally considered the matter of education through its 1816 inquiry into the *State of Education among the Lower Orders in the Metropolis*; to one where a reflective Brougham queries “how such a system can be established without placing in the hands of the Government, that is of the Ministers of the day, the means of dictating opinions and principles to the people... (Brougham, 1834); through to a position whereby in 1880 education becomes explicitly compulsory for all children aged between 5 and 10.

This shift was caused by a change in the status of the population brought about by the extension of the franchise by the 1832 and 1867 Reform Acts. New obligations on the subject forced the state to reconstitute the subject, first as the dutiful, obedient, and orderly subject and then increasingly as the responsible citizen. This was not a planned and progressive shift, but instead arose out of political decay, whereby the legitimacy of the government was thrown into doubt. It was fear of revolution, not planned progressive development that gave birth to state education in England. It is at this point when the population becomes a problem of the state that the government takes the subject and his (sic) “life and life-conduct as in some sense the correlative object of its own suasive capacity” (Gordon, 1991, p. 5). In towns and cities, and in the factories within them, organised groups of working class people now presented a potential threat to the structure of established authority. For government there was now an increasingly urgent need to ensure that as the population grew and as it gained ways of organising itself, that it did so in line with the aims of the state. In this way the population becomes the object of the state, and as it does so we witness the rise of disciplinary power. Where once education of the masses - of the working classes, was an informal, ill coordinated, if not uncoordinated affair, gradually the state through the mechanisms of normalisation, hierarchical judgement and the examination, constructs the formality and ‘rigour’ with which we are familiar today. It is in this period the school becomes the organiser of time, space, appearance, and conduct, when norms are set to be ruled over by observations and examinations.

It is in this period that education becomes the vehicle for creating citizens, instilling an allegiance to the state, inculcating an accepted worldview which produces subjects capable of producing the ends of government. By the 1880s, subscription to state education has become compulsory, and thus the questions raised at the end of the last chapter become further distilled. Whilst the idealised educational aim of developing emancipated, rational and autonomous subjects endures, schools, in their actuality, appear as principal sites for the production of order and obedience. This is now a compulsory system, and subjects are obligated by law to subject themselves to this order. Whilst the curriculum focussed on the three Rs, educational achievement is a by-product or at best co-terminus with the production of dutiful citizens. As a consequence there is therefore a dual role in teaching and for the teacher – to impart knowledge authorised by the state, and to teach correct behaviour which

produces allegiance to the state. This is sustained through to the present day. The House of Commons Education Committee report, *Behaviour and Discipline in Schools* (2011) is a response to proposals put forward in an earlier White Paper which “focused on Government policies to improve behaviour and discipline in schools”. The scope of the paper is wide ranging and includes: proposals about improving teacher training in techniques for managing behaviour, the use of psychologists, allowing pupils to be detained without prior notice; guidance on restraining pupils, the inspection of behaviour by Ofsted; and the implementation of ‘specialist and therapeutic services’. The overall approach is justified on the grounds that ‘good behaviour’ is required in order to support educational attainment. Whilst this assertion is difficult to contest, my analysis suggests that ‘good behaviour’ has been, and remains, a primary aim of state education in its own right.

In the following chapter, I move forward to contemporary education, to examine the way in which the present day education seeks to harnesses ‘good behaviour’ in constituting of the aspirational subject to fully produce the ends of government.

EARLY 19TH CENTURY EDUCATION



Figure 8.7 | Pieters, Evert, (19th century), *The Reading Lesson*, Private Collection, Bridgeman Art Library (image number: BAL37078)



Figure 8.8 | Cotman, Frederick George, (19th century), *The Dame School*, Ipswich Borough Council Museums and Galleries, oil on canvas, Bridgeman Art Library (Image number: IPS72937)

MID 19TH CENTURY EDUCATION



Figure 8.9 | Bromley, William, (19th century), *A Village School*, Private Collection, Bridgeman Art Library (Image number PFA52578)



Figure 8.10 | Blaikley, Alexander, (19th century), *The First Ragged School*, Westminster, Birmingham Museums and Art Gallery, oil on canvas, Bridgeman Art Library (image number: BIR185845)

LATE 19TH CENTURY/ EARLY 20TH CENTURY STATE EDUCATION




Figure 8.11 | Photographer Unknown, *Children in the schoolyard*, (Late 19th/ early 20th century), Private Collection, Bridgeman Art Library (image number: LLJ587041)



Figure 8.12 | Photographer Unknown, *Male pupils sitting behind their desks during a lesson at school*, Private Collection, Bridgeman Art Library (Image number: LLJ587045)

CHAPTER 9



Constituting the Individualised, Aspirational Subject



Figure 9.1 | University of Sheffield, (2012), *Dream Bigger Dreams*,
<http://www.shef.ac.uk/aboutthehomepage/examples>

9.1 INTRODUCTION

In the last two chapters I set out how state education stumbled into existence. As it emerged its growing acceptance within parliament, amongst the population and by the Church, facilitated successive governments to expand its instruments and institutions to become the state infrastructure we have today. Nonetheless it would be wrong to suggest these interventions were part of planned, successive development. The growth of state education was not part of a master plan. Rather it expanded with twists and turns in a staccato rhythm, with major changes often being prompted by political decay, moments of crisis and fundamental societal changes. In other words major developments have often occurred at times when adjustments are made to the constitution of the subject which have been required for the continued legitimacy of the state. A number of examples of this are evident after the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867.

Firstly, following World War 1, the Representation of the People Act 1918 enfranchised all men over the age of 21 and many, but not all women. At the same time the Education Act 1918 raised the school leaving age from 12 to 14, and developed policy around physical well-being and medical inspection of pupils. It can be seen that at this time the health of subjects as a necessary condition for the production of a population capable of defending the country and serving the economy, begins to emerge as a principal concern of the state.

Secondly, following a period of instability after the war the Hadow Report was issued shortly after the General Strike of 1926. Concerned that the newly established and growing National Union of Teachers represented a social danger, Parliament acted to change the basis of curriculum control from prescription to suggestion (Ozga, 2000), which was designed to:

... win the teachers away from dangerous alliances with the working class by trying to remove their sense of occupational grievance, by taking more seriously their claim to be professionals and crucially by establishing a principle of school and teacher autonomy in respect of curriculum... (Grace, 1985, p. 11)

As a consequence these measures were seen as necessary for steering the allegiance of the educational infrastructure away from the trade union movement back towards the aims of the state.

Finally the Education Act of 1944, sought to set the requirements for a post World War II system, further increasing the school leaving age and creating the tripartite system.

All of these interventions, and more, continued to shape the development education along disciplinary lines forming an evolving education system which functioned to constitute the subject as an orderly, dutiful subject.

Whilst the overarching objectives did not change, a break in the primary modality of power began to develop with the arrival of Margaret Thatcher in Downing Street in 1979. The aim of this chapter is to explore this break and to understand how a shift in emphasis from a modality

of operation which privileged disciplinary power to one which emphasises the technology of the self occurred.

As I set out in previous chapters these modes of power are not abstract concepts devised in isolation from actuality. Instead they exist through production. Just as language “produces that which it names” (Butler, 1993), so power exists in production – through the “humble modalities and minor procedures” (Foucault, 1977) that in their sum produce power. The school, and the education system more generally, is a principal site for the application of these modalities and procedures on the population. It is therefore a primary site for the production of power.


This chapter aims to explore the production of power in the present-day education system. I argue that in contemporary times this is characterised by the promotion of an aspirational ideal which is closely linked to the implementation of policy designed to develop power in line with what Foucault terms, the technology of the self.

This chapter charts the rise of ‘aspiration’ as a rhetorical device designed to ‘appeal to the highest ideals of liberal society’. As such aspiration is an open textured aim that conjures up notions of free will and which is therefore easy to subscribe to and difficult to contest. Nonetheless the chapter aims to do just that, creating critical openings in both policy intent and educational practice as it occurs in its actuality. To achieve this the chapter looks at the rhetoric of aspiration before identifying the relationship between aspiration and the wider neo-liberal governmentality. Through this I seek to develop an understanding which reveals that ‘raising aspiration’ contains normative hierarchies which aim not at the agentive self-realisation of the rationalised, autonomous subject, but rather seek to individualise subjects to both maintain the control and authority of government and fulfil its arbitrary aims of producing a marketised, globalised, and patriotic nation state.

9.2 POLITICS OF ASPIRATION

The introduction of the rhetoric of aspiration into politics came in 1967 when Nye Bevan first used the expression ‘poverty of aspiration’ (Brown, 2006). Hansard’s first record of the term “poverty of aspiration” is from 1974, the next not until 1990 when Tony Blair, then in opposition, said “It is not the poverty of aspiration among the British people that we need fear, but the poverty of aspiration of the Government” (Blair, 1990). However it is only in the past decade that we have seen its rise to prominence with ‘poverty of aspiration’ being replaced by ‘raising aspiration’ as the term most preferred by politicians. The term “raising aspiration” was recorded in Hansard less than 10 times between 1803 and 1989, but there were then twelve entries during the 1990s and then from 2000-2005 this rose to 118 entries. Characteristic of this new found love of ‘aspiration’ is a speech, by the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (2007), at the University of Greenwich, where he included the word no less than 30 times.

Such is the prevalence of the term in the political lexicon of the time that it then came to be used in the development and publication of a wide range of policy initiatives.



Whilst the term rose to prominence under New Labour it is something which has transcended political boundaries. Michael Gove on introducing a new school White Paper to parliament said that the UK needs to become an “aspiration nation”¹, whilst more recently when speaking on education reform he proclaimed that “It is time to raise aspirations and restore rigour to our examinations”². With the Conservatives now firmly appropriating the term for themselves, Prime Minister, David Cameron, claimed at the Conservative Party Conference 2012, that theirs was the party to deliver an aspiration nation once more:

That’s why the mission for this government is to build an aspiration nation ... to unleash and unlock the promise in all our people...

Let us here in this hall, here in this government, together in this country make this pledge – let’s build an aspiration nation ...let’s get Britain on the rise.

Deficit, paid down. Tough decisions, taken. Growth, fired up. Aspiration, backed all the way (Cameron, 2012)

This was a speech which slid seamlessly from notions of a “global race” with “global battles to win jobs, orders and contracts”, through to arguments for “disciplined, rigorous education for our children” which would enable ‘us’ to build an “aspiration nation” capable of creating a “strong economy” and a “big society”. This was a speech which sought to justify an ‘obvious’ need for an ‘obvious’ kind of nation state, one which requires a particular constitution of the subject to see its aims realised.

9.3 ASPIRATION AND NEO-LIBERALISM

To recognise how this rhetoric of aspiration has become prevalent in political discourse, and to more fully understand its aims as they are manifest in actuality, I want to explore its relationship to a wider governmentality - neo-liberalism - which has developed in Britain since the 1970s.

With its emphasis on deregulation, free markets, and privatisation neo-liberalism is a political philosophy which was first fully introduced to the UK by Margaret Thatcher but which has since been taken forward by both Labour and the current (2013) coalition government. Neo-liberal governmentalities originate from theories developed in the 1930s at the Chicago School of Human Capital in America. Olssen (2004), describes the concept as extending:

...the market across into the social arena and political arenas, thus collapsing the distinction between the economic, social and political in what constitutes a marketization

¹ <http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/teachingandlearning/schoolswhitepaper/a0068680/oral-statement>

² Michael Gove: Examination Reform Speech Rt Hon Michael Gove, Monday, September 17 2012
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2012/09/Michael_Gove_Exam_Reform_Speech.aspx

of the state. No longer is the state independent of and outside the market, but itself now subject to market laws. In doing this, the US neo-liberals extend economic criteria into spheres which are not economic ... In this model, the social and political spheres become redefined as economic domains. The government and the public sector will be economized to reflect market principles and mechanisms. Thus, the economic covers all of society and society is theorized as a form of the economic. The task of government is to construct and universalize competition to achieve efficiency and invent market systems. p 198

When Thatcher came to power she wasted no time in seeking to implement this neo-liberal political philosophy. The Winter of Discontent of 1978-1979 had led to widespread public sector strikes which caused a significant instability to both the economy and wider society. This destabilisation amounted to a delegitimisation of government – it was a significant episode of political decay which resulted in Labour losing power. When Thatcher returned the Conservatives to government she moved quickly to bring the political decay to an end.

Identifying the public sector, the trade union movement and employment law as major issues to be addressed, Thatcher privatised state run industries with a policy which has transcended the political divide and continues to this day. Over the past thirty years industries including gas, electric, airways, telephony, the railways, coal and many more have been sold off to the private sector, whilst the public sector has become increasingly outsourced. During Thatcher's reign the policy was coupled with a significant change in employment laws which reduced the rights of employees and increased the power of company owners and shareholders. Through this process and in particular through the mining strike of the 1980s, the Conservatives sought to marginalise the unions. Ten major acts of parliament were introduced during this time which sought to discredit the union movement and anything which seemed to prevent the effective freedom of the market. When Thatcher left government in 1990 it brought just over a decade of power to a close in which there was a barrage of "legislation on freedom of association, collective bargaining and trade unions in general ... [all of which was] justified by policy-makers ... as advancing, not only market goals such as efficiency and competitiveness, but also the high-minded ideals of freedom, democracy and individual rights. (Fredman, 1992). It is this pursuing and promotion of the individual which directly links this neo liberal agenda to the rhetoric of aspiration. Both arise from the need to mitigate the risk of political decay.

The trade union movement and other forms of collective protest which had brought political decay in the nineteenth century and led to the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867, had in the 1970s once again generated levels of political decay which had delegitimised government. On coming to power Thatcher set out to ensure that this level of collectivism which threatened the legitimacy of government would be crushed. Alongside the notorious policies of privatisation and union busting, more diffuse interventions have functioned as a general attempt to create the individualised subject, whereby government has sought to transfer responsibility for personal welfare from all collective forms of representation to the subject herself. This not only includes an attempt to discredit collective organisations such as the trade

union movement, but also to seek to actively deconstruct and transfer responsibilities from the state to the individual for everything from housing, health, wealth well-being, and educational achievement.

9.4 THE CREATION OF THE AUTONOMOUS, ASPIRATIONAL SUBJECT

Within education the state has sought to achieve this through the creation of an education market in which the individual is required to make rational choices and therefore take full responsibility for the achievement of their own outcomes. I wish to argue that raising aspiration is the next step in the development of this neo-liberal education agenda.

Critics of the choice agenda such as Stephen Ball, Geoff Whitty and Michael Apple not only note that the ability to express choice is unequal, favouring those who ‘understand the game’, but also that any choice only exists within the system: that is to say that all schools and colleges are subject to the constraints of government and the way in which it uses policy levers such as the National Curriculum, Ofsted and funding regimes to create a system in which the opportunity for real choice is extremely limited. And so as Ball (1993) states, “The market is thus heavily constrained and singularly constructed by Government”, a construction which includes creating the illusion of choice. As Apple (1993) argues the effect of this illusion is that “the very idea of education being part of a public political sphere in which its means and ends are publicly debated atrophies”.

Thus whilst government has attempted to responsibilise the individual through choice, the arguments put forward by Apple, Whitty, Ball and others, successfully contend that choice is nonetheless limited to the market created by the state. Rather than acknowledging the fundamental flaw in policy, government has continued with the marketisation agenda, but has in more recent times supplemented this with the rhetoric of aspiration. Analysis of entries in Hansard provides evidence of this shift in the political lexicon from notions of choice in education, to raising aspiration.

Frequency of Political Terms in Hansard		
	choice+education	raising+aspiration
1960s	23	0
1970s	72	1
1980s	78	3
1990s	181	12
2000-2005*	24	118

* Entries not searchable after 2005

In this way, the term ‘aspiration’ might be seen as a continuation of the neo-liberal “verbal magic” (Kahn-Freund, 1972) through which the state seeks to rid itself of its role as guarantor and provider of successful outcomes in health, well-being, incomes, housing, and education, and instead places ever greater responsibility for this (and more) with the individual. Rather than being both the organiser of the game and guarantor of the results, the state now removes itself by one small but very significant step. In the neo-liberal world, the state continues to control the rules and limits of the game but now it demands that individuals aspire to achieve their own results. Success or failure is no longer a matter for the state – it is now the responsibility of the individual. In the neo-liberal world view once the market is in place, it’s over to you, the individual, to raise your aspirations – your aspiration, or lack of it, is the only thing holding you back. In the neo-liberal world you need only raise your aspirations to improve your education, health, income, and happiness. Aspiration is the next step on from market and choice.

The latest trick in the neo-liberal box of “verbal magic”, the rhetoric of aspiration is designed to conjure the illusion of free will and empowerment. But this is aspiration of a very certain kind - aspiration from within the system where “responsibilised individuals are called upon to apply *certain* management, economic, and actuarial techniques to themselves as subjects...” (Peters, 2001) emphasis added. Thus the policy of aspiration does not attempt to create radically different ends - the objective of the state remains broadly the same - the individual is required to become a dutiful, orderly, and productive citizen. But instead the state seeks to change the means by which this is effected. In broad terms this means a shift from the state to the individual herself. The state, in seeking to remove itself from the holding responsibility for the subject, obligates the subject to responsibilise herself. In so doing new norms and divisions emerge. Now individuals are constituted as ‘intelligent’ ‘feckless’³ ‘ambitious’⁴ part of the ‘underclass’⁵, or ‘aspirational’⁶.

9.5 FREEDOM TO ASPIRE IN VERY CERTAIN WAYS

It must be underlined; this is aspiration of a very certain kind – the aspirations not of rational, autonomous subjects, but the aspirations of government. I wish to draw on two studies to help me make this point clear. Firstly, a study by Paul Willis from 1977, and then a more recent study by Bright (2011).

Paul Willis examined how class is culturally reproduced in a study located in Birmingham in the 1970s. Abbott, Wallace, & Tyler (2005), provide a useful summary of this work. Paul Willis asked:

³ Estelle Morris, quoted in the Guardian Newspaper 21st May 2002.

⁴ Confederation of British Industry campaign: <http://www.cbi.org.uk/campaigns/education-campaign-ambition-for-all/>

⁵ Jain Duncan Smith quoted by the BBC News: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14488486>

⁶ Speech at the University of Greenwich by Gordon Brown, 31st October 2007 (Brown G. , 2007)

... not just why working-class boys finish up in working class jobs, but why they see them as desirable jobs to take on. In other words, he argued that working class boys were not forced into unskilled manual work but positively opted for it – seeing it as ‘real men’s work’. His study focussed mainly on a group of twelve ‘lads’ in a school in Birmingham who constituted a small ‘subculture’. It was evident that the lads experience school not as a process of enlightenment but as a source of oppression. They reacted against teachers’ authority by escaping from supervision and doing the things they valued most: smoking, drinking, swearing and wearing their own variation of the school uniform. While the teachers saw these lads as trouble-makers, the lads themselves were effectively driven by their experiences in the school to embrace male working class culture. The lads were proud of their actions and saw those who conformed to school as passive and absurd ‘ear oles’. The lads looked forward to starting work, their subcultural values and expectations reflecting those of the factory subculture. (Abbott, Wallace, & Tyler, 2005)

The picture portrayed by Willis in Birmingham in 1977, was repainted in a more recent study by Bright (2011). This time the setting was a coal mining village in Derbyshire, but the same story is played out. What both Willis and Bright show is that far from having a poverty of aspiration, the ‘feckless underclass’ simply hold different aspirations to those which the ministers of the day think they should have. The young people in both studies actively aspire, but not to aims dictated from Westminster. Thus the notion that these young people should raise their aspirations is in reality a call from government for them to align their aspirations to those of the state. Far from the political rhetoric of aspiration holding notions of free will and empowerment, it is in this way, clearly normative, “dictating opinions and principles to the people...” (Brougham and Vaux, 1834 [1836]).

The policy and rhetoric of aspiration is in this way a clear example of the technology of the self in action. Subjects created in this way “produce the ends of government by fulfilling themselves rather than being merely obedient” (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 89). Aspiration creates subjects which are “obliged to be free in specific ways” (Rose, 1989). Thus, the ultimate aim of this modality of power is to engender the subject to constitute herself, but in a way which has been designed by the state. The subject becomes an agent of the state.

But what if the subject does not align their aspirations to those of the state? In such cases the normative machinery of disciplinary, and at times, sovereign power, springs into action. If the unemployed subject does not attend retraining she loses benefit, if the school pupil does not attend school her parent is jailed, if the post 16 subject does not attend college, sixth form or some other form of training, she is tracked down until she is able to engage in suitable education, training or employment. This approach is now supported by a wealth of input from the education system: local authority response teams, special projects and contracts, college structures, funding, statistical monitoring and so on, all aimed at *Tackling the NEETs Problem*, (Institute of Education (2009). Within the rhetoric of aspiration the subject remains disciplined to conform. It appears that almost every council now has strategies and action plans in place

to 'raise aspirations' in this way. Near Sheffield, the Bolsover Raising Aspirations Partnership is one example of this where their stated aims⁷ are to:

- raise the aspirations of pre-16s
- reduce the number of young people not in employment, education or training
- reduce worklessness amongst working age residents

Bristol, Wakefield, Norfolk, City of London, Derbyshire, North Warwickshire, Plymouth, Leicester, Blackpool and Leeds – these are just a snapshot of councils that have published strategies and action plans for 'raising aspirations'.

9.6 THE CONTRAST BETWEEN 19TH AND 21ST CENTURY POWER

Raising aspiration might be seen as the next neo-liberal step on from markets and choice, but compared to the political position I set out in chapters 7 and 8, it marks a radical shift which serves to underline the constructed nature of the system.

In Sheffield, Hillsborough Barracks was built in 1848 to replace Hillfoot Barracks which was deemed no longer sufficient for the needs of the city. This was not a military development, in the sense that its purpose was not to protect England from foreign threat. This was a civil project: one designed to enforce civil rule. In 1839, when riots broke out in Sheffield following Chartist meetings calling for an extension to the franchise and universal education, the military were called from Hillfoot to quell the uprising. With tensions mounting Hillsborough Barracks was constructed to ensure Sheffield could continue to enforce rule over the population. (Taylor, Evans, & Fraser, 1996, p41). Sovereign power was used to control the population and ensure that restrictions on voting, property rights and access to education were maintained.

By the 21st century this has radically changed. Hillsborough Barracks, no longer required as a military installation has been converted into a shopping centre. And yet it is in this shopping centre, that we find the control over the population being enforced to this day. Extracts from a Guardian article (2002) reproduced overleaf show how the aims of that control have reversed. Now, instead of power being used to maintain exclusion, it is used to assert compliance to educational and behavioural management treatments.

⁷ http://www.lsp.bolsover.gov.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=55&Itemid=77, accessed 07/06/2013

theguardian

Estelle's army

Rebecca Smithers hears excuses for truancy on a patrol with the attendance police in Sheffield

Rebecca Smithers

The Guardian, Tuesday 21 May 2002 02.26 BST

This particular challenge - in the Barracks shopping centre in Hillsborough, to the north of Sheffield, last week - was one of dozens of interventions during the first of 10 daily truancy sweeps taking place this month in the city under the new national crackdown ordered by Estelle Morris. The truancy patrol in Sheffield has been hard at work since 9.30am, with members of the South Yorkshire Police in tandem with staff from the local education authority's attendance and inclusion service scouring the haunts where youngsters usually hang out in school hours.

The results of the estimated 400 regional sweeps - by 82 local education authorities - will be published by the Department for Education and Skills next month. On this day alone in Sheffield, the patrols picked up 22 youngsters, of whom 12 were secondary school pupils.

Truancy sweeps are conducted by all local education authorities, but this month's unprecedented push is a concerted effort by the education secretary. Sheffield recently received £2m - of which £1.5m will be used for behaviour management and truancy initiatives - from the £66m package announced in the Budget.

The message about the importance of parental responsibility is coming loud and clear from the DfES. Over Easter, Morris condemned "feckless" parents who failed to support their children's teachers. Last week, she endorsed the decision by magistrates in Banbury to jail Patricia Amos, a mother of five, for failing to stop her two youngest daughters from bunking off school.

9.7 REWRITING HISTORY

The globalising totalising force of the system is difficult to recognise. Obvious observations become obscured. Conditioned to our conditions we become constructed in specific ways, unable to recognise the very act which makes us into a certain kind of subject. As such our unconscious familiarity with the processes of enculturation, inculcation and indoctrination obfuscate the general effects of the operation. More specific examples of the procedures being deployed are required to understand the effects of the interventions.

David Cameron has described his “unashamed preference for a traditionalist view of the curriculum, ‘with children sitting in rows, learning the kings and queens of England, the great works of literature, proper mental arithmetic, algebra by the age of 11... That’s the best training of the mind and that’s how children will be able to compete” (*The Times* 6th March 2010). This emphasis on tradition has the effect of reinforcing the values of the past and the existing order and structure of society.

Whilst Cameron’s opinion may be seen as just a view, the way in which Michael Gove is seeking to develop the history curriculum has direct and profound effects on the constitution of the subject. Gove has told Parliament that history should be taught as a ‘proper subject’ – “children ought to celebrate the ‘distinguished role of these islands in the history of the world’ by learning about issues such as the Royal Navy’s role in ending the slave trade. Britain he added was a ‘beacon of liberty’ and its history ought to be taught ‘in a way in which we can all take pride’” (Michael Gove quoted in *The Times*, 5th December 2011)

Such a curriculum is designed to create patriotism; to instil in subjects an unquestioning allegiance to the state. To ensure that subjects are constituted to be dutiful subjects; to align their aspirations to a very specific worldview. An example such as this pierces through the blanket which obscures our view of present reality to reveal a glimpse of an unseen panorama. The green pastures and fertile valleys of emancipatory education are replaced by the dark, imposing, barren landscape of state indoctrination where only official ideas are allowed to grow. Reinforced by state investment in patriotic endeavours such as the Olympics, just as it is difficult to confront the ideal of aspiration, so it becomes hard to oppose the idea of being patriotic. Being patriotic becomes part of the accepted worldview and education the primary tool for ensuring subscription to it. This is of course not about creating a nation of flag wavers. It is about ensuring that subjects are aligned to produce the ends of government by fulfilling themselves. In so doing it seeks to cut off political decay. Whilst it cannot guarantee allegiance to particular governments, it does aim to create loyalty to the state. In a compulsory system where those who seek to subvert the system are aggressively pursued and treated through correctional and behavioural management programmes, such a curriculum represents an uncompromising state ideology.




Figure 1.1 | Goodall, John Strickland, (20th Century) *The History Lesson* , Private Collection, Watercolour on paper, Bridgeman Art Library (Image number: STC413077)

The 1834 *Report from the Select Committee on the State of Education* came just one year after the first government expenditure on education was made. As part of the report's evidence, the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Brougham and Vaux, when asked if he had any further objections to a national system of education, said this:

There is one which would make me pause before I consented to it; suppose the funds were easily to be had, and no diminution to be apprehended from the interference of the Government, I not well perceive how such a system can be established without placing in the hands of the Government, that is of the Ministers of the day, the means of dictating opinions and principles to the people... (Brougham and Vaux, 1834 [1836])

9.8 CONCLUSION

In the previous two chapters I set out how education stumbled into existence to maintain the legitimacy of government, and as a vehicle for creating citizens with an allegiance to the state. In this chapter I have outlined the how rise of 'aspiration' is part of a neo-liberal worldview, which aims to responsibilise individuals to produce the ends of government by fulfilling themselves. Such rhetoric aims to develop a specific form of power: the technology of the self, which operates as techniques which "*permit* individuals to effect, by their own means, a *certain* number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, ... so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a *certain* state of perfection, of happiness, of purity," (Foucault M. , 1980) emphasis added. However the chapter has demonstrated that the modality of power does not operate on its own. On the contrary in *permitting* the attainment of a *certain* state of being, government continues to employ sovereign power to enforce subscription and disciplinary power in order to normalise, observe and examine the subject, much as it did throughout the nineteenth century. In this way the policies of aspiration, maintain the illusion of aiming for the agentive self-realisation of the rationalised, autonomous subject, but instead seek to individualise subjects to both maintain the control and authority of government and fulfil the arbitrary aims of a patriotic nation state.

CHAPTER 10



Conclusion



Figure P1: Harrison, P. (1987), *Schoolchildren on their way to St Thomas First School, Sydney Road, Exeter.*

10

10.1 THE AIMS OF THE THESIS

At the very beginning of the thesis I posed the question:

Is education, not should it be, but is it, in its actuality, about trying to find the 'truth' about the human subject and the world she/he lives in – about allowing her/him to find her/himself, to discover or to interpret her/his own self? Or, is education about the formal construction of the individual, about making her/him into a certain kind of subject, about constituting her/him in a certain kind of way?

I asked: are the children in this photograph on the way to being emancipated, on their way to having their minds awakened, becoming rational, autonomous beings; or are they on their way to being constructed into very certain kinds of subjects?



Figure P1: Harrison, P. (1987), *Schoolchildren on their way to St Thomas First School, Sydney Road, Exeter*.

To answer these questions I developed a Foucauldian grid of analysis that allowed me to draw some insights and conclusions from the history of education presented in Chapters 3 – 9. As a whole, the history I sought to develop was a spatial history of education and the constitution of the subject, but nonetheless it is not a history without chronology. Before showing the relevance of the grid of analysis to the thesis, I will briefly summarise what this thesis has

revealed about of how education has played a role in the constitution of the subject in different historical periods and how this continues to have an effect on the assumptions we make about present day education.

The history began with a recognition that meaningful records of schools in Britain begin with the arrival of Augustine in 597. Seeking to establish Christianity in Britain, Augustine constructed schools to train priests in Latin, the writing of the Bible and the teachings of the Christian fathers; and to train boys to sing in the choir. Thus the school had a narrow and purely vocational aim, creating the means for producing the transformation which occurred between the 6th century and the later Middle Ages, from a pagan to society to a Christian one.

This early Christian education sought not to allow to subject discover or to interpret her own self, but instead it functioned to formally construct the individual, making her into a Christian, God fearing subject. The influence of this constitution of the subject remains to this day and although religion is no longer the principal force in constituting the subject, the historical origin of schools, and the effect it had in building a Christian nation continues to significantly influence contemporary practices.

The Christian account of truth dominated unopposed for over a thousand years until the Enlightenment destabilised its orthodoxy. But even at the time, Kant and others raised the subjectivity involved in knowledge – our inability to divorce ourselves from anything that we claim to know. And so whilst there were attempts at constructing newly independent knowledge, in reality Christian mysticism gradually came to be replaced by empirical subjectivism.

In the space created by the Enlightenment opinions about education began to flourish: natural development, utilitarianism, and the development of the rational autonomous subject were all proposed as the natural and logical objectives of education. The range of views expressed gave rise to the contested aims of education in terms we are familiar with today. However there is a fundamental difference. Whilst today the arguments that are held are about the nature of the education system and the aims it should serve, in the eighteenth century the argument was first and foremost not about contested education, but about different ways of seeing man (sic). It was about different ways of knowing and recognising the subject.

Despite the proliferation of thought, the practical means for taking these differing perspectives forward was limited. Education fell outside the scope of the state and as a consequence the general enlightenment push for an expansion of education could only be achieved by the Church. Giving rise to the development and spread of the Sunday school for a brief period this constituted the subject in Christian terms anew, but this time not from the pulpit, but in the school room itself. Initially the subject was constituted in relation to truths established by the Church, but gradually, as the aims of schools evolved so too did the way the subject was framed. As science and society sought to create an ordered world and as the industrial revolution sought a disciplined workforce, so the constitution of the Sunday school subject

began to extend to encompass secular notions of the good citizen – a God fearing subject, who was also a well-disciplined, hard-working, dutiful individual who would fit into an ordered society.

The development of secular aims arrived as the state began to draw education within its purview at a time when the advent of statistics saw the reason of state begin to shift from one concerned with the dominant power of the sovereign to one which was aimed at the development of the population as a means for securing its strength. Roebuck, set out this shift in a speech to Parliament in 1833:

Within these few years a new element has arisen, which now ought to enter into all political calculations. The multitude—the hitherto inert and submissive multitude—are filled with a new spirit—their attention is intently directed towards the affairs of the State—they take an active part in their own social concerns, and however unwilling persons may be to contemplate the fact, any one who will calmly and carefully watch the signs of the times, will discover, and if he be really honest and wise, will at once allow, that the hitherto subject many are about to become paramount in the State.

Despite Roebuck's sentiments being widely accepted, denominational disputes hampered development, with state led education barely stuttering into existence over the next forty years. Whilst the path was rarely smooth, the overall direction of travel was consistent and with the Elementary Education Act in 1870, together with further acts in the period, the scope of state education became wide ranging.

It is then, during this period that there is a significant shift from a subject constituted by the Church as a God fearing Christian, to one which is constituted by the state as an orderly, dutiful, and responsible citizen. This is a shift from the population being subject of/to the Church to being subject of/to the state. It is in this period that education becomes the vehicle for creating citizens, instilling an allegiance to the state, inculcating an accepted worldview which produces subjects capable of producing the ends of government. By the 1880s, subscription to state education had become compulsory, and whilst the idealised educational aim of developing emancipated, rational and autonomous subjects endures, schools, in their actuality, appear as principal sites for the production of order and obedience. In a compulsory system, subjects are obligated by law to subject themselves to this order. Whilst the curriculum focussed on the three Rs, educational achievement was a by-product or at best co-terminus with the production of dutiful citizens. As a consequence there appears a dual role in teaching and for the teacher – to impart knowledge authorised by the state, and to teach correct behaviour which produces allegiance to the nation state. Initially obedience was demanded – part of the trace and memory of systems of hierarchy and authority. Today the overall approach becomes justified on the grounds that 'good behaviour' is required in order to support educational attainment. Whilst this assertion is difficult to contest, the analysis suggests that 'good behaviour' – the production of orderly and obedient citizens, has been, and remains, a primary aim of state education in its own right. More recently, whilst retaining

disciplinary control, policy which is characterised by the rhetoric of ‘aspiration’ has aimed to responsabilise individuals to produce the ends of government by fulfilling themselves as patriotic, orderly citizens.

10.2 GRID OF ANALYSIS

In Chapter 2, through a review of Foucault’s work I constructed a Grid of Analysis to support the thesis. The Grid of Analysis contained a number of ‘tools’ for creating perspective: relations; technologies of power – pastoral power, disciplinary power, technology of the self; division; and political decay.

10.2A RELATIONS

Through the Grid of Analysis I have analysed the way in which the subject has been constituted in the space of education, and how that constitutive process has shaped what we call and know to be the education system. I have been principally concerned with understanding how in the space we call education the “history of our thought, I mean of our relation to truth, to obligations, to ourselves and to the others, make[s] us what we are” (Foucault M. , 1983). As a tool I have used relations to develop an understanding of how particular governmentalities have created relations through the production of truths and the forming of obligations which have promoted particular thoughts, and caused people to act upon themselves in certain ways. Through the thesis I have shown how education, particularly in the compulsory era, ensures the population recognises authorised truths, thereby establishing obligations, thoughts and behaviours which constitute the subject in particular ways.

10.2B TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER

In understanding relations I have been concerned with recognising the technologies of power that successive forms of government (the church, sovereign state) have used in order to establish its truths, realise its aims and frame its subjects.

PASTORAL POWER

During the development of the early Christian constitution of the subject, and through into the renewing of that constitution by means of the Sunday school, the dominant form of power was pastoral. This form of power manifests itself through a powerful set of relations: relations to truth, which are clearly laid down in the Bible; relations to obligations, set out in formal and informal codes of conduct established by the Church; and relations to the self and to others as either a sinner or a good Christian. Initially this power was enacted through the church itself, but with the advent of the Sunday school in the late 18th century, the school becomes the site of its operation as Annie Hoile testified in 1842:

If I died a good girl I should go to heaven – If I were bad I should have to be burned in brimstone and fire: they told me that at school yesterday, I did not know it before (Hammond & Hammond, [1923] 2003, p. 73)

This form of power persists through pre-modern times, until such time as the Christian truths, set out in the Bible, in myth and superstition, in parables and prophecies, are replaced with the Enlightenment, by science.

DISCIPLINARY POWER

The extension of the franchise by the 1832 and 1867 Reform Acts was brought about by the problem of population which emerged at this time. It is at this point when the population becomes a principal concern of the state that the government starts to take the subject and her “life and life-conduct as in some sense the correlative object of its own suasive capacity” (Gordon, 1991, p. 5). As the population becomes the object of the state, so we see the rise of disciplinary power. Where once the education of the masses was an informal, ill coordinated, if not uncoordinated affair, gradually the state through the mechanisms of normalisation, hierarchical judgement and the examination, constructs the formality and ‘rigour’ with which we are familiar today. It is in this period the school becomes the organiser of time, space, appearance, and conduct, when norms are set to be ruled over by surveillance and observation. Whilst the Sunday school is still very much part of the fabric of the education system, gradually both its dominance and its use of pastoral power begins to be first mediated and over time increasingly replaced by the state and the use of disciplinary power.

TECHNOLOGY OF SELF

In the last chapter I described the creation of the responsibilised, individualised, aspirational subject, a subject closely linked to a specific form of power, the technology of the self. Arising out of postmodernism and neoliberalism, this new subject is commodified to aspire to “produce the ends of government by fulfilling themselves rather than being merely obedient” (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 89). The political rhetoric of aspiration creates subjects which are “obliged to be free in specific ways” (Rose, 1989). Thus, the ultimate aim of this modality of power is to engender the subject to constitute herself, but in a way which has been designed by the state. The subject becomes an agent of the state. Within the rhetoric of aspiration the subject remains disciplined to conform.

10.2C DIVISION

Across each period, characterised by broad modalities of power (pre-modern – pastoral/sovereign: modern – disciplinary: post-modern technology of the self), a constant mode of constituting the subject has remained - the process of division. In order for someone to be constituted as a subject, “he or she must first be divided from the totality of the world, or the totality of the social body” (Gutman, 1988). In each of these periods for the subject to be rendered visible, a distinction has been made between subjects: *subject a* has been made distinct from *subject b*.

It is then through the constitution of the subject that the boundary lines are drawn which divide the subject from the not subject. It is these lines which have divided the good Christian from the pagan, the sinner from the redeemed, the obedient citizen from the vagrant, the feckless from the ambitious, and the underclass from the aspirational. Once drawn, dividing lines have a function which is performative – division acts to “produce that which it names, to enact its own referent, to name and to do, to name and to make. ... produc[ing] that which it declares” (Butler, 1993) (Youdell, 2006). Division produces norms which modifies behaviour and creates a self-knowledge. Under pastoral power subjects are required to conform to norms or risk eternal damnation, under disciplinary power subjects are observed and monitored, policed and surveilled to conform to the norm, whilst through the technology of the self, the subject is required to produce the norm by fulfilling themselves.

10.2D POLITICAL DECAY

Throughout the thesis I have aimed at generating a genealogy of the constitution of the subject – that is to say I have attempted to understand the process of change from one set of conditions to another. To support this I explored the extent to which change has been the product of progressive development or as Huntington suggests, the result of political decay. Whilst further research would undoubtedly aide this understanding, there is clear evidence to support the application of Huntington’s concept to education and the constitution of the subject. This is perhaps most evident in the threat of revolution leading to the passing of the Reform Act 1832 and the first state expenditure on education a year later. Similarly the threat of revolution led to the 1867 Reform Act and passing of the Elementary Education Acts in the years that followed. Each time there was a shift in the constitution of the subject. Whilst not wishing to propose an atemporal, structural, theory about the way in which the constitution comes to be transformed, the evidence does promote the importance of resistance in facilitating change.

10.3 CONCLUSIONS, QUESTIONS, INSIGHTS, AND NEW WAYS OF LOOKING

10.3.1

The overriding belief that education is emancipatory would seem to arise with the optimism of the Enlightenment, but in reality my thesis demonstrates that far from releasing the subject from the constitutive power of the Church, education became first a tool for seeking to reinforce the authority of the Church (through the Sunday school), and then a primary means for inculcating state ideology.

10.3.2

The belief that education is in some way emancipatory has led to a British/Western philosophy of education which promotes the aim of education as seeking to develop the rational, autonomous subject. But from within a state system which constitutes the subject and actively uses education as a primary tool for inscribing this constitution, this aim might appear somewhat naïve, or perhaps at best utopian. However, this ideal is maintained, and whilst it argues that this is what education should be, not what it is, it does nonetheless prolong and promulgate the notion that education is emancipatory and that the school is a site for developing rational autonomy. In this way the philosophy of education adds to the instruments, and discourse of the education system: educational research, teacher education, headteachers, benchmarks, standards, qualifications, rigour, Ofsted, the university, and Professors; all of which act to justify the existing educational paradigm.

10.3.3

If we accept that it is “the perceived legitimacy of government that binds populations together and makes them willing to accept its authority” (Fukuyama, 2011) (Huntington, 1968 [2006]), then it is also the perceived legitimacy of the education system which makes us willing to accept its structures and operations. But when the way in which it divides and names, establishes relations and distributes symbolic capital according to aims derived through arbitrary powers, on what grounds can it claim to be legitimate? When the answer to the question points to is the education system itself: educational research, teacher education, headteachers, benchmarks, standards, rigour, Ofsted, the university, Professors; we arrive at a Kuhnian (1962) circularity.

And whilst there is undoubtedly educational research which seeks to destabilise the perceived legitimacy of the system, for the most part it does so with a small d. That is to say that for the most part it seeks to destabilise elements of the system from within the system. This kind of challenge to the system merely strengthens the legitimacy of the system by creating the illusion that it is subject to challenge. As a consequence the overarching framework, the overarching system which places “in the hands of the Government, that is of the Ministers of the day, the means of dictating opinions and principles to the people”, remains intact.

10.3.4

The corollary of this is that educational debate then becomes centred not on the purpose, aims and objectives of education, but rather on the techniques required for operating the system. If the aims and objectives of education are taken as a given, then there is nothing more to do than ensure the effective and efficient delivery of these objectives. The focus becomes “optimal performance: maximizing output and minimizing input” (Lyotard, 1979 [1984], p. 44), resulting in an “intensification of central target-setting and performance measurement” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 317). In a system with intense performance measurement, “the question (overt or implied) now asked by the professionalist student, the

State, or institutions of ... education is no longer 'Is it true?' but 'What use is it?' (Lyotard, 1979 [1984], p. 51). The utilitarianism which results, manifests as a purpose which is not to guide "the nation toward emancipation, but to supply the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions." (Lyotard, 1979 [1984], p. 48)

As Marshall states:

Education is no longer to be concerned with the pursuit of ideals such as that of personal autonomy or emancipation, but with the means, techniques or skills that contribute to the efficient operation of the state in the world market and contribute to maintaining the internal cohesion and legitimation of the state. But this requires individuals of a certain kind – not Kantian autonomous persons but Foucault's normalized and governable individuals. (Marshall, 1999, p. 309)

10.3.5

The construction of normalised, governable individuals can be understood as part of a process of nation building. In Chapter 3 I showed how education was successfully used to construct a Christian nation, whilst in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 I have shown how state education emerged and evolved to develop the orderly, dutiful citizen, to a point whereby in contemporary times (Chapter 9) education is a primary tool for developing the patriotic, aspiration nation. Education is in this way a means for controlling the population and averting political decay. It creates allegiance to the state and its objectives. In this way, the political priority given to education – to ring-fence educational budgets, is not about protecting the rational autonomy of subjects, but about protecting the means for controlling the population. The system does not create autonomy, it creates automatons.

10.3.6

If education is not what we thought it was – if it is not about developing the awakened mind of the autonomous subject – if it is about controlling the subject, normalising her behaviour, creating allegiance to the state and its aims, then neither is the role of the teacher what we thought it was. Suddenly the role of the teacher is not to illuminate, liberate and enlighten, but to regulate, order and control. The role of the teacher is to inveigle the subject to fulfil herself by fulfilling the aims of the state.

But the teacher, being a product of the system herself, is unaware of the role she is fulfilling, because discussion and debate about the role of the teacher focusses not on what she does, but on how it can be done more efficiently. Thus educational practitioners are no longer

encouraged to debate and consider why they teach what they teach, but are instead increasingly required to focus on applying behaviourist theories of teaching and scientific approaches to educational management and administration (Carr, 2005, p. 42). Thus in the real world, critical pedagogy of the kind championed by Freire (1970 [2000]), Giroux (2011) and Biesta (2007) is marginalised.

Moreover, this mismatch between what education is commonly understood to be, and what teachers and the education system actually do, is correlated to the mismatch between the philosophy of education (which retains its Enlightenment ideals) and education in reality. Thus somewhat paradoxically, rather than challenging flaws in the construction of education, the historical understanding of education which derives from the Enlightenment ideals of developing rational, autonomous subjects is promulgated by the philosophy of education, sustaining a belief in the system that prevents it from any sense of fundamental challenge.

10.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In the introduction to the thesis I outlined the following research questions.

Firstly I asked: In what way is the subject constituted?

In asking this question I was interested in analysing the ends to which the subject is constituted. I wanted to identify the multiple intentions and aims of various sources of power such as the Church, sovereign, the state and subjects themselves, and alongside this to recognise how the subject is constituted in actuality. I wanted to identify if the subject is constituted for specific ends or if education supports her to interpret her own self.

Through the thesis I have identified a number of ways in which the subject has been and still is constituted. In Chapter 3 I identified how the subject was constituted through Christianity as a God-fearing subject. Through Chapter 4 I demonstrated how the Enlightenment deconstructed this constitution, allowing for (in Chapter 5) the identification of latent philosophical aims which sought to frame the subject in a number of ways : Rousseau's natural development, the promotion of utilitarian aims from Smith and Bentham, and the emancipatory ideals of Paine, Wollstonecraft and Godwin. I showed in this chapter how these aims were necessarily of their time, and yet how they have had an influence on education from that period through to the present day. In Chapter 6 I showed how the Sunday school sought to sustain the constitution of a Christian subject, whilst Chapters 7 and 8 set out how the state began to constitute the subject as an orderly, obedient, and responsible subject. In the last chapter I outlined how the constitution of the aspirational subject is in reality a rhetorical device for the continued application of technologies of power aimed at the constitution of the dutiful, patriotic subject.

Secondly I asked: How is the subject constituted?

In answering this question I wanted to analyse the mode of operation by which the subject comes to be constituted. I wanted to develop an understanding of how the constitution of the subject becomes effected and the role of education in this.

Through the thesis I used Foucault's concept of technologies of power to analyse this effect. I showed that whilst each constitution of the subject is effected in ways which are unique and specific to it, these are linked to the broad epistemological and cultural understanding of the time, and that each of these draws on specific technologies of power. I also showed that whilst one technology of power dominates, in actuality, multiple forms of power can be seen to operate at the same time. Thus, the Christian subject was constituted primarily through pastoral power, the orderly citizen principally through disciplinary power, and the aspirational subject is constructed with a significant appeal to the technology of the self. However the contemporary educational subject is also constituted by means of residual pastoral power, sovereign power (the rule of law makes attendance compulsory) and disciplinary power through the use of normalising judgements, hierarchical observation and the examination.

Thirdly I asked: What is the relationship between education and the constitution of the subject?

In answering this question I sought to understand the extent to which education is framed by a prior constitution of the subject, or whether the constitution of the subject arises directly out of education.

In the thesis I set out how the subject is constituted first and foremost by intent – the intent of Gregory the Great to create Christian Britain; the intent of Robert Raikes, creating the Sunday school to save the “wretchedly ragged” from their “miserable state and deplorable profligacy”; the intent of the state to reconstitute the subject “so framing the mind of the individual, that he may become a useful and virtuous member of society... making him a good child, a good parent, a good neighbour, a good citizen, ...” (Roebuck, 1833); the intent of the present day government to frame the subject as part of a patriotic, aspiration nation (Cameron, 2012).

In all these cases there is clear intent. However the subject only comes to be framed in this way when the subject is constituted by the production of these aims. As stated intent, these aims are simply words. It is only when these aims are produced in actuality that the subject comes to be constituted. Throughout the thesis I have shown that education is a primary means for this production.

Fourth, I asked: How do fundamental changes to education and the constitution of the subject occur?

Through this question I sought to examine the extent to which changes to the constitution of the educational subject are the result of contingent turns in history and a process of political decay, or the result of progressive policy development.

At a certain level it is possible to see changes to government policy being the direct result of political decay or attempts to prevent it: struggle for reform led to the Reform Act 1832 and investment in education in 1833; further struggles led to the Reform Act 1867 and the Elementary Education Act 1870; World War I led to the rising of the age of participation from 12 to 14; and the Hadow report of 1926 came after the General Strike that same year amid concerns that the strength of the teaching union and their increasing allegiance to the working class posed a threat to the legitimacy of the government. In all these examples and in others there were adjustments to the constitution of the subject following political decay or a potential threat to the validity and legitimacy of government. Each time the government made significant changes to the education system to align it to the adjusted constitution of the subject.

However, I have shown that more significant and fundamental breaks are delineated by changes in *episteme*. Firstly, in the pre-modern world when orthodox knowledge was drawn from and developed in line with the Bible, the subject was constituted along Christian lines. Secondly, with modernity the citizen was constituted as the dutiful and orderly subject. Thirdly in the postmodern era, the subject is individualised, constituted as an aspirational subject through the technology of the self. In all these periods the *episteme* and the constitution of the subject go hand-in-hand. In all these periods the education system was designed and constructed to create individuals according to the specific constitution of the subject of the time.

Moreover, whilst the aims change, adjust and mutate through political decay and changing *epistemes*, in all periods it is education which has remained a principal site for the process of subjection to the authorised aims of those in power: the church, sovereign and state.

10.5 FINAL CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, my thesis calls forth a number of tasks:

The first task is to recognise we are subjects - "subject to someone else by control and dependence" (Foucault M. , *The Subject and Power*, 1982, p. 781)

The second task is to recognise how we are subjected - that is, in what ways are we constituted. I have shown through this thesis the ways in which subjects have been constituted: as the Christian subject, God fearing, well disciplined, hard-working dutiful subject, the good citizen, feckless or ambitious, part of the underclass or aspirational. A greater recognition of the different ways we are divided and made subject is required.

The third task is to recognise how this subjection takes place. Through this thesis I used a Foucauldian grid of analysis to show how the process of division occurs, which based on relations to truth causes the establishment of relations to obligations, the self and others, and that this process of constitution is enforced with a number of technologies of power. The site for the application of these technologies of power is the education system. In recognising these technologies of power and the aims to which they are directed we are:

Fourth, obliged to reconsider what education is in its actuality. And in doing that reconsider the role of the teacher. Not to consider what we think the teacher should be – nurturer, carer, shepherd, liberator, illuminator, but what the teacher is in reality. Consider to what extent they are controllers, enforcers, behaviour managers, regulators.

The fifth task is to recognise that how we are constituted often changes not through an ordered sense of managed progress, but through the delegitimisation of the existing order. That is to say that without political decay, the tendential law is for the status quo to remain. Such a recognition would acknowledge that resistance is not something to be quashed, side-lined or marginalised, but fostered, encouraged, and celebrated. Such a recognition would support and promote critical and radical philosophy of education as the means for achieving change.

The sixth task is to recognise that even after political decay occurs, one form of power replaces another, one constitution of the subject supersedes another. In other words even after political decay occurs we are still made subject, and this subjection, has until now been applied by arbitrary forms of power. And therefore in promoting radical philosophy of education:

Seventh, we must kill education, proclaim it to be dead, because the education system is not and never has been ‘education’. Once we have killed it, once education is dead, and we begin to more clearly recognise the system as one of training, inculcation of state ideologies, indoctrination, the creation of docile subjects and automatons, then and only then can we begin to argue the case for *education*.

At this point we must be mindful that reasoning for a system to better *know* ourselves or to *know* ourselves differently will not be the task. Such a path is simply the road to subjection of another kind – another set of norms against which we will be observed and examined, ‘fulfilling’ ourselves by achieving another set of arbitrary aims. Instead the challenge is to construct the constitution of the subject, that is to say construct education, in such a way that it neither frames, nor limits, nor normalises, does not regulate, obligate or order, divide, judge or cause us to produce ourselves in certain ways – a way of being that instead allows for an education which does not constitute the subject. Whilst such an aim might appear futile since it requires a form of subjectivity that we cannot presently grasp, if we do not aim for it it is doubtful we will achieve it, and in the meantime, recognition of this aim will itself support a critical challenge to education and the way in which it acts to constitute us.

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